



Quick Look Report

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St Petersburg Train Bombing

Event Date: 03 April 2017

Report Date: 04 April 2017

1) Facts:

1. At approximately 1420 local time a blast occurred on a metro train car of St Petersburg's #2 line.
2. The blast happened in the interior of one of the passenger cars.
3. The event happened while the metro was traveling between Sennaya Ploshchad Station and Tekhnologicheskij Institut Station.
4. The metro did not stop but continued to Tekhnologicheskij Institut Station where an evacuation could be effected and it was accessible to first responders.
5. Reports so far are 11 people killed and as many as 50 injured.
6. Afterwards a second device was discovered and rendered safe by police at the Ploshad Vosstaniya Station prompting a shutdown of the entire metro system until it could be searched and cleared.
7. The second device was concealed within a briefcase or laptop bag and had a fragmentation effect utilizing ball bearings.

April 4, 2017

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8. St Petersburg metro is used by more than 2 million people daily.
9. Russian officials named Akbarzhon Jalilov, a 23 year old Kyrgyzstan native, as the primary suspect in the attack.
10. This is the first terrorist attack in St Petersburg in recent history.



2) Assumptions:

1. This attack was to coincide with President Putin's visit to St Petersburg on Monday.
2. It is being reported that this is not currently being considered a suicide attack but that the device was left on the train.
3. Russian officials estimate the explosive charge to be approximately 200g of TNT equivalent.
4. There are reports that "nuts and bolts" were added to the first device to enhance fragmentation.

April 4, 2017

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3) Assessment:

1. Below are images of the metro car's exterior. The first set of doors are nearly torn off but this appears to have added damage, probably from the movement of the train against the tunnel, indicated by the exterior scrapes and the direction of the damage being relative to the train's motion. A second set of doors can also be seen bowed outward but not to the extent of the first set. The window panel in between the two doors is missing while the window panels on either side are still intact. This indicates the blast center being somewhere between those two doors more than likely closer to the first set.



April 4, 2017

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- 2. Below are photos of the metro car's interior. There are indicators of additional fragmentation which is consistent with reports of "nuts and bolts" being added to the device. The blast seat can be surmised as being located slightly further back in the first picture than where the man in the orange vest is standing based on damage to the seating and interior. Russian officials estimate the explosive charge to be approximately 200g of TNT equivalent. This is not believed to be a suicide attack but rather the device was left on the train. The greater damage to the lower portions of the train indicate it was probably at or below seat height.**

April 4, 2017

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


3. Below are images of the second device at Ploshad Vosstaniya Station found by Police and rendered safe. It first appears concealed in a laptop or brief case. The second photo shows the main charge and

April 4, 2017


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added ball bearing fragmentation. The charge container is a fire extinguisher, close to or the same as the Pigeon Auto (1kg) fire extinguisher in the third picture. This is also consistent with the Russian officials' approximation of 1kg explosive weight. The curvature of the ball bearings indicates they were wrapped around the exterior of the container. No initiation system is shown in the photos. The hole on the top of the charge correlates to the hole in the top of the fire extinguisher where the nozzle would be attached. This is possibly the place where a booster or initiation system would have been inserted.



April 4, 2017

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April 4, 2017

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