ADDRESSING THE THREAT POSED BY IEDS: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL INITIATIVES
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This report seeks to respond to the threat posed by IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) by investigating the C-IED (Counter-IED) initiatives that are being conducted around the world. We specifically focus on three of the most-impacted regions: the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel. The paper also identifies Afghanistan, Kenya, Somalia and Pakistan as four additional countries that are highly impacted by IEDs and therefore warrant examination.

The research was conducted over ten months and examined 39 countries in total. 227 actors engaged in C-IED throughout the regions are included in the report, whilst over 300 were examined globally in total during the course of this research. This makes this report the largest study of C-IED actors in these regions.

Our research finds that C-IED initiatives vary greatly from country to country. Not only were the typical ‘destroy the device’, ‘train the force’ and ‘attack the network’ approaches found, but efforts that fall under the banner of counterterrorism, demining and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) featured as well. Such efforts have the ability to greatly reduce IED usage, as well as serving to disrupt the networks that use them, and consequently were essential to incorporate.

As part of this research, questionnaires were sent out to actors within the C-IED field. Phone interviews were also conducted in order to understand the role of the various actors in the field and the situation in the countries in which they operate. Through the responses received, key challenges to C-IED operations were identified. These include inadequate resources, lack of awareness, lack of victim assistance programmes, and a general resistance to information sharing.

The IED threat and C-IED work in these regions were examined country-by-country. The national, bilateral, regional, and international C-IED initiatives that the state was involved in, or that were seen to be operating in the state, were assessed, as well as the NGOs and private actors working on such operations in the countries.

The research conducted on C-IED capacity in the Middle East showed that, whilst many of the states had received training focused on military and law enforce-

ment, many were under-resourced. This effectively means that many states lack the equipment to adequately tackle their respective IED threat. For less-impacted states in the region, border security was understandably a top priority. Efforts to implement better border security often focused on a person-centric approach, which left customs vulnerable and allowed dual-use materials (such as fertiliser) to end up more easily in IEDs.

Similarly, North Africa’s C-IED efforts predominantly focused on military-based initiatives, whilst also leaving countries too under-resourced to carry out C-IED effectively. Unlike many other regions, there were some initiatives working on psychological victim assistance, an area of C-IED which often remains ignored. Other preventative measures such as terrorism financing and investigations were found to need more assistance in North Africa.

Countries in the Sahel region seem to be heavily reliant on external assistance from other nation states, international actors and NGOs. However, Sahelian states also, in general, seem to embrace support and utilise resources that other regions did not. For example, they were more welcoming of assistance from neighbour states and better at integrating C-IED strategies into communities than countries in the other regions examined.

The last group of nations examined included highly impacted states. Some of these nations have been impacted by IEDs for a long time, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. Cooperation is essential between these states to prevent the use of the weapons in both countries. Knowing this, Afghanistan has been a strong advocate for cooperative techniques to tackle IED harm, not just in relation to the national problem but also on the international stage. In Kenya and Somalia, as in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the IED threat is one that needs a trans-border cooperative effort as the threat chiefly stems from al-Shabaab cells in both states. However, it is clear that Kenya has far greater capacity to combat IEDs on their side of border. Kenya also provides assistance to Somalia through the African Union’s military mission in Somalia, AMISOM.
After examining the various countries and regions, this report explores some of the leading regional C-IED initiatives, including regional military efforts (such as the Multinational Joint Task Force) as well as data collection and information sharing efforts. Regional efforts also sought to build regional capacity through training and cooperation. This section draws upon some of the initiatives already partially explored within the nationally focused section.

Lastly, this report reflects on the C-IED progress made on the global stage. Emphasis is initially placed on UN initiatives due to the recent successes of these programmes. Other initiatives of importance are also reflected upon to reveal the steps taken to generate a more rounded approach, highlighting the success of some of these initiatives, as well as emphasising where challenges remain. Information sharing is identified as one such area.

In conclusion, there are still many challenges that need to be addressed in the battle to combat the rising tide of IEDs. These include the provision of resources and equipment, victim assistance and information sharing. The report, to support this need, highlights past successes that might give insight on how to best meet these challenges. The paper also draws on the expertise of influential C-IED actors, and notes that many see greater information sharing as an important leap to be taken, as has been acknowledged throughout the report. The conclusion also recognises passages of progress where C-IED initiatives are building on lessons learnt to reinvigorate C-IED efforts internationally.

15 worst impacted countries from IEDs across the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel

![Map of 15 worst impacted countries from IEDs across the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel](image)

Total number of IED casualties (civilian casualties) = 250 casualties
1.1 METHODOLOGY
AOAV has been monitoring explosive violence for over five years. AOAV’s Explosive Violence Monitor records from English-language news reports incidents of explosive violence that have resulted in the death or injury of at least one person. Since AOAV began its record in 2010, the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and the civilian harm they cause has become ever more apparent. AOAV’s Explosive Violence Monitor recorded 6,320 IED attacks, that resulted in deaths and injuries, across 75 countries between 2011 and 2015 according to English-language media reports – at least five additional countries have witnessed such IED attacks this year. These IED attacks resulted in at least 105,071 deaths and injuries, of which 82% (86,395) were civilians. The civilian impact of IEDs is particularly concerning. When an IED is used in an area where there is likely to be a high concentration of civilians, such as markets or residential areas, AOAV’s data shows that on average 91% of those killed and injured are civilians.

Whilst it remains the case that some countries are far more impacted than others, due to the IEDs lethality and their relatively simple manufacturing process, the use of these devices has spread around the globe. This has meant that no region has been left unaffected by IEDs, leading to calls for effective national, regional and global responses to the IED threat.

The analysis of IED threat in this report is therefore based on events that occurred and were recorded by the EWMP. The EWMP collects data on global explosive violence from English language sources. Sources are collected through an amalgamation of alerts set up for certain words pertaining to explosive violence being used in news stories. Examples of such words include ‘explosion’, ‘rocket’, and ‘IED’. Only attacks that have produced casualties (killed and/or injured) are taken into account. Incidents are classified according to the launch method used. For the purposes of this report, the part of the EWMP classified as ‘Launch method: IED’ is therefore the one that has been analysed. This launch method may have different activation methods, which means that suicide bombings and car bombs (among others) are included in the report as long as the device used was an IED. The EWMP also records the location, time, target and perpetrator (if known) of IED attacks.
The responses that have been developed to mitigate the harm caused by IEDs are diverse; a diversity that is essential given the multi-faceted nature of the problem. The various efforts that seek to mitigate IED harm are often collated under the broad heading of counter-IED (C-IED). There are many actors that seek to mitigate IED harm, from governments, military, police, customs and other law enforcement to NGOs, private companies and other civil society actors. Whilst military and law enforcement tend to tackle the immediate IED threat through “defeating the device” and “training the force”, other civilian efforts look to prevent IED use and mitigate the impacts after their use. Defeat the device includes taking measures to mitigate, detect and neutralise IEDs, whilst the training the force approach sees forces provided with C-IED understanding and effective organisation to provide C-IED capability. All of these may be considered C-IED efforts as they reduce the harm of IEDs and can contribute to decreasing their attractiveness to their users.

It should be noted that C-IED involvement may be a politically sensitive issue for some NGOs and international actors who must remain neutral. Often work that may assist in combating IEDs, is considered under another name to make it clear that their work comes under efforts that are seen as less controversial, such as EOD and mine action.

To combat IEDs, unlike other explosive hazards, it is vital to consider the “dynamic dimension of the threat, including perpetrators and also its root causes”. C-IED must go beyond the necessary task of detecting and destroying IEDs and seek, as well, to target the root of IED harm, examining why and how IEDs are used and responding to the answers. In short, to comprehensively combat IEDs, there must also be preventative strategies in place.

Military efforts also recognise an ‘attack the network’ approach. This aspect of C-IED acknowledges that whilst the weapons are “improvised”, the groups constructing them often receive substantial financial assistance and have access to expert networks and advanced bomb-making facilities. The largest users of IEDs are internationally connected extremist groups, such as IS and al-Qaeda affiliates, who are connected with groups and individuals across the globe. The attack the network approach recognises the necessity of a joint, interagency and multinational approach and is driven by intelligence that seeks to understand tactics and techniques and prevent IED attacks by tackling the root causes.

Many types of C-IED actors, from militaries to governments and civil society, now seek to target the groups, the financiers, and the trade in explosive materials that IEDs depend on. These C-IED efforts focus on research, intelligence gathering and information sharing. As such, they require high levels of international cooperation and global engagement, engagement that goes beyond what military and law enforcement can often provide – or, at least, are willing to share. A focus on this aspect of C-IED also helps states disrupt the sequence of events that lead up to the use of an IED, as well as providing a tactical focus for those engaged in operations on the ground.

Other preventative attack the network C-IED actions may include demining, EOD and stockpile controls to prevent terrorist groups fashioning IEDs from these materials, as well as programs to counter violent extremism or rehabilitating captured terrorists. Many programs target those more vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment and provide strategies to counter extremist messages.

The last decade has seen many nations improve and broaden their C-IED capabilities and initiatives. Alongside these national improvements – often with the aid of others – there have been calls for more cooperation in C-IED. The national responses remain weak unless they are tied to bilateral, regional, and international approaches that mimic the very structures of those terrorist networks that pose the central IED threat.

What has become clear throughout the course of this research is that, for there to be a properly coordinated response to the global IED threat, police, customs, military, international services, UN bodies, civil society and even cultural representatives and influencers need to be brought to the table. Stronger collaborative ties need to be created, based on a relationship of trust and respect.

Below, this paper seeks to outline some of the national, regional and international C-IED initiatives that are already being implemented and their capabilities. The paper will draw on these examples to characterise C-IED successes and shortfalls. This will help identify where improvements can be made to aid future C-IED initiatives.
IEDs have global reach and threaten the security of states. However, whilst this is indeed the case, it is also true that there are a handful of states that are far worse affected than others. In fact, over the last five years, just five countries account for over three quarters of all IED attacks recorded by AOAV's explosive violence monitor, namely: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, and Nigeria. IED use within these countries has dramatically shifted the nature of their internal and external conflicts.

This report looks at the states in the areas most impacted by IEDs that face a significant national threat from groups that use such weapons. The regions examined include: the Sahel, North Africa, and the Middle East. The report shall also look at four countries outside these regions due to their high number of IED attacks: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kenya and Somalia. IED use within the states in these regions has meant that the brunt of the lethal consequences from IEDs have been borne by civilian populations. They have also significantly impacted the national and international actors who are working towards an end to conflict. In the last few years much has been done to tackle the IED threat within these nations: the aid of foreign militaries, humanitarian actors, and international organisations. This has resulted in many states engaging in bilateral, regional and international commitments, as armed forces and governments from developed nations seek to offer beleaguered nations expertise, equipment and monetary aid, and impacted nations seek assistance and aid.

### 3. NATIONAL C-IED INITIATIVES

Counter-IED actors across the Middle East, North Africa and Sahel

![Counter-IED actors across the Middle East, North Africa and Sahel](image)

Number of counter-IED actors per country:

- **1-3**
- **4-6**
- **7-10**
- **11-15**
- **16-20**
- **21-24**
MIDDLE EAST REGION

Bahrain
* Al Wefaq
* Arab League
* Bahrain Coast Guard
* Bahrain Public Security Forces
* Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
* Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
* Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAFT)
* US Department of State Office of Antiterrorism (ATA)

Cyprus
* Cyprus Police
* Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing if Terrorism (MONEYVAL)
* Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
* INTERPOL
* US Department of State Office of Antiterrorism (ATA)

Iran
* Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
* Iran National Police and Intelligence
* Iran Mine Action Center (IRMAC)

Iraq
* Australian Defence Force
* British Army Counter-IED/EOD units
* Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve
* Conflict Armament Research
* Danish Demining Group (DDG)
* Dynasafe
* Handicap International
* I-Trace
* Information Management and Mine Action Programs
* Iraqi Body Count (IBC)
* Iraqi Mine and UXO Clearance Organization (IMCO)
* Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)
* Iraqi Security Forces
* Janus Global Operations
* Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA)
* Kurdish Security Forces/Peshmerga
* Mines Advisory Group
* New Zealand Defence Force
* Task Force Al Asad
* Task Group Taji
* Norwegian People’s Aid
* Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
* United Nations Mine Action Service
* US Marine Corps C-IED units

Israel
* Combat Engineering Corps (Israel)
* Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
* International Bomb Data Center Working Group (IBDCWG)
* Israeli Mine Action Group
* Israeli National Mine Action Authority
* Israel Police Bomb Disposal Division
* Israel Security Agency – Shin Bet
* Eitan Lidor

Jordan
* Arab League
* Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
* Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
* King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center
* Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAFT)
* National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation
* NATO C-IED COE
* Organisation for Islamic Cooperation

Kuwait
* Arab League
* Dynasafe
* Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
* Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
* Kuwaiti Police
* Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAFT)
* Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
* PAE
* The Development Initiative

Lebanon
* BACTEC
* Conflict Armament Research
* DanChurchAid
* Egmont Group
* Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
* Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
* Handicap International
* INTERPOL
* Lebanon Armed Forces – Bomb disposal/C-IED
* Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMMA)
* Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAFT)
• Mines Advisory Group
• Norwegian People’s Aid
• United Nations Mine Action Service
• US Department of State Office of Antiterrorism (ATA)

Oman
• Arab League
• Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
• Gulf Cooperation Council
• Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAFT)
• Organisation for Islamic Cooperation
• Royal Oman Police
• SITA - Oman
• US Department of State Office of Antiterrorism (ATA)

Palestine – Gaza
• Mines Advisory Group
• United Nations Mine Action Service

Palestine – West Bank
• HALO Trust
• Israeli National Mine Action Authority
• Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAFT)
• Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF)
• Palestinian Mine Action Centre (PMAC)
• Quadro Projects and Technologies
• United Nations Mine Action Service

Qatar
• Airbus Defence and Space
• Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
• Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF)
• Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
• Islamic Counterterrorism Coalition
• Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAFT)
• US Department of State Office of Antiterrorism (ATA)

Saudi Arabia
• DSA Detection
• G4S
• Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
• Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
• Islamic Counterterrorism Coalition
• King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue
• Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAFT)

Syria
• Center for Documentation of Violations in Syria
• Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve
• Conflict Armament Research
• DanChurchAid
• Danish Demining Group
• Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
• Handicap International
• Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAFT)
• Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
• United Nations Mine Action Service

Turkey
• Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR)
• Danish Demining Group (DDG)
• Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
• Global Counterterrorism Forum
• Turkish Customs Administration
• Turkish National Police – Bomb Disposal and Investigations Division

UAE
• Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
• Global Counterterrorism Forum
• Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAFT)

Yemen
• Danish Demining Group (DDG)
• National Mine Action Committee (NMAC)
• United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
• Yemen Coast Guard
• Yemen intelligence services
• Yemen Anti-terrorism units

NORTH AFRICA REGION
Algeria
• Algerian Gendarmerie
• Arab League
• Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
• Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
• Handicap International
• Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAFT)
* Organisation for Islamic Cooperation
* US Department of State Office of Antiterrorism (ATA)

**Egypt**
* Arab League
* British Army Counter-IED/EOD units
* Egmont Group
* Egyptian Armed Forces (C-IED/EOD teams)
* Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
* Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAT)

**Libya**
* DanChurchAid
* Danish Demining Group
* Dynasafe
* Free Fields Foundation
* Handicap International
* Libyan Mine Action Centre
* Libyan National Safety Authority
* Mechem
* Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAT)
* Mines Advisory Group
* Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
* United Nations Mine Action Service

**Morocco**
* British Army Counter-IED/EOD units
* G4S
* Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
* Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
* Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAT)
* Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, Morchidines, and Morchidates
* Muqaddamin
* Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership

**Sudan**
* INTERPOL
* Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAT)
* Partnership for Regional East Africa
* Counterterrorism (PREACT)
* United Nations Mine Action Service

**Tunisia**
* British Army Counter-IED/EOD units
* Danish Demining Group
* Global Coalition to Counter ISIL

* Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
* Handicap International
* Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAT)
* Tunisian Security Forces

**Western Sahara**
* Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
* MineTech International
* MINURSO
* Norwegian People’s Aid
* Polisario Front – SPLA

**SAHEL REGION**

**Burkina Faso**
* AFRICOM
* Global Counterterrorism Forum
* Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA)
* Operation Barkhane
* Police and Gendarmerie
* Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership

**Cameroon**
* Cameroon military EOD/C-IED
* Council of Imams and Religious Dignitaries of Cameroon (CIDIMUC)
* Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)
* Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (Groupe d’Action contre le blanchiment d’Argent en Afrique Centrale (GABAC))
* Vigilance Committees

**Chad**
* Centre National de Déminage (CND)
* Chadian National Police
* Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
* Dynasafe
* Egmont Group
* Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
* Handicap International
* Islamic Counterterrorism Coalition
* Mines Advisory Group
* Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)
* Operation Barkhane
* Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
* Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (Groupe d’Action contre le blanchiment d’Argent en Afrique Centrale (GABAC))
* Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
Eritrea
- DanChurchAid
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
- United Nations Mine Action Service

Ethiopia
- AMISOM
- Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group
- Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Peace Support Training Centre (FDRE-PSTC)
- Ethiopia National Defense Force
- Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
- International Committee of the Red Cross (Demining Support)
- National Intelligence and Security Services
- Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- US Department of State Office of Antiterrorism (ATA)

Niger
- British Army Counter-IED/EOD units
- Central Service for the Fight Against Terrorism (SCLCT)
- Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
- Inter Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA)
- Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)
- Operation Barkhane
- Sahel-Sahara Development and Security Strategy (SDSS)
- Spirit of America in Niger
- Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
- US Department of State Office of Antiterrorism (ATA)

Nigeria
- Civilian Joint Task Force
- Danish Demining Group
- Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
- Inter Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA)
- MKDS Training
- Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)
- Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF)
- Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
- US Department of State Office of Antiterrorism (ATA)
- Vox Peccavi

Senegal
- AFRICOM
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
- Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
- Handicap International
- INTERPOL
- National Police
- Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
- United Nations Mine Action Service

South Sudan
- DanChurchAid
- Dynasafe
- National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
- Norwegian People's Aid
- United Nations Mine Action Service
OTHER HIGHLY AFFECTED IED COUNTRIES:

Afghanistan
- Afghan National Army (ANA)
- Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)
- Afghan National Police
- Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP)
- Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG)
- British Army Counter-IED/EOD units
- Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Counter-IED Directorate (CSTC-A C-IED Directorate)
- Danish Demining Group
- Dynasafe
- Handicap International
- Mine Action Co-ordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA)
- Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA)
- NATO Resolute Support
- Programme Global Shield (PGS)
- Tripartite Counter-IED Working Group
- Ulema Council of Afghanistan
- United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)
- United Nations Development Programme

Pakistan
- Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG)
- Bomb Disposal Squad – Pakistani Police
- British Army Counter-IED/EOD units
- Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
- Pakistan Security Forces C-IED units
- Pakistan Air Forces (PAF) EOD School
- Pakistan Ulema Council
- Programme Global Shield (PGS)
- Sabaoon Rehabilitation Center
- Tripartite Counter-IED Working Group

Somalia
- AMISOM
- Arab League
- Bancroft Global Development
- Danish Demining Group (DDG)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Deming
- Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
- Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
- HALO Trust
- Mechem
- Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFAT)
- Mines Advisory Group
- Organisation for Islamic Cooperation
- Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT)
- Puntland Mine Action Centre
- Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
- Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC)
- The Development Initiative
- United Nations Mine Action Service

Kenya
- AFRICOM
- Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa
- Danish Demining Group
- Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group
- Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
- Kenya Bomb Disposal Unit
- Kenya National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
- Kenya Defence Forces (KDF)
- Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT)
- US Department of State Office of Antiterrorism (ATA)
3.1 MIDDLE EAST

3.1.1 BAHRAIN (33)

Threat

In the last 5 years, Bahrain has seen a total of 29 IED incidents that have caused death or injury as reported in English-language media. Though Bahrain is not as impacted as many of its neighbours in the region, it has faced attacks consistently since 2012. Security personnel have faced the brunt of these attacks, with 69 deaths and injuries in this period – compared to 12 civilians. In the first half of 2016, Bahrain saw one IED incident in Eker, where a roadside bomb killed one woman and injured her three children.\(^7\)

News reports on IED incidents rarely identified a perpetrator, but most are thought to be perpetrated by Shia militant groups or IS sympathisers. Many of the intercepted terrorist cells are believed by the Bahraini government to have links to other terrorist organisations in Lebanon and Iran.

Fortunately, most of the IEDs in the incidents seen to date have had relatively little sophistication and impact compared to the lethality of those seen elsewhere. However, security forces have found evidence of military-grade explosives such as C-4 and RDX in recent devices and seizures.\(^8\)

Capability

More could be done to improve security in regard to IEDs, precursor materials and terrorism itself, such as border security or checkpoints, particularly along the King Fahad Causeway. Nevertheless, there have been interceptions of bomb-making materials and explosives. For example, the Bahrain Public Security Forces counter-terrorism units have been known to intercept potential perpetrators before they carry out attacks and have confiscated many explosive materials.

The Coast Guard in Bahrain has also proved to be very useful in C-IED efforts. The Coast Guard is responsible for monitoring shipments into and out of Bahrain by sea. Part of this involves observing terrorist activity, such as the shipment of explosives, weapons, and terrorists themselves. The Bahraini Coast Guard has been successful in monitoring terrorist movements and in terrorist related seizures and arrests. In June of this year, it was reported that a boat heading to Iran, on which eight terrorists were hiding, was intercepted.\(^9\)

The Coast Guard often work in cooperation with other Bahraini security authorities. For example, in July 2015 the Coast Guard, alongside the Police Aviation Unit and Bahrain Royal Naval Force, intercepted a ship heading for Bahrain. On board were terrorists, some trained in explosives, explosive materials (including detonators), and other weaponry.\(^10\) The shipment was said to come from Iran.

The Bahrain counter-terrorism officials often cooperate with those of other states, such as the UK, in order to share information and expertise that can contribute to the wider fight against terrorism. Bahrain particularly appreciates engaging with those of developed countries to improve their counter-terrorism operations and performance. However, it is believed that the police and customs lack the intelligence and information-sharing skills and utensils. This is still the case despite efforts by some agencies to improve these capabilities in Bahrain, such as the ATA’s Combatting Domestic and Transnational Terrorism course.

The Bahrain counter-terrorism units have dogs trained in bomb detection. The UK has also exported over £1.5 million worth of C-IED equipment to Bahrain, predominantly detection and disposal equipment. Over £1.1 million of this was bought in 2010 in a sale of equipment and “components for launching/handling/control of munitions”.\(^11\)

However, counter-terrorism units in Bahrain have come under criticism due to the use of counter-terrorism measures against children, including life imprisonment. Counter-terrorism measures have also been used very widely, with pro-democracy activists often facing charges under counter-terrorism legislation.

Pro-democracy movement Al-Wefaq was closed by the Bahrain government in June 2016 on the charges of supporting sectarianism and terrorism. Al-Wefaq has, according to their website, condemned terrorist attacks. Given that they provided a voice to the disenfranchised within Bahrain alongside their encouragement of peaceful dissent,\(^12\) it is likely that Al-Wefaq could have proved useful in curbing radicalisation and the use of terror tactics.

Regional efforts

Bahrain’s regional efforts have focused on terrorist financing due to their position as a financial transit point in the Gulf and into Southwest Asia. Bahrain is part of
the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a regional effort to counter the financing of terrorism allowing militant groups to buy and transport materials used in the making of IEDs. The headquarters of MENAFATF are located in Manama, Bahrain.

Bahrain is also part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), who recently committed to urgently undertake additional steps to help defeat IS. The EU-GCC Workshop on Combating Terrorist Financing and Violent Extremism, held in 2015, was organised by Bahrain in cooperation with the GCC General-Secretariat and the US. The conference focused on national risk assessment, exploitation of charities – in which Bahrain brought their own experiences to the table – as well as information sharing and technical assistance.

International efforts
Bahrain is part of the Arab League, through which terrorist attacks are consistently condemned and work is done to promote better state cooperation and bridge divides. The Arab League has also supported Bahrain’s counterterrorism efforts and praised Bahrain’s judicial measures in the matter, which have in other forums been criticised as they appear to often conflict human rights.

Bahrain is also part of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL as well as the Saudi-funded 34-state Muslim nations coalition. Bahrain have committed two F-16 Fighter Falcons to the efforts, which have been engaged in airstrikes in Syria. In June 2015, the US lifted its restrictions on security assistance to the Bahrain Defence Force and National Guard that was implemented due to the government’s suppression of demonstrations in 2011. This meant that Bahrain could receive the equipment and support needed to update the F-16s and other aspects of their counter-terrorism operations.

Similar to their regional efforts, as part of their counter-ISIL endeavours Bahrain has had a particular focus on the financing of the terrorist group. Bahrain has hosted a number of conferences on countering terrorist finance. As part of the Coalition they hosted a conference on terrorist finance in November 2014. They have been considered a strong participant within the Coalition’s Strategic Communications Working Group, which seeks to counteract the threat of IS’s recruitment and other propaganda efforts. As part of this aspect of Bahrain’s assistance, the country hosts the US Naval Forces Central Command too.

3.1.2 CYPRUS (71)

Threat
Cyprus has seen little death or injury from IEDs. However, there have been many incidents where IEDs were used to cause damage to buildings or property. Additionally, there are often failed IED attack attempts in Cyprus. In general, the IEDs seen in Cyprus are not made with the same kind of sophistication as those seen in neighbouring countries.

Capability
The Cyprus Police has a bomb squad as part of their Criminal Investigation Office. The bomb squad is responsible for giving advice to the public about suspicious objects. They make the public aware of the dangers and how to contact the police if they encounter what may be an IED. The bomb squad may also utilise the police force’s dog unit within the force as the dogs are trained in discovering explosive substances such as those found within IEDs.

The bomb squad work in cooperation with the Counter Terrorism Office, which takes on more of the attack the network responsibilities of C-IED. The Counter Terrorism Office coordinates operations to target terrorist groups and organise training. They take the lead on information sharing efforts in regard to explosives and terrorists between other governments and international organisations, such as INTERPOL.

In May 2015, Cypriot police arrested a Lebanese-Canadian national, Hussain Abdallah, after a surveillance operation indicated he was stockpiling explosives. The police seized over eight tons of ammonium nitrate chemicals, often used for manufacturing explosives, in the basement of his temporary home. Abdullah admitted he was working for Hezbollah’s External Security Organization and acknowledged to Cypriot investigators that the explosive pre-cursors were for an IED to be used against Israeli targets in Cyprus and other places in Europe. The seizure of that much ammonium nitrate was one of the largest confiscations ever seen of this chemical.

The UK has delivered £300,000 worth of C-IED equipment requested by Cyprus for detection, decoying, disposal and jamming, for military C-IED use.

Cyprus has engaged in counterterrorism efforts with the US, particularly the ATA and Regional Strategic Initiative programs.
Regional efforts
In regard to the financing of terrorism Cyprus are also a member of the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL). MONEYVAL’s efforts since 2001 have also included countering terrorism financing.

International efforts
International C-IED efforts in Cyprus have seen the government engaged in the International Counter ISIL coalition. Cyprus has allowed the UK to base strike aircrafts in their bases, for the UK to carry out aid drops and air strikes in Iraq. They have also allowed the same for France.

The Cyprus National Guard also took part in an international terrorism exercise organised by the EDA in Sweden. The exercise, Bison 2016, took place in August 2016 and particularly engaged with C-IED techniques and terror attacks using IEDs. A wide range of members of the National Guard took part, including those from bomb squads, intelligence, Navy SEALs, and CBRNe experts.

3.1.3 IRAN (45)

Threat
Recently, the threat from IEDs has decreased in Iran. In the last five years, between 2011 and 2015, Iran experienced six IED attacks that caused deaths or injuries, according to English-language news reports. These killed and injured 21, of which 12 were civilians. However, 2010 saw large scale IED attacks. A suicide bombing in December 2010 killed and injured over 100, after a similar attack in July killed 27.

The most hit area tends to be Sistan-Baluchistan, an area known for insurgency and smuggling. The main perpetrator of IED attacks in Pakistan is the Jundullah, or the People’s Resistance Movement of Iran, based in Sistan-Baluchistan.

Capabilities
Iran’s National Police is responsible for a multitude of C-IED and counterterrorism tasks. These include: border control, emergency response, identity checks, preventing and fighting terrorism.

Iranian intelligence officials monitor terrorist activities in the country. They are responsible for carrying out investigations into suspicious activity, conducting interrogations and seizing weapons, ammunition and explosive materials. In May 2016, Mahmoud Alavi, Iran’s Intelligence Minister, announced that 20 terrorist groups had been dismantled. The groups were accused of planning to detonate bombs across the country. In June, Iranian intelligence announced a series of operations that led to the capture of ten “Wahhabi takfiri terrorists”, who they accused of planning IED attacks.

In regards to mines and unexploded ordnances (UXO), which may be used in IEDs, Iran used to be littered with them. In 2013, Iran was said to be the second-most contaminated country in the world. It appears that demining across the country was successful, as in 2014 the Iran Mine Action Center (IRMAC) released a statement claiming that 99% of contaminated land had been cleared. However, there remain mixed figures on the scale of the contamination.

The IRMAC, established in 2005, was responsible for coordinating demining and other mine-related activities across the country. Over the course of demining there have been many accidents in Iran – with over 100 deaths and injuries to deminers between 2012 and 2014. There have also been many civilian accidents, although there are no clear figures. Civilians also stress that they have received no education on the dangers of explosive remnants of war (ERW) and mines. A lack of medical assistance and rehabilitation also hinders the victims of landmines, just as it would IED victims. Due to sanctions, Iran has also not been able to purchase some of the demining equipment it is said to require.

Bilateral assistance
Iran is better known as a funder and supporter of terrorism. Many Iran-backed groups abroad have carried-out and attempted to carry-out terrorist attacks including those with IEDs. Iran has even stated publicly that it has armed Hezbollah with advanced long-range Iranian-manufactured missiles, which would violate the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1701 and 1747. The Quds Force, a special unit within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards, is the mechanism by which many terror groups receive Iranian backing.

In Syria, Iran has provided arms, funds, training and fighters to support President Bashar al-Assad. Though Iran explained the Iranian forces provided an advisory role, Iranian armed forces (such as the Quds Force) and Iranian-funded militias are known to be on the ground in Syria. Funding, weapons and training has also been provided to groups from Bahrain, Gaza, Yemen and Iraq, amongst others.
Iran has also engaged bilaterally with Indonesia to discuss counterterrorism efforts in an effort to increase cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Russia and Azerbaijan have also come to an agreement with Iran on cooperative efforts to counter terrorism. This has included information sharing on terrorism and committing to efforts to work out joint counterterrorism measures.\textsuperscript{25}

**International initiatives**

Iran drafted a resolution on counterterrorism that was adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). The resolution was titled “A World against Violence and Violent Extremism”.

Iran has complained that international organisations have failed to provide the required assistance with Iran’s demining efforts. On the other hand, UNMAS did not receive a request for assistance in Iran, and Iran did not attend the international Meeting of Mine Action National Programme Directors and UN Advisors in 2015. Iran has also received assistance from the Red Cross, whose work has predominantly focused on missing persons, and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

**NGO support**

**GICHD**

In January 2005, the GICHD signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with the IRMAC. Though very little came of this initially, in 2012 Iran attended a study visit. In 2013, Iran participated in the first workshop of the Persian-language Outreach Programme, in Tajikistan. GICHD’s risk management activities saw a training course in insurance and liability in mine action and the legal aspects of mine action.

### 3.1.4 IRAQ (1)

#### Threat

In the last five years Iraq was the country worst impacted by IEDs, according to AOV\textquotesingle s Explosive Violence Monitor. Between 2011 and 2015 the country suffered 42,114 deaths and injuries from 2,266 IED attacks. Of these casualties, 87% (36,772) were civilians. However, there has been a substantial decrease in IED deaths and injuries in 2015, where the numbers dropped to the lowest they been for five years, after a substantial rise between 2011 and 2013.

Between 2013 and 2015, Iraq saw the deaths and injuries from IEDs per year drop by 64%. Whilst this decrease in IED attacks and victims represents progress, it should be noted that at the same time the lethality per IED incident has increased from 14 per incident in 2011, to 21 per incident in 2013, 2014 and 2015. This increased lethality of IED attacks is a similar pattern across many of the most impacted countries. While there may be much more that needs to be done, in many of the highly impacted countries, such as Iraq, there have also been great successes in the C-IED fight.

**Capability**

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have faced serious threat from IEDs. Not only are the forces often targets but they are also often responsible for clearing areas once they have been liberated from IS control, leaving them further vulnerable to death and injury. Many within the Iraqi forces had already had direct experience with IEDs prior to IS’ proliferation of the weapons. However, given the increasing threat from IEDs, it has been the priority of many foreign governments to assist in the C-IED training of the security forces, so that they can respond to the threat adequately and better avoid force casualties.

Alongside Iraqi Forces, there is also the Kurdish Security Forces/Peshmerga, which chiefly operate across Iraq’s Kurdish region. Given the threat the Kurds face from groups such as IS and their IED use, it has been important for Kurdish Security Forces to increase their understanding of C-IED tactics. Their role in fighting IS in Iraq alone has significantly contributed to C-IED efforts in Iraq. The Peshmerga have disposed of over roughly 13,000 IEDs since 2014.\textsuperscript{26} Additionally, the Kurdish Security Forces have also been coordinating their intelligence efforts with the US. This has also helped the US with their Iraqi counter-terrorism and C-IED efforts.

They have worked cooperatively with many states engaged in counter-terrorism and C-IED efforts across the country and their C-IED training and equipment have benefited from these arrangements.

Both Iraqi Army and Peshmerga personnel have been involved in the land clearance of liberated areas. In October 2016, both were engaged in the clearance of IEDs in the villages around Mosul and they have had to cooperate in the clearing process, thereby dividing the tasks between the two forces. However, the Kurdistan Security Forces clearing these areas have reported a lack of equipment to carry out the task safely. A news article published in October 2016 reported that the Peshmerga forces defused the bombs with their bare
hands, using only pliers. They wore no protective equipment, such as suits, gloves, helmets or shatterproof glasses. Many also drove in unarmoured pick-ups. They also asked for radio frequency-jamming devices to stop remote-controlled IEDs. It is clear that better equipment is needed.

**Training**

The US-led coalition forces started a Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) mission. This was designed to train Iraqi Army units in various tactical subjects to include C-IED, an area the Iraqi Army specifically requested training in. As part of this mission the Marines and the Danish Army provided a C-IED class for members of the Iraqi Army to teach them basic IED reaction and mitigation skills at Al Asad Air Base in January 2015. Other, foreign state actors such as the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) provided additional assistance with C-IED training based on their own past experiences in Iraq.

Many task forces have also emerged as part of the BPC operation, which has played a vital part to help build C-IED capacities. Iraq has seen the creation of operations that include the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), Task Force Al Asad (TFAA), and Task Group Taji (TG Taji). Many of these initiatives have focused on training, but have also seen provision of C-IED equipment for Iraqi forces. This engagement has seen a considerable improvement in military and police C-IED capabilities across Iraq.

TG Taji is a combined Australian-New Zealand military training force located at the Taji Military Complex northwest of Baghdad. The group consists of approximately 300 Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel (drawn largely from the Australian Army’s 7th Brigade,) and 110 New Zealand Defence Force personnel. The aim of TG Taji is to support, train and build the capacity of the regular Iraqi Security Forces as part of BPC.

TG Taji’s main role is training, so the role of the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) and New Zealand Defence Forces (NZDF) troops is non-combative. This means the group is mostly comprised of trainers, as well as force protection, support and command elements. Much of this training involves C-IED work given the threat that IS poses by their IED use. TG Taji is undertaking the BPC mission at the request of both the Iraqi and US governments.

TFAA is made up of US Marines and Danish soldiers. The Task Force, as part of their other operations to support the Iraqi Security Forces in their fight against IS, developed a C-IED class for members of the Iraqi Army to teach them basic IED reaction and mitigation skills at Al Asad Air Base in January 2015. The Iraqi Forces received the same formal instruction Marines receive when learning how to combat IEDs. The training itself consisted of classes on the fundamentals of IEDs alongside practical application, with lanes marked with simulated IED indicators like exposed wires and danger areas. TFAA also taught the soldiers how to implement this C-IED knowledge into the planning of missions. C-IED equipment has been provided by the forces that are part of the TFAA. This equipment will be fundamental in learning C-IED tactics.

The CJTF-OIR was established in 2014 by the US-led coalition against IS to coordinate military efforts. The CJTF-OIR has prioritised C-IED work within their mission and has deployed C-IED training teams in order to augment other trainers at Taji, Besmaya and Asad. C-IED training has focused on IED detection and disposal, as well as intelligence and post-blast investigations.

By September 2015, it was believed that more than 8,000 Iraqi army and Peshmerga soldiers had been trained in various aspects of C-IED operations. This went beyond the regular training given to all BPC graduates. The UK, on its part, has trained over 2,170 members of the Kurdish Security Forces in C-IED tactics and techniques.

As part of the BPC operation, states including the US, UK, Italy, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Belgium have contributed to Peshmerga training. Training courses are conducted at the Kurdistan Training Coordination Center (KTCC) at the Bnaslawa training base just south of Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan. The C-IED aspect of the KTCC is considered by both the Peshmerga and the foreign forces, as one of the most important aspects of training.

**Equipment**

The Iraqi Army is in command of:

- An undisclosed number of Husky 2G mine detection systems, bought by the Iraqi government.
- 250 mine-resistant, ambush protected vehicles, donated by the US in early 2015.
- 60 VALLON hand-held mine detectors as part of a donation from the UK in June 2015.
• 200 anti-personnel obstacle breaching systems (APOBS) provided alongside further C-IED equipment from the US.\(^{32}\)
• Bulldozers, mine-clearing equipment, anti-armour weapons for the vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) threat and other assured mobility assets.\(^{33}\)

The CJTF-OIR issued a range of C-IED equipment to the Iraqi forces. The equipment has included: bulldozers, mine-clearing equipment and anti-armour weapons.\(^{34}\) Much of the equipment provided was also essential within training.

In June 2015 the UK Government gifted the Kurdish Security Forces with 1000 C-IED VALLON detectors.\(^{35}\) This supply of training and equipment to the Kurdish Security Forces has enabled them to continue to stem the IED threat.

Other equipment the Peshmerga has received includes 150 armoured vehicles from the US in 2015, of which 15 had mine-roller attachments which are used to detonate mines and IEDs.\(^{36}\)

International support

Coalition air forces in Iraq also have had an impact on C-IED capabilities. They have been responsible for destroying not only IS fighters themselves but also their IED factories and ammunition depots. This has a large impact on IS’ ability to carry out attacks if their equipment, facilities and men are destroyed. Unfortunately, this does not necessarily have a significant impact on the scale of the IED threat, as factories are not necessary to create IEDs. The necessary knowledge and explosive material are so widely spread in this conflict-inflicted area that individuals can manufacture IEDs in their homes and still have a substantial impact.

Not only have foreign governments and militaries significantly improved Iraq’s C-IED capabilities but international organisations, NGOs and mining organisations have also aided Iraq in coping with their national IED threat. These actors have played a range of C-IED roles, from IED clearance and training, to data collection and victim assistance.

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
The UNMAS has played an important role in Iraq, since their deployment to the country in June last year at the request of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Iraq and the Iraqi Mine Action Authorities. They have been instrumental in assessing the scale of the threat of UXO and ERW, predominantly IEDs, left by IS. Their impact threat assessments carried out so far have shown that the IED threat was beyond national capabilities due to the scale of the problem in the areas assessed. Based on these assessments, UNMAS have been formulating plans to address the threat, including not only IED clearance but also developing national C-IED capabilities and improving national IED threat mitigation policies and procedures.

UNMAS’ support in Iraq has also meant vital training has been provided in IED disposal, such as to the Iraqi...
Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) – the Kurdish Regional Government’s (KRG) demining agency. The IKMAA were highly skilled in the detection and destruction of landmines and most other ERW, but they had very little experience with IEDs – a weapon they were increasingly seeing. UNMAS provided training to 15 IKMAA personnel in IED disposal, with the help of Canadian funding, after the IKMAA requested this help. The Canadian government also provided six remotely operated demining robots in January 2015, to aid the work of Kurdistan forces in the region.37

The training has impacted IKMAA’s ability to clear areas of IEDs before displaced persons return to homes that have recently been relieved of IS. A focus of IKMAA’s C-IED work has also been awareness raising and providing education on IEDs and the danger they pose to those returning to IS liberated areas. It was reported by a researcher at GICHD on Twitter in February 2016 that the IKMAA were going to be introducing eight new IED teams in four camps to address the threat of IEDs from IS.38

NGO support
NGO’s have also been involved in C-IED work across Iraq. Recent successes have seen the Peshmerga forces work alongside NGOs to declare the town of Jalawla in Diyala Province safe. They had cleared almost 900 IEDs in just this town.39 In 2015, over 7000 IEDs were destroyed by Peshmerga forces.40 Although, over 180 of their soldiers were also killed by the popular IS weapon last year.41 The Peshmerga criticise the fact that the Iraqi Army receives more funding and equipment than them, which they feel is needed for them to continue to strengthen their C-IED and counter-IS efforts.

Conflict Armament Research
Conflict Armament Research (CAR) was established in 2011 as a private limited company. They have carried out extensive research into IED in Iraq, particularly those used by IS. CAR has generated multiple reports on IEDs in Iraq and Syria with the aim of supporting weapon management and control. Over the last year, CAR have produced three different pieces of research into IS’s IED use in Iraq. These include: “Turkish Fertilisers Used in Islamic State IEDs in Iraq”, “Inside Islamic State’s Improvised Weapon Factories in Fallujah”, and a 20-month investigation in Iraq and Syria, “Tracing the Supply of Components Used in Islamic State IEDs”. The research used iTrace, a project funded by the EU and German Government, to establish where IS’s weapons and weapon precursors came from, particularly for IEDs. iTrace provides a public access weapons tracking database. This database serves as an independent monitor for the implementation of international arms control agreements, including the UN Programme of Action and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). However, CAR’s findings about IEDs are not included in the iTrace database and are not made available on the publicly accessed portal of iTrace; these findings are only shared with rebel and state forces on the ground if needed.

CAR’s C-IED fieldwork consists of IED mapping, contamination mapping, some C-IED training, incident reporting of battlefield damage assessment, in-field recovery of IEDs and IED component parts (samples’ collecting), recovery of explosive precursors and some chemical agents, and components’ tracing, as well as technical and biometric exploitation in conjunction with the FBI. They do not use robots or any electronic counter-measures. Their C-IED activities are determined in discussion with local security forces. They mainly engage in discussions with army and security forces on the ground to decide the nature of their C-IED activities, but they also engage with other, including non-state, forces in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, these include: The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units, the Iraqi Federal Police, the Kurdistan Region Security Council, the Peshmerga forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Sunni Affairs, Hashd al-Shaabi, Hashd al-Anbar, Marji’iyya (Kerbala), ISOF/CTS, Anbar Governorate, Salah al-Din Governorate, Peshmerga, IKMAA.42

CAR field teams document suspected IEDs and related material in conflict-affected locations and trace their supply sources. Their latest reports highlight the speed at which IS forces have been able to acquire IED components and the lack of monitoring by national governments and companies. They point out to the progression and diversification of IED construction, particularly in Iraq and Syria and, to a certain extent, Lebanon. Their aim is to catalogue the changes in construction, different supplies in components, refinements in manufacturing technology, changes to reactions or resistance to electronic counter-measures. In short: “To better understand the logistics, dynamics, and mechanisms behind the network.”43 They then transfer the findings to forces on the ground who could benefit from them to counter any terrorist IED-related activity.

Though CAR is funded by the EU, German and UK governments, CAR completely self-funds its IED work,
with the exception of its IED work in Lebanon and the iTrace project. CAR’s personnel consist of six individuals working in multi-tasking roles (not specifically in C-IED roles) across Syria, Iraq, Libya and Lebanon. They do not have a specific C-IED team; their staffs recover and test IED components at the same time as other weapons. The staff is trained externally to perform C-IED work on the ground, and do not use any specific search equipment, only basic documentation material. James Bevan, CAR’s Executive Director expressed that though they do not face equipment shortages, they would like to access more funding to allow them to acquire better, more advanced, testing materials.

Danish Demining Group

The Danish Demining Group (DDG) has worked in Southern Iraq’s Basra governorate, since 2003. They have successfully provided Mine/ERW Risk Education (MRE) and performed Community Liaison (CL) work in addition to Battle Area Clearance (BAC) and EOD.

The DDG has also established themselves in northern Iraq, impacted by the recent conflict in 2015, particularly within the Erbil and Duhok governorates, jointly with other Danish Refugee Council (DRC) operations. One of the main aims was to deliver MRE so that people were able to identify, avoid and report mines, ERW and IEDs. The other aim was to provide emergency EOD. The MRE initially focused on IDPs and refugees in highly impacted areas, who were highly likely to face contaminated areas if they try to return to their homes. On-going needs assessments are carried out for ERW contamination alongside other EOD actors in Iraq.

DDG employs 90 local and four expatriate staff in four offices (Dohuk, Erbil, Baghdad and Basra). In addition, DDG carries out on-going needs assessment related to ERW contamination, engaging in survey work and coordination with other mine action actors such as the IKMAA, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and the wider NGO community.

Mines Advisory Group

In 1991, Human Rights Watch approached the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) for help in carrying out an impact assessment of landmines on civilians in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, at which point MAG started providing a MRE programme to those at risk. In 1992, MAG joined forces with Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Handicap International, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation to form the lobbying coalition International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). MAG also introduced in the late 90’s Community Liaison teams – made up of local people – to find out about landmines and UXO problems by asking those affected. In Iraq, MAG works in coordination with the IKMAA.

IEDs found in Iraq in 2005. (U.S. Federal Government)

In more recent years MAG has been clearing landmines and UXO from hazardous land for the safe establishment and expansion of camps for displaced people and
Syrian refugees in northern Iraq, as well as delivering risk education for those fleeing the violence. They have provided clearance work as well as awareness-raising sessions with displaced Iraqi families since June 2014.

In late 2014, MAG was said to be the only international humanitarian demining NGO left doing clearance work in Kurdistan. MAG has been conducting awareness-raising sessions with IDPs since June 2014. The education aims to increase awareness of the potential explosives dangers, particularly IEDs, now and when they return. They also carry out clearance in areas where active hostilities have ceased. They must be careful as a humanitarian mine clearance operator in a conflict situation to not engage in clearance in support of ongoing military operations.

The tools used by MAG to detect and destroy landmines are manual deminers (using metal detectors), mechanical resources and mine detection dogs. Using a combination of all of them is often referred to as the “tool box”, or integrated approach to landmine clearance. MAG also deploys EOD teams in immediate response to reports of UXO found on land by local communities.

**Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)**

The FSD has also been aiding the recent efforts in Kurdistan, including training. More often though, they have been providing assistance in clearance operations to defeat the IEDs, mines and other UXO/ERW left by IS when they have been forced out of or abandoned an area.

**Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP)**

With support from the US, iMMAP provides operational management and victim assistance support, to help with data collection and treating victims of IEDs and other UXOs.

**Handicap International**

It currently employs 66 national staff and six expatriates in Iraq. Handicap International’s initial response focused on emergency response initiatives, rehabilitation, and support for Disabled People’s Organisations (DPOs), to meet the needs of displaced Iraqis. It provides education sessions on the risks posed by ERW, as well as physical therapy and psychological support to refugees who have been injured and/or disabled by IEDs. It also provides professional safety training and other capacity building activities, as well as micro-financing opportunities for DPOs.

Early in 2016, Handicap International moved into weapons clearance and launched its first weapons clearance actions in the governorates of Kirkuk and Diyala. Clearance operations will start in these regions, after several months of preliminary non-technical surveys and the marking of contaminated areas. Non-technical surveys are being conducted to map and mark areas contaminated by ERW and IEDs from past wars and recent contamination in areas that were occupied by the Islamic State.

Handicap International is waiting for the final approvals from the Iraqi authorities to launch its first official mine action activities. The organisation’s clearance operations are supposed to start in the latter half of 2016, particularly in the city of Jalawla and its surroundings in the Diyala Governorate. This city has seen considerable fighting and residents are still unable to access many of the neighbourhoods. Booby traps and IEDs are still present in many streets, homes, and buildings. Handicap International’s mine action activities, which include weapons clearance, victim assistance, and risk education, will all be conducted in Jalawla, pending the go ahead from the relevant Iraqi authorities.

**Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)**

The NPA was involved in Humanitarian Disarmament in Northern Iraq from 1995 to 2009. In 2010, NPA established an Advisory and Support Humanitarian Disarmament project in Basra, southern Iraq, with the objective to capacity build the operations and quality assurance and control departments within the Regional Mine Action Centre South (RMACS).

NPA has been working with the Regional Mine Action Centre South (RMACS) to build capacity for coordination, tasking, and data management since 2011. Currently, NPA is conducting BAC, Non-Technical Survey and Risk Education in the provinces of Missan and Basra. Mapping and clearing cluster munitions is the priority, and the NPA hopes to eradicate the cluster munition problem in Missan by 2017.

The NPA is also creating its first C-IED team in northern Iraq, to start operating in 2017. Bjørn Skodvin Hannisdal, a Humanitarian Disarmament Specialist at NPA, expressed they can only provide traditional C-IED methods for research and clearance due to lack of funding. He insisted that the biggest difficulty they are facing is the lack of personnel suited for this kind of jobs. The key, he said, is “to find the right people for this kind of work,
with the limited resources available to us”. They are facing difficulties in finding ex-military staff with the relevant experience in C-IED work.

**Private companies**

*Janus Global Operations (JGO)*
The US Department of State awarded JGO, and their Iraqi subcontractor Al Bahad, a $20 million contract to conduct demining efforts throughout Ramadi in April 2016. A further $5 million was awarded in July 2016. JGO worked in partnership with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, former Anbar Governor Suhaib al-Rawi, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), and the United Nations Development Program’s Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization (FFIS), in Iraq to tackle the UXO and IED threat. They have already removed hundreds of IEDs and booby-traps, as well as other abandoned munitions. Operations look to be expanding beyond Ramadi, into areas such as Fallujah, Nineveh and Karmah.

*Dynasafe*
Another company, Dynasafe, have been operating in Iraq since 2008 as a fully licensed and accredited entity with a regional office in Erbil to support operations. In this time it has conducted over 50 clearance projects. Dynasafe dog teams protect against IEDs – 20 canine projects have been established in Iraq to aid in the C-IED efforts. Though they appear to have predominately worked with private companies against the contamination threat posed to the success and safety of the company operating in Iraq, the work has seen them survey and clear large swaths of land. They are currently involved in support operations, searching vehicles, baggage and people.

**3.1.5 Israel (30)**

**Threat**
Between 2011 and 2015, Israel faced 28 successful IED attacks, according to AOAV Explosive Violence Monitor, based on English-language media sources. These attacks caused 119 deaths and injuries, of which 87% (104) were civilians. It is also worth noting that very few deaths were caused by these IEDs – only 11 were recorded – which suggests that the IEDs are not as lethal or sophisticated as those seen elsewhere in the Middle East. In the first half of 2016, there were 5 IED attacks that caused death or injury. 31 civilians were killed or injured in these attacks – two were reported as killed, 29 injured.

The motivations of the perpetrators of such attacks in Israel are more various compared to other Middle Eastern states due to Israel’s political history. Perpetrators of extremism in Israel act for a range of reasons, including “religious” motivations, anti-Western motivations, as well as nationalist and political motivations. Perpetrators include Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

As Israel also has borders with countries highly impacted by IEDs and would be considered a significant target to most extremist groups operating in these countries, Israel faces a big threat from IED attacks.

**Capacity**
The Combat Engineering Corps was established in 1947. It is considered crucial in the battlefield, because it is the only Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) force trained to break through obstacles such as mine fields, tunnels, and dirt mounds. Engineering soldiers are specially trained to deal with a variety of challenges including using mines, as well as the neutralisation of explosives and NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) weapons. One of the main purposes of the Corps is to counter explosives on missions, overcoming enemy traps and obstacles, enabling the IDF to complete its missions.

Sayeret Yahalom (special operation engineering unit) is the Engineering Corps’ special forces unit and one of the most elite units in the IDF. The purpose of the unit is maneuvering operations involving dangerous weaponry, engineering reconnaissance, and dealing with tunnel threats and weapons hideouts in enemy territory. For this, they use technologically advanced equipment. The unit primarily conducts special engineering missions, such as those including:

- Commando and Counter-Terrorism missions.
- Accurate demolitions and planting of pinpoint explosives.
- Defusing bombs, landmines and ERW (Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)).
- Maritime sabotage and obstacles breaching.
- Searching and destroying smuggling tunnels.
- Developing advanced methods and tools for demolitions and EOD.

Teaching and training engineering corps soldiers and other Special Units in demolitions and EOD.

Saveret Yahalom personnel are highly trained in EOD and C-IED methods and are involved in training other
units of the IDF in these areas. They are said to be in command of many of the most modern and advanced tools for this work, such as robots and vehicles including the IDF Caterpillar D9 bulldozer.

Within the Israeli Police, there is a specific Bomb Disposal Division. This consists of Israel’s top bomb disposal specialists. During training, the elite specialists practice with live agents and chemicals. The personnel within the Police Bomb Disposal Division will deal with both terrorist and criminal activities. Daily tasks can include neutralising suspected car bombs or unattended objects suspected of containing bombs, to removing threats from unused weaponry. The police are said to encounter these tasks approximately 80,000 times a year.

The training the specialists receive lasts for about a year. In this time, they learn to defuse bombs, use specialist equipment, handle explosives as well as various weapons. They will know how to use the robots involved in the work as well as the more common place equipment. The Israeli Police also manages Israel’s Bomb Data Center and is part of the International Bomb Data Center Working Group.

Fences along borders, and porous borders, also pose a threat to security. Israel have barriers in place along the West Bank, between Israel and Gaza, between Israel and Egypt, and a new one – begun in January 2016 – along the border with Jordan. This allows greater security as designated checkpoints can better monitor the flow of people across borders and boundaries. Cameras and other security technology have been used to increase the effectiveness of these boundaries, and border personnel monitor perimeters and checkpoints. Though these have improved security, some have been widely condemned for infringing upon the human rights of others, specifically Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced in 2016 a proposal to surround Israel completely with security fences.44

The Customs Authority ensures the legality of imports and exports into and out of Israel – and commercial imports to the Palestinian Authority. These efforts are to prohibit illegal materials passing across borders, including explosive materials. The customs administration has successfully intercepted many illegal materials, such as explosives. Often these are disguised as other materials. Some items intercepted have included those that were meant for terrorist organisations.

Intelligence services

The Shin Bet, similarly to the FBI, is in charge of internal security intelligence. Its three main wings target: Arab-related counterterrorism threats in Israel, the West bank and Gaza, non-Arab security issues, and protecting high-value individuals and locations. The Shin Bet carries out investigations into suspected terrorist activities such as the smuggling of explosives and terrorism recruitment. This work also involves interrogating terrorist suspects and providing intelligence for counterterrorism operations in the West Bank and Gaza. They have been responsible for foiling terrorist attacks (such as suicide bombings by Hamas) uncovering terrorist cells, and intercepting weapons and explosive materials. Though the Shin Bet is a security agency, it is not part of the Ministry of Defence. Instead, the Chief of the Shin Bet reports directly to the Prime Minister of Israel.

Mossad is the Israeli security agency responsible for intelligence gathering outside of Israel. Like the Shin Bet, Mossad report directly to the Prime Minister of Israel, rather than the MoD. They often cooperate with the IDF and with the security forces of other states, as well as the Shin Bet, particularly as the terrorist threat to Israel from neighbouring countries is high. Mossad’s involvement with the intelligence units of other states has led to significant breakthroughs in cooperation, prompting peace agreements with countries previously hostile to Israel, such as with Jordan and Egypt – considerably increasing Israeli security.

Israeli National Mine Action Authority

The Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) was established in 2011, and oversees mine clearing projects inside Israel. The INMAA contracts commercial companies to conduct clearance and quality assurance. The contractors used in 2014 were: Eitan Lidor Projects
and the Israeli Mine Action Group (IMAG). These contracted clearance operations took place alongside those of the IDF, who conduct their own demining, unregulated by the INMAA.

Israel does not use surveys for land release, instead it is always released through clearance – even low-risk areas will see at least one clearance operation. Between 2011 and 2014, INMAA cleared and released over 5.1km$^2$ of land. Israel are said to have well over 100km$^2$ of land to clear, so at the rate they work, clearance will take a long time especially as Israel have also laid new mines in strategic areas, such as near the Syrian border. The annual mine clearance budget is said to be almost $8 million, although there are often delays in receiving the funds which often sees work delayed.

They also operate a “minefield information bank” that is accessible to the public, where they can query demining plans and programmes. They will continue to manage projects in the West Bank, funded by governments of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK, and the US.

**Equipment**

Israel have the most up-to-date and advanced equipment. Some of the most notable pieces of C-IED equipment in use by Israel are the Counter IED and Mine Suite (CIMS) and the IDF Caterpillar D9.

In 2014, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) unveiled a multisensor system placed on the front of armoured vehicles to detect IEDs. The CIMS is made up of an above-surface detection system, advanced ground penetrating radar and a powerful metal detector. It can detect camouflaged explosives, partially exposed explosives and underground explosives. It allows safer and quicker ground manoeuvres.

The IDF also have D9 bulldozers that are impervious to mines and IEDs. They can be used in counterterror operations, to clear landmines, detonating IEDs and explosives, and handling booby traps. However, they are mostly used by Israel in the demolishment of Palestinian houses. Israel modified the bulldozer, adding greater protection to the operator.

**Bilateral initiatives**

One of Israel’s key partners in security is the US, and this remains the case in regard to counterterrorism and C-IED. They are often in dialogue on security issues and terrorism threats in the region. They collaborate in regional efforts and Israel is seen by the US an important counterterrorism ally in the Middle East.

Turkey and Israel, after years of disagreement, came to terms of agreement that would see them cooperate against terrorism. Israel agreed to: pay compensation for the Turkish civilians killed in the Gaza flotilla raid in 2010, allow Turkey to send humanitarian supplies to Gaza, and allow Turkey to support building projects in Gaza. In return, Turkey has agreed to: end the lawsuits against those involved in the raid, stop Hamas from launching or financing terrorist operations from Turkish territory, and negotiate with Hamas on Israel’s behalf to secure the return of two Israeli civilians and the bodies of two soldiers being held in Gaza. This could be an important step, despite the challenges on Turkey’s side, to greater counterterrorism cooperation, especially concerning Syria.

**Regional initiatives**

Israel is engaged in regional initiatives in Africa to prevent terrorism. Heads of state from Israel, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Zambia, South Sudan and Tanzania, convened in July 2016 to enhance their cooperative efforts to defeat terrorism. The other heads of state looked particularly to Israel for assistance tackling cyber terrorism. Israel saw the Summit as an opportunity to share Israel’s experience with counterterrorism and security with those concerned in Africa.

**International initiatives**

Israel houses a Bomb Data Center operated by the Israeli Police, and Israel is part of the International Bomb Data Center Working Group (IBDCWG). The IBDCWG is a collaborative body, comprised of bomb data centers and recognized government agencies that are focused on the efficient and effective sharing of technical intelligence on explosives, as well as other information related to the unlawful use of explosives. The Working Group was formed in 2005 by bomb data centres from 12 countries who saw the need for such information sharing in C-IED and counter-terrorism work. The group now has more than 40 member nations and an additional 12 countries participating with observer status.

Each year the IBDCWG holds a conference. These include presentations from member nations regarding major incidents, emerging trends, and other topics of interest, as well as demonstration of new tools and techniques and focused discussions on best practices to employ in future attacks using explosives. The
IBDCWG also facilitates information sharing through the IBDCWG Portal, where not only can information be posted but members can also engage in encrypted live chat.

The FATF granted Israel observer status in 2016, in a decision that is said to reflect the importance of Israel’s contribution to fighting the financing of terrorism. Joining the FATF allows Israel to participate in shaping global policy on the financing of terrorism. However, if Israel wishes to become a full member it must address shortcomings such as, improving identification requirements at financial institutions and expanding regulation to additional sectors.49 Funding of Hamas and Hamas operatives remains a concern to Israel, particularly through charitable organisations.

Whilst Israel is not part of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, it provides intelligence that can greatly assist in the counter ISIL operations.

NGO and private company support

Eitan Lidor

Eitan Lidor is a private Israeli firm, operated under the leadership of Eitan Lidor, a former IDF combat engineering chief officer, who also served as a UN mine action consultant and carried out demining projects across the globe. Eitan Lidor is a registered UNOPS, MoD and INMAA supplier. They carry out demining and EOD work, with employees who are former IDF combat engineers and bomb squad reserves.

They use the most up-to-date equipment, such as robots and mechanical demining systems, alongside mine detection dogs and standard mine detectors. They have a special relationship with demining technology providers DOK-ING and MineLab. Alongside the standard EOD work, which includes IEDD projects, they also provide training and capacity building for law enforcement agencies.

Israeli Mine Action Group

The Israeli Mine Action Group (IMAG) has been contracted by the INMAA to undertake demining projects.

They only carry out projects in Israel and operate under INMAA’s command. This has included land clearance work in the south, around Sapir. In 2013, they cleared just over 1km². In 2014 IMAG carried out clearance in the north, around Snir.

3.1.6 JORDAN

Threat

Jordan believes it is a likely target of terrorist acts due to its relationship with the West, particularly the United States, and its peace treaty with Israel. The threat is seen to mainly stem from external terrorist groups, and the country’s location between conflicts in Syria and Iraq is another cause for worry.

Capacity

Although all Jordanian security forces undergo counter-terrorism training at the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center in Amman, it is the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) that is in charge of investigating terrorism-related crime, often with the assistance of the Public Security Directorate. In response to IS, GID has modified its strategies to counterterrorism, particularly in the areas of intelligence gathering on IS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. Their investigations have led to the arrest of terrorists and the prevention of attacks during which weapons and explosives have been seized.

The GID also coordinates with the air forces, with which they share responsibility, on border security issues. The Jordan Border Security Program (JBSDP), which began in 2009, saw many improvements to border security. These improvements have included sensors to alert to and prevent illegal border crossings. The monitoring at border crossings and other entry points also increased. At these points, terror watch lists as well as biographic and biometric screening are used. All border guards and law enforcement receive one to two months intensive training at the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center.50

Jordanian customs have also seen improvement through the use of more advanced equipment to detect chemicals and explosives brought into or out of the country. These are used to examine all goods and luggage. The devices are portable and can also detect dual-use goods. The new devices are part of the efforts to improve customs capacity through improving speed and accuracy of examinations.51

Jordan has also engaged in efforts to counter radicalisation, particularly through mosques and among the country’s youth. This has seen civil society work in schools, universities and other important youth areas to reach out to young people and promote moderate Islam.
and community cohesion. The government has also encouraged mosques and preachers to refute extremism and promote moderate Islam to stop radicalisation through religious institutions. In November 2014, the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs announced 25 radical preachers had been prevented from giving sermons, as part of this strategy.52

However, since terrorism has increased in neighbouring states, particularly through IS’ advances in Iraq, it has led to a strain on Jordan’s economy. Whilst more funds have been required for the defence budget, and despite the efforts to counter extremism, strains on the economy and the continued rise in occasionally violent Salafism, an ultra-conservative strand of Islam, has seen many youth engaged in extremism.53

**National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR)**
The NCDR was established in 2000. They coordinate and supervise all programs and activities related to mines and Explosives Remnants of War (ERW) including:

- Mine and ERW Clearance
- Risk Education (RE)
- Survivor and Victim Assistance
- Mine Ban Convention Universalisation
- Resources Mobilisation
- Training Programs

Jordan has been working throughout the last two decades to free its land from the threat of landmines due to the threat it posed to the social and economic development within the affected regions and to the safety of individuals living there.

The NCDR was able to announce Jordan as a land free of mines from all known mined areas in 2012 – the first Middle Eastern country to complete this mission.54 The demining saw them remove more than 300,000 anti-personnel and tank mines in the Jordan Valley, Wadi Araba, and the northern areas.

The training efforts include many related to bomb disposal, safety and identification, in regard to many forms of explosives. The aim of the NCDR was to enhance the peace building process by diminishing social, economic and environmental impacts of landmines and remnants of war in a way that provides a better humanitarian environment. NCDR hoped to achieve their aims through comprehensive leadership and technical guidance on eradicating landmines and ERW.

Most of NCDR’s work now focuses on the rehabilitation of the victims that remain in Jordan. However, they also continue to develop their C-IED capabilities. In this respect, the NCDR believe they require “advanced training to deal with the latest IED technologies”.55

**Bilateral assistance**
Jordan and the US have provided training and demonstrations for the Iraqi forces to aid in their C-IED and more general counterterrorism efforts. Much of this training has taken place in the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center in Amman.

**Regional assistance**
As part of its requirements under MENAFATF, Jordan has sought to improve its ability to address terrorism financing. This saw Jordan bring its legislation up to international standards. Despite this, there have not been prosecutions for terrorism financing and these improvements still do not see non-profit organisations file suspicious transaction reports.

**International assistance**
As part of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Jordan took part in coalition military operations in both Iraq and Syria. Jordan hosts the US and other coalition members for operations, training and other coalition meetings. They have also allowed the use of their air bases and training facilities for coalition states. As a member based in the Middle East, Jordan also has a particular role in preventing terrorist fighters joining those in Syria and Iraq, and in preventing financing for terrorism.

Jordan is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), an international forum compiled of 29 countries and the EU. The GCTF sees counterterrorism experts apply their expertise to develop tools and strategies to combat the terrorist threat. Jordan is also a board member of the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ), a law-based institution that provides training to law makers and enforcers on how to address terrorism and other transnational crime that came about through the GCTF.

The NATO C-IED COE have also organised training courses to support the Jordan forces and law enforcement, including a C-IED awareness course in November 2015. The course covered IED threats, and C-IED capabilities.
As a member of the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Jordan has encouraged further cooperation between the member states to counter extremism and assist other international counterterrorism activities. The international organisation has supported Jordan’s counterterrorism exertions and encouraged support from the international community to aid Jordan. Similarly, the Arab League has praised Jordan’s effort.

3.1.7 KUWAIT (22)

Threat
Kuwait has not faced many IED attacks. Despite its proximity to Iraq, Kuwait faced its first and only suicide bombing in June 2015, when an IS-affiliated suicide bomber attacked a Shia mosque in Kuwait City during Friday prayers. The attack killed and injured over 200 civilians. Other terrorist attacks are said to have been foiled in Kuwait, which means that though the country has only seen one successful attack, more may be likely. IS sympathisers are not the only threat, with many Shia arrested for supporting terrorism. Groups that seem to attract sympathisers in Kuwait are Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and Hezbollah.

Capability
The Kuwaiti Police has been involved in investigations and tracking networks, particularly after it became evident that IS was operating in the country. There have been arrests of IS supporters and terrorist attacks have been foiled. Kuwaiti police will also respond to any reports of suspicious packages or people – they are often called out to investigate abandoned bags and cases.

Following reports and investigations, the police will often carry out raids to find explosives and other indications of terrorist activity. These are particularly targeted at those suspected of having links to IS. In July 2016 the police foiled three planned IS attacks, including a plot targeting a Shia mosque. At least six people were arrested.

The arrests in July 2016 were not the first IS related arrests that Kuwait have made – in fact, Kuwait have been quite diligent in their investigations into terrorist activity. In November 2015, local security agencies arrested individuals from an IS terror cell in Kuwait. The group of six had promoted IS online, developed recruitment materials, bought weapons and planned attacks. In August 2016, police arrested a Kuwaiti national for terrorism financing as they had funded IS sympathisers in India and facilitated the travel of recruits to Syria. Information sharing between India and Kuwait led to capture of Abdullah Hadi, the Kuwaiti terrorism financier.

Since the terror attack in June 2015, Kuwait have placed a lot of emphasis on tackling terrorism financing. In one month alone, seven were convicted of terrorism financing, some had further charges.

They are said to have taken several measures to improve the oversight and regulation of charitable fundraising, such as monitoring transfers to international beneficiaries and regulating online donations to such organisations. In December 2015, two citizens were convicted of joining and financially supporting IS. Though these actions have enabled Kuwait to capture more terrorists and prevent further IED attacks, it remains the case that there are terrorism financiers still at large within Kuwait – in 2015, 80 cases of illegal fundraising were detected.

There have been allegations of Kuwait being involved in the financing of terrorism – allegations that have been strongly refuted by the state – as well as allowing some terrorist financiers to go unpunished. In 2014, Kuwait was singled out as a country not doing enough to target terrorist financiers, when it was found that Kuwait and Qatar had both been major sources of funding for Sunni extremist groups in Syria. Improvements to counter terrorism financing efforts have been attempts to negate this image as a harbourer of terrorism financiers.

Border security has undergone significant changes in Kuwait. Biometric systems have been employed, alongside aerial reconnaissance and border sensors. However, the border security measures, particularly at entry points such as airports, do not meet international standards and more could be done to prevent terrorists and IEDs passing between borders. Both the bomber from Kuwait’s only suicide bombing and his explosive device passed through airport security. The cache of weapons and explosives found in a raid of a farmhouse in June 2016 are testament to not only thorough police investigations but also poor border security that allowed so much weaponry and explosives to be smuggled into the country.

Kuwait has recently broadened the mandate for the Center for Counselling and Rehabilitation in order to
better prevent radicalisation and terrorism recruitment. It has been hoped that the centre will begin to emulate the Muhammad bin Naif’s Center for Counselling and Rehabilitation, in Saudi Arabia.

**Bilateral assistance**
Kuwait is said to have a strong counterterrorism relationship with the US. The US has also praised Kuwait’s cooperation on information sharing to counterterrorism with neighbour states, as well as with the US. The US has been looking to increase cooperation in counterterrorism but sees Kuwait as a key ally.

**Equipment**
Kuwait has purchased approximately £4million worth of C-IED and EOD equipment from the UK between 2008 and 2016. The equipment has included jamming and disposal equipment, CBRNE detection equipment, and training devices.

The US is said to maintain around 2,200 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in Kuwait. Most of these vehicles are prepositioned for the use of the US military in their operations and the remainder are contracted for distribution to partners throughout the Middle East.

**Training**
Training efforts have seen the US partner with Kuwait in order to facilitate coordinated training efforts through the Joint and Combined Exchange Training Program. The programme develops the capabilities of local counterterrorism units through training and bilateral exercises. This also contributes to Kuwait’s counterterrorism capacity as a whole.

**Regional initiatives**
Kuwait is a member of MENAFATF. Having addressed many of MENAFATF’s concerns, Kuwait was removed from the International Cooperation Review Group process, in February 2015. This was recognition of the improvements made by Kuwait. It is hoped that Kuwait’s improvements and diligent efforts to counter terrorism financing will be sustained.

As part of the GCC, Kuwait participated in the US-GCC Counter-terrorism and Border Security Working Group meeting in Riyadh in August 2015. Though Kuwait participates in many of the counterterrorism efforts of the GCC, they are the only member that has not ratified the Gulf Security Pact. The Gulf Security Pact aims to enhance regional cooperation in regard to counterterrorism.

**International assistance and initiatives**
Kuwait is part of the 34-nation alliance led by Saudi Arabia to combat IS, as well as part of the Small Group of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, the Arab League and the GCTF. Kuwait participates within all these organisations to facilitate global counterterrorism responses.

Kuwait has been a member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) since 1969. They hold a key role and within the OIC have been vocal about countering terrorism.

**NGOs and private companies**
There are very few NGOs engaged in Kuwait in C-IED exercises. Most UXOs and mines have been removed from previous wars. Still, many were engaged in the early 2000s, such as GICHD. Recently, there are often only private companies, such as those listed below, engaged in such work in Kuwait. This work mostly sees them reassure businesses in Kuwait such as oil companies that the land they are operating on is safe.

**PAE**
PAE has been contracted to supply C-IED support to OIR, who are working in Iraq in assistance to the ISF. They are based in Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, so that PAE personnel may provide training on C-IED tactics from search and destroy to defeat the networks to the OIR and ISF. The efforts have included building a curriculum tailored to the IED threat faced and mission requirements. Moreover, PAE are enabling OIR and ISF to better respond to IEDs and other explosive hazards throughout their operations. They are providing operational support alongside developing National C-IED Strategy. Though based in Kuwait, the majority of this effort is focused in Iraq.

**Dynasafe**
Dynasafe has been operating in Kuwait for 16 years, working mostly for other private companies such as oil businesses. They have significant local knowledge and contacts in the region. The work Dynasafe has carried out in Kuwait has included searching, surveying and land clearance for UXO. Other companies that now operate under Dynasafe also have experience in Kuwait, such as BACTEC, who conducted clearance operations after the first Gulf War.
The Development Initiative (TDI)

TDI has been working in Kuwait since 2006. Recently they have been providing UXO and mine field verification support to several commercial organisations. A lot of this work has seen the removal and destruction of explosives to allow land to be used and developed for commercial agencies. Not only does this allow regeneration within the area but it also prevents terrorists reconstituting the ERW into an IED.

3.1.8 LEBANON (7)

Threat

Lebanon has become one of the states most impacted by IEDs. Over the last five years the country has suffered 2,075 deaths and injuries from 39 IED attacks. Of these deaths and injuries 96% (1,991) were civilians. In comparison to other states severely impacted by IEDs, Lebanon has not encountered many IED incidents. For example, Yemen suffered 39 IED attacks in 2015 alone, causing 1,092 deaths and injuries. In Lebanon, it appears that many attacks use multiple IEDs and cause large amounts of civilian damage through using multiple suicide bombers or vehicles laden with explosives, such as car bombs.

In 2015, Lebanon only saw 4 IED incidents. However, there were 318 deaths and injuries from these – an average of 80 per attack. In 2013, the year Lebanon experienced the most deaths and injuries from IEDs, the country saw 1,174 deaths and injuries from just 11 attacks – an average of 107 per attack. The attack with the highest number of civilian casualties for the whole of 2013 was recorded in Lebanon. It was a twin car bombing of the As-Salam and Al-Taqwa mosques in Tripoli, Lebanon. At least 47 people were killed and 500 more were injured. The bombs struck just as Friday prayers were ending and were the deadliest in Lebanon since the end of the civil war.60 However, totals have not reached those seen in 2013 since.

Recent violence has typically targeted Beirut and areas in Beqaa Valley, along Lebanon’s border with Syria. The IEDs have been used by a wide variety of groups, particularly those affiliated to IS and al-Qaeda.

Capability

National responsibility for C-IED generally lies with the Armed Forces, Internal Security Forces and the Police. The Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces routinely execute counterterrorism operations targeting groups such as al Nusra and IS. Their military operations have recently strengthened and it has seen them become more effective at tackling terrorist threats. There have been a couple of high profile operations against terrorists operating in Lebanon. The counterterror campaign has seen not only increased military operations against the groups, such as raids on IS positions, but also senior terrorist commanders arrested.70

The army has also claimed that it has foiled terrorist attacks. For example, in June the army claimed it foiled two IS attacks – one on a tourist site and the other in a crowded area.71 The intervention of the army also led to the arrest of five people involved. The Armed Forces oversee most border security and works collaboratively with other areas of law enforcement to prevent the movement of illicit goods or terrorists across the border. This is difficult given that the border between Lebanon and Syria is so porous and includes complicated terrain. Other C-IED initiatives have seen the armed forces engaged in a concerted effort to counter radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. The armed forces have attempted to disrupt terrorist ideology from impacting youth by airing moderate voices on television, advertisements, social media and other communication outlets.72

The Lebanese police have also been responsible for countering IED attacks and terrorism. They have arrested IS members, as well as collected intelligence from IED attacks. The security services were responsible for disrupting multiple terrorist networks throughout 2015. In 2015 they arrested Ahmed al-Assir, a radical Salafist cleric, who incited violence and hatred, as well as organised terrorist attacks.73

The Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) coordinates the demining efforts conducted throughout the country and ensures they comply with national and international standards. The demining and other clearance efforts conducted by NGOs in Lebanon have been aided by LMAC’s assistance. They host training events and s
eminars as well as conduct awareness raising and risk education. They are supported by the UNDP and EU funding as well as the aid of various international NGOs that operate clearance activities in Lebanon.

In 2015, Lebanon purchased £29,000 worth of C-IED equipment for detection, disrupters and disposal of IEDs from the UK.74

The threat IS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham pose has also seen Hezbollah involved in counterterrorism efforts. Christian civilians in Beqaa Valley have been trained by Hezbollah and they cooperate in the area to try to protect from extremist attacks.75

Bilateral support
The United States provided Lebanon with $2 million worth of bomb disposal equipment in 2014, alongside an increase of its military aid to the country, in response to the Islamist militant threat along the border with Syria.76 The equipment included three robots, explosive protective equipment, water cannons for deactivating IEDs, high tech X-ray equipment, and communications devices, as well as various other electronic tools needed by explosives experts.

In 2016, the US delivered three military helicopters to help Lebanon target IS, leaving 10 in their fleet.77 The US also conducts bilateral training exercises focused on C-IED and EOD with the Lebanese armed forces, such as Resolute Response 16,78 and the Antiterrorism Assistance program. The ATA assistance programme has particularly focused on building capacity at the border and in other areas of law enforcement.79

The Lebanese Army was expecting to receive $4 billion worth of aid from Saudi Arabia, for weaponry and security. However, in February 2016, Saudi Arabia announced that they were cancelling the aid in response to Lebanon’s failure to condemn the attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran in January.80 However, there is speculation that it may be for a number of reasons, including Lebanon increasingly siding with Iran, in the many disagreements between Saudi Arabia and Iran.81

Regional support and initiatives
As a member of MENAFATF, Lebanon acts to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing within Lebanon and within the MENA region. These efforts hope to intercept the funding of terrorism and disrupt terrorist networks.

Global support and initiatives
In regard to terrorist financing, Lebanon is also a member of the Egmont Group. As such, Lebanon has a Special Investigations Commission (SIC), a financial intelligence unit that was established in 2001. This means that they investigate any suspicious transaction reports and ensure the compliance of such entities as the banks and financial institutions, in the hope of preventing the funding of terrorist acts and terrorist groups, alongside other financial crimes. As part of this work SIC staff attend regional and international training events and seminars. Many of these events target terrorist financing, such as the workshop organised by the IMF in October 2015 on “Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the MENA Region: The Supervisory Response” that was held in Kuwait and attended by three SIC staff, or the training course of “Countering the Financing of Terrorism” in London in July 2015 that was organised by the UK National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit and the Metropolitan Police.

As well as fighting IS in their own country, Lebanon is also a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. Lebanon has been represented at many of the counter-ISIL meetings. Though their work continues to focus on the terrorism happening within their borders, it is thought that greater control of their borders and terrorism in Lebanon will assist in preventing it elsewhere, particularly in Syria. Lebanon’s participation in the Counter-ISIL Coalition sees the state engage with the Counter-ISIL Finance Group.

Lebanon has worked in cooperation with INTERPOL on several terrorist-related cases. They have carried out investigations for INTERPOL and have facilitated further engagement.82 Other C-IED related international organisations that Lebanon is part of include the Arab League, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

The UNMAS in Lebanon (UNMAS Lebanon) supports The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) by implementing its mandated tasks, and by assisting resource mobilisation by the LMAC as necessary. UNMAS Lebanon supports UNIFIL’s demining activities on the Lebanon-Israel border, also known as the “Blue Line”, through training, qualifying demining teams, quality assurance and monitoring operational sites. This enables UNIFIL to conduct clearance and ensures compliance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and Lebanese National Mine Action Standards (NMAS).
UNMAS provides demining training to UNIFIL troops and conducts explosive ordnance awareness briefings for UNIFIL, civilian and military personnel, as well as risk education outreach to local communities and NGOs.

**NGO and Private organisation support**

*Handicap International*

Lebanon has seen mines and other ERW cleared by organisations such as Handicap International. Handicap International has also provided victim assistance to those who have already felt the impact of IEDs, mines and other explosive weapons – they provide medical care and rehabilitation. Those particularly affected in Lebanon include refugees fleeing the violence in Syria. Many refugees faced the risk of explosive violence in Syria, where IEDs and mines had already been laid upon many routes. Now, they face further danger in Lebanon, where the danger is significantly less but the refugees do not know the terrain.

*DanChurchAid (DCA)*

DCA is part of the ACT alliance (Action by Churches Together) – an alliance that consists of more than 100 churches and humanitarian organisations across the world. DCA is rooted in the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church, but is active in many countries in the MENA region and operates regardless of religion, gender, political beliefs, race, national or ethnic origins. Their main activities have surrounded protecting democratic values, disaster relief and humanitarian mine clearance. The Mine Action efforts have focused on:

- Clearance of Mines and ERW conducted in accordance with community needs, national priorities and International Mine Action Standards.
- Risk Education in order to keep at-risk populations safe through disseminating safety messages.
- Armed Violence Reduction reduces and prevents occurrence of armed violence and reduces the social and psychological impact of armed violence through advocacy within the national authorities.
- Victim assistance enables victims of armed conflict to be reintegrated into society; either through direct support – e.g. prosthetic legs – or through long-term psychosocial support.
- Physical Security and Stockpile Management removes the threat posed to communities by unsafe storage of weapons and explosives.
- Emergency response, which aims to deliver time-critical humanitarian responses in crisis and conflicts areas.

DCA and NPA have been funded by ITF to carry out continuous support for landmine and ERW clearance activities throughout South Lebanon. The clearance operations are conducted in coordination with the LMAC, and last year 113,708 m² of land was cleared of mines and UXOs. ITF’s work in 2014 was funded by OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) and the US Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement.

The US Department of State’s Office for Weapons Removal and Abatement have granted $1,170,266 to DCA for a project that will run from October 1st 2016 to September 30th 2017, that allows DCA to continue to undertake clearance operations. However, this work is predominantly carried out in South Lebanon, where the risk of landmines and ERW is high but the risk of IEDs is low. These efforts do help to ensure that the ERW from previous conflicts is not repurposed into an IED by militants.

Before the commencement of this new funding, DCA had 108 total programme staff in Lebanon – two international and 106 national staff. This was made up of three BAC teams, four manual demining teams, and one Mine Risk Education (MRE) team.

*BACTEC (Dynasafe Group)*

BACTEC, a UK-based EOD specialist now part of Dynasafe, has taken part in efforts in 2008 to provide EOD and clearance teams to South Lebanon. Their task was to clear bombs, missiles, submunitions, cluster bombs, booby traps and landmines. BACTEC predominantly uses Lebanese EOD specialists with knowledge of the area. Previous to the UN contracting BACTEC in such efforts, BACTEC had been carrying out such operations in Lebanon for the UAE Operation Emirates Solidarity (OES). BACTEC’s OES work has seen them remove over 50,000 mines and around 100 booby traps.

*Mines Advisory Group (MAG)*

MAG has played a very significant role in Lebanon and continue to do so as more people increasingly become at risk from landmines, ERW and IEDs. MAG has worked in Lebanon to clear the land of mines and other ERW, whilst their Community Liaison teams visit affected communities to conduct surveys and spread risk education through leaflets, posters, dialogue and more recently drama. In 2014, MAG completed a Nationwide Impact Assessment survey of all cluster munition strikes across Lebanon.
Lebanon, and the organisation is the only humanitarian mine action organisation in the Lebanese Bekaa region. Many of the team members are comprised of local people trained by MAG, of which several are also women.

In Lebanon, MAG teamed up with Clowns Without Borders to create risk education lessons that children from Lebanon and those that are Syrian refugees will enjoy and take life-saving lessons away from. Educational performances were used in schools across the country, alongside other educational games and leaflets that they can share with their families and communities. The children were taught how to inform MAG if they come across a device and the danger they pose. Not only does this help protect Lebanese and Syrian children from the dangers that exist in Lebanon, but will also protect the Syrian refugees when they can return home. MAG has also worked with the Arab Puppet Theatre Foundation to create a play based on everyday dangers that the children could meet and what should be done to improve the situation.

MAG works with the LMAC to ensure that mine action activities are targeted towards community needs, enabling essential land to be safely released and allowing local people to live and work in safety. MAG is supporting the LMAC towards a “Lebanon Free from the Impact of Landmines and Cluster Munitions” by 2020.

GICHD
The GICHD have been involved in Lebanon for a decade. The GICHD has provided significant support to the LMAC. The support provided by GICHD is particularly centred around support for the management of LMAC programmes and operations. GICHD’s assistance has also seen them aid LMAC in training efforts, such as those for mechanical demining and land release, and facilitate workshops in Lebanon on demining and other clearance efforts. Their work in Lebanon has led to several studies and publications, such as on the impacts of landmines and ERW on the country and its citizens.

Conflict Armament Research (CAR) have carried out research into IEDs mostly in Iraq and Syria, however they have performed C-IED in Lebanon also. In Lebanon, CAR carries out specific C-IED training on the ground. This has included a series of C-IED training sessions teaching evidence collection, data recording, different types of IEDs, countermeasures and component tracing. Though most of CAR’s C-IED work is self-funded, this project in Lebanon is funded by the UK government to build Lebanon’s C-IED capacity.

NPA
The NPA has been clearing unexploded cluster munitions in South Lebanon since 2007 and is currently operating in the country with seven clearance teams.

NPA and local partners also launched a Landmine Victim Assistance (VA) and a MRE programme in Lebanon in 2001. Currently, NPA operates with a number of BAC Teams in South Lebanon. NPA also assists LMAC in manual clearance methods, as well as MRE and mine victim assistance activities. NPA’s operational approach ensures that the focus is on the actual threat, deploying manual assets to the areas where there is actual contamination.

It is worth noting that Bjørn Skodvin Hannisdal of the NPA wanted to make it explicitly clear that his organisation is not involved in any “C-IED work” in any country except in northern Iraq.

3.1.9 OMAN

Threat
Oman has not suffered any IED attacks since AOAV started monitoring explosive violence. However, Oman’s neighbouring states are highly impacted by IEDs and terrorism, particularly Yemen. Given its position in the Middle East and its cooperation with Western states, such as the US and UK, it has the potential to be a valuable target to terrorist groups.

Capability
As Oman’s primary insecurity is the border with Yemen, border security has remained a vital component of Oman’s efforts to prevent IED and other terrorist attacks in the country. The border with Saudi Arabia is also of concern. Over the last few years Oman has been engaged in building a border fence along its boundary with Yemen. This aims to prevent unregulated entry into Oman, which can benefit terrorists and smugglers.

However, further progress on border security is hampered by limited resources and the need for further border security training.

The policing system is relatively new to Oman, who only 40 years ago conducted internal security through walis, who acted as a type of local governor. Now, internal
security is governed by the Royal Oman Police (ROP). They are responsible for carrying out terrorism investigations, customs and border security. The Special Task Force of the ROP is accountable for dealing with explosives, and monitors the use of commercial explosives. The Special Task Force are on call to respond to emergencies.

To counter violent extremism, Oman has engaged in efforts such as “Islam in Oman” – a campaign aimed at promoting tolerance. Interfaith dialogue has also been promoted as part of the government’s projects.

**Bilateral assistance**
Oman has received training from the US government. As border security is a principal concern, Oman has frequently engaged in the US’s Export Control and Related Border Security programs. Oman is also a participant in the US Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. This has seen further training provided to Oman on border security, as well as cyber security and investigations. In 2014, the Royal Oman Police Customs Agency in Muscat conducted a week-long Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNe) Commodity Identification Training and Interdiction Tabletop Exercise, with the assistance of the US. This aimed to strengthen Oman’s ability to detect and interdict smuggled materials of this kind.

Oman is also assisting the US. Oman has accepted many of the Guantanamo inmates that have been released for resettlement and has ensured proper security and humane conditions for them. They have also provided a diplomatic channel between Middle East states and the West, as well as intelligence for counterterrorism operations.

Bilateral cooperation has also seen increased information sharing and training between Oman and Pakistan.

**Regional initiatives**
As a member of the GCC, Oman’s C-IED capabilities have benefited from workshops on customs control.

Oman is a member of the MENAFATF and acted as MENAFATF president in 2015. Oman is one of the states in the region that is most aligned with international counter terrorism financing standards. Oman must now work to make their counter terrorism financing framework as effective as possible to increase investigations and prosecutions against terrorism financiers.

**International initiatives**
Oman is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and has pledged to provide military support, humanitarian aid, and to assist in halting the flow of funds and fighters to the group. The country has been commended by the US for their contributions. However, it is not clear exactly what Oman’s contribution has been, though it has been reported that the country generated no foreign fighters serving in Iraq and Syria, as of September 2015.

Oman is also involved in the counter terrorism efforts of the Arab League and the OIC.

**NGO and private company support**
In recent years it is mostly commercial entities that helped Oman improve its C-IED and counterterrorism capacity.

In March 2015, Oman contracted SITA, a border management specialist to provide a fully integrated border management system and the tools to manage, monitor and operate the borders effectively. The system covers visa processing and security clearance, passenger processing and visitor information. This will be integrated into Oman’s existing border management solutions to provide better information about those coming into and exiting the country.

**3.1.10 PALESTINE – GAZA (42)**

**Threat**
Gaza has faced a persistent threat of low-impact IED use over the last five years. Between 2011 and 2015, Gaza saw nine IED attacks that caused deaths or injuries, recorded from English language media sources. These caused 30 deaths and injuries, of which four were civilian. Most attacks have targeted Israeli security forces, with devices planted in tunnels or roadsides.

The biggest perpetrator has been Hamas, though others such as the Popular Resistance Committee and IS are also among the perpetrators. In 2015, the only IED attack was said to be committed by IS and was the first targeting Hamas officials.

**Capability**
Currently, Hamas remains in control of the security forces in Gaza, who have supported attacks on Israel from Gaza. This allows many terror groups to maintain bases in Gaza. Hamas and other armed
groups operating in the territory, such as Jaysh al-Islam and Omar Hadid Brigades, continue to build tunnels used for the smuggling of weapons among other things – though they have faced increasing resistance from Egypt who have amplified their work to destroy the tunnels.

**International support and initiatives**

On 23 July 2014, in response to the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Gaza and the discovery of weapons and explosives caches on UN premises, the United Nations Secretary-General directed UNMAS to immediately deploy in Gaza. To mitigate the risks posed by ERW, UNMAS has provided training to over 30,000 UN staff, humanitarian workers, IDPs, engineers, construction workers and other at-risk populations to identify and safely respond to ERW contamination. Over 60,000 ERW alert flyers and booklets have been distributed to the civilian population living and working in contaminated areas.

UNMAS continues to monitor the ERW demolition processes and has ensured the safe destruction of over 2,953 items of ERWs, including aircraft bombs.

UNMAS is also working with the UNDP Rubble Removal project providing on-site ERW training sessions, quality assurance, risk assessments and technical advice on explosive ordinance disposal (EOD).

In parallel, UNMAS continues to work closely with UNICEF, UNRWA and other international organisations to ensure the widespread delivery of risk education across the Gaza Strip by training trainers and carrying out quality assurance. Within the Protection Cluster, UNMAS continues to lead the ERW/Mine Action sub-cluster, coordinating all NGOs and UN entities involved with mine action services. UNMAS also provides technical expertise to coordinate all activities across agencies and maximize coverage.

In 2015, UNMAS received $3 million from Japan, EUR 250,000 from Italy, CHF 380,000 from Switzerland, $250,000 from Denmark, $20,000 from Estonia, and £500,000 from the United Kingdom. In 2016, UNMAS received $500,000 from the Government of Japan, and EUR 800,000 from the European Union. As a result of these contributions, UNMAS Gaza operations are fully funded to December 2016.

**NGO and private company support MAG**

In 2011, MAG teamed up with the UN Mine Action Team in Gaza (UNMAT-GO) to carry out clearance work. They mainly found mortars, rockets, bombs, and M-15 anti-vehicle mines used to demolish buildings, alongside some white phosphorous ordnance. MAG helped identify the areas that needed to be given priority and provided advice to rehabilitation and development stabs, especially regarding contamination and risk. Throughout MAG's time in Gaza, they maintained a 24/7 Emergency Response capacity.

3.1.11 PALESTINE - WEST BANK (55)

**Threat**

There have been few IED attacks recorded in English-language media reports from the West Bank. Between 2011 and 2015, six injuries (mostly to security forces) were recorded from four attacks. In 2016, two attacks have been recorded so far, causing four injuries to Israeli security personnel operating in the West Bank.

The threat of violent extremism stems both from Palestinian extremists as well as extremist Israeli settlers. There is significant tension between these groups, which poses a threat to both moderate Israelis and Palestinians.

**Capability**

The division of areas in the West Bank makes identifying capabilities in the West Bank slightly more complicated. Area A is completely under Palestinian civilian and security control; Area B is under Palestinian civil control, but joint Israeli-Palestinian security control; and the security, planning and construction in Area C – which accounts for about 60% of the West Bank – is completely under Israeli control. Below we will elaborate on the Palestinian capabilities throughout the West Bank, and touch upon further Israeli efforts.

The Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) monitors and intervenes to prevent violence from Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), in the West Bank. They have successfully intervened to prevent terrorist attacks from such groups against the IDF, and other Israeli targets. They have also been responsible for the arrest of terrorists in groups such as Hamas.
The Preventative Security Organisation works to prevent internal terrorism and is responsible for carrying out investigations into those suspected of terrorism. However, they lack the training and experience that would make them more effective in this role.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) controls the Friday sermons of the mosques in the West Bank to make sure they do not incite violence. The PA under President Mahmoud Abbas has seen significant steps taken to avoid messages or remarks that could incite violence. Often those in positions of authority who make such remarks are reprimanded. Abbas recognises the State of Israel and works towards the possibility of peace.

The IDF and other Israeli security agencies continue to operate in the West Bank but it still has little control to enforce further wishes to stop incitement of such violence. They often carry out similar responsibilities to the PASF in preventing terrorism and investigating any suspected activities. However, the Israeli forces have greater capabilities in investigating such activities, as well as better resources. The Israeli forces operating in the West Bank have so far had greater success in the West Bank in targeting terrorists in terms of arrests.

Alongside the INMAA, the Palestinian Mine Action Centre (PMAC) coordinates demining and land clearance efforts across the West Bank. PMAC was established by the PA in February 2012 to coordinate mine action in the West Bank. They receive technical advice from UNMAS. PMAC has set up subcommittees to tackle the varied areas of concern such as risk education, technical issues, and legal affairs. UNMAS provided training to a team of 30 in demining, though they lack appropriate equipment — the Civil Police EOD unit conduct rapid response to locate and remove items of UXO.

PMAC has conducted surveys, with the aid of HALO Trust and identified contaminated areas. Though areas have been identified, PMAC does not have the authorisation from Israel to conduct or oversee mine clearance operations. The only operations allowed so far have been those of HALO, who work in coordination with both PMAC and the INMAA and whose work is monitored by 4CI Security, as contracted by the INMAA.

Israel is also responsible for the border security in the West Bank.

**Bilateral assistance**

The US aids counterterrorism efforts in the West Bank, and has provided training and equipment to the PASF,
as well as helping with capacity building. This has included assistance to the PA’s criminal justice system in investigating and prosecuting individuals for terrorist-related activity.

Canada has assisted investigations through the development of a forensic science laboratory, with the assistance of the UNODA. This has seen PA personnel improve their basic forensic investigatory knowledge. PMAC received US$171,000 from New Zealand.

Training
The US funded training for the PASF, which took place at the Jordan International Police Training Center, the Academy for Civil Protection, the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center, and the PA’s Central Training Institute in Jericho.

REGIONAL ASSISTANCE
The PA became a full member of MENAFATF in 2015, recognising the PA’s efforts in tackling the financing of terrorism and money laundering. Terrorism financing has been made a criminal offense and the Palestinian Financial Follow-Up Unit has been investigating suspicious transactions. Despite these efforts improvement is limited through slow legislative progress and their lack of control across most of the West Bank.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE
UNMAS provide technical advice to PMAC and trained a team of 30 in demining to improve PMAC’s capacity – though they lacked equipment. UNMAS have also been involved in improving cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian authorities to coordinate mining efforts to allow land clearance efforts to be increased in the West Bank. Furthermore, they facilitated a partnership between UNICEF and PMAC for the development of MRE in the West Bank.95

NGO AND PRIVATE COMPANY ASSISTANCE
Quadro Projects and Technologies
Quadro Projects and Technologies is an Israeli commercial operator that specialises in demining and EOD with experience stemming from the employees’ years in the IDF. In 2013, they were contracted by Roots of Peace to conduct mine clearance in Husan, Bethlehem, as approved by INMAA. The minefield was partially cleared by Quadro, totaling 7,000m² of mined area cleared. HALO Trust cleared the remaining contamination.

HALO Trust
HALO works in coordination with INMAA and PMAC to carry out clearance work in the West Bank. It began its work in April 2014 in a-Nabi Elyas, Qalqiliya District, where there was a 64,000m² minefield, close to the village. By November 2015 the land was declared fit for use again, allowing families to use the land safely. In June HALO’s operation in the West Bank had expanded to cover a new area in Bethlehem, close to the village of Hussan. During this operation 215 mines were found and destroyed. The work was complete by January 2016. HALO operates in the West Bank with the funding of the US Department of State (PM/WRA), the Netherlands, the British FCO and New Zealand. Equipment has been donated for the operation by Hans K. Rausing Charitable Trust and NVESD.

In May 2016, HALO launched a campaign in coordination with Israelis and Palestinians to help them provide land clearance at a large minefield at the site of the Baptism of Christ, which blocks access to sacred churches and monasteries.96

3.1.12 QATAR

Threat
In recent years, Qatar has faced very little threat from IEDs. However, Qatar is located in a region that has grown prone to such attacks and borders Saudi Arabia, where bombings have become more frequent.

Capability
The State Security agency and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) hold primary responsibility for C-IED and counterterrorism initiatives in the country. The MoI security forces respond to incidents of insecurity in the country, such as terrorist threats. The security agency is responsible for monitoring the terrorist threat and cooperating with the MoI to share such information. The National Anti-Terrorism Committee, under the operation of the MoI, constructs the country’s counterterrorism policy and coordinates the various limbs of the government engaged in counterterrorism efforts.

Though the state security forces may lack resources and training to improve effectiveness, they do have state of the art surveillance allowing the state to easily detect and monitor terrorist suspects.

Similarly, border security at the main points of entry employs biometric screening and monitoring for those coming in and out of the country.
**Bilateral assistance**

Qatar are involved in information sharing initiatives with the US to aid counterterrorism efforts in the region, and in 2015, Qatar began participating in the US’s Antiterrorism Assistance program.

India and Qatar have also recently agreed to further engage in information sharing efforts to combat terrorism financing. 97

**Regional initiatives**

Qatar is a member of MENAFATF. The financial intelligence unit is also a member of the Egmont Group. The country has increasingly been looking to improve its compliance with international laws and standards to combat terrorism financing. This has seen greater efforts to investigate and prosecute those suspected of financing terrorism. However, this may be in response to allegations that Qatar has been involved in funding terrorist groups such as al-Nusra Front – even those associated with Qatari royalty and those in the financial sector have been accused of financing terror groups. 98

**International initiatives**

As a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Qatar has aided the coalition’s military operations. Qatar hosts two US military installations, and have been involved in training efforts, operational and logistical support.

Qatar is also part of the 34-state Islamic Counterterrorism Coalition/Military Alliance and the GCTF.

During the 13th United Nations Crime Congress, the “Doha Declaration” was adopted. Qatar announced a new educational initiative to counter violent extremism, targeting displaced youth. This saw the US agree to $49million funding alongside the UNODC for programs such as prisoner rehabilitation and youth education.

Alongside Switzerland, Qatar co-hosted an event to highlight the role of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) in preventing violent extremism. Qatar and Switzerland are also the fund’s largest donors.

**Private company support**

Airbus Defence and Space was contracted to provide the national Security Shield to Qatar, to cover Qatar’s 600km of borders. The technology addresses the threat of smuggling and terrorist crossing. The system is now operational in Qatar and the security forces have received the appropriate training. 99

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### 3.1.13 SAUDI ARABIA (24)

**Threat**

The threat from IEDs in Saudi Arabia returned in 2015 when the country suffered a string of suicide bombings. The first occurred May 2015, and four more followed throughout the year. The attacks resulted in 189 deaths and injuries, of which 90% (170) were civilians, as most attacks targeted Shia mosques. The country has already seen three bombings in 2016, though these have resulted in significantly less civilian harm. Where the perpetrators of such attacks have been identified, IS or affiliated individuals have been responsible for all attacks in Saudi Arabia.

The years preceding this recent escalation of attacks were relatively quiet since al-Qaeda’s attacks in Saudi Arabia in 2003 and 2004. A few high profile attacks have occurred, such as the assassination attempt of a Saudi prince by a suicide bomber using a “Body Cavity Bomb” (BCB), but very little had occurred between then and 2015.

**Capability**

The Ministry of Interior (MoI) Special Emergency Force (SEF) is a special operations counter-terrorism unit of the Saudi Arabian General Security. It is the equivalent of a special weapons assault team (SWAT) and have a counter terrorism and counter piracy remit. They have 13 bases throughout Saudi Arabia and have been the target of IS attacks in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia itself. They have also been deployed to Yemen in the Saudi offensive against the Houthi rebellion. After the al-Qaeda attacks, Saudi Arabia bolstered these types of forces.

The personnel go through a rigorous training programme designed to prepare soldiers for every possible contingency, from an attack on a VIP convoy to hostage search and recovery, bomb clearance, storming militant hideouts, pinpoint parachute landings, precision shooting and surveillance. There is a strong focus on explosives’ training, and some teams take specialised extra training in handling IEDs triggered by every-day objects, from the tab on a can of Pepsi to a doctored Quran or a small briefcase.

Every region of the kingdom also has a unit of the engineering corps of the Saudi Army. These will respond to
reports of mines and UXOs. They carry out EOD for the small residue of UXOs left from the 1991 Gulf War, including cluster munition remnants. The clearance of such ordnance not only protects civilians but stops militants from appropriating them.

In late 2015, Saudi security forces in Riyadh discovered and interdicted an IED cell and arms cache.

The Mabahith is the “secret police” agency of the Ministry of Interior in Saudi Arabia, and deals with domestic security and counter-intelligence. They are responsible for finding terrorist networks, conducting raids and collecting intelligence to bring down the terrorist networks that may be responsible for spreading IEDs. Their methods have been called into question however, and have often been the focus of human rights investigations.

Border security personnel man checkpoints and other entry-points into the country. The latest reports from Saudi customs confirm that the total number of explosives confiscated in 2014 saw a 67% increase from the previous year. Security experts expect a 250% rise for 2015 following major seizures on the Saudi-Bahraini border. Terrorists have been trying to bring C4 and RDX explosives into the country. This is because “they are easily transported and can be used in small quantities, unlike conventional explosives”. It was suspected that the RDX explosives come from Iran. 100

Smuggling through the Yemeni border decreased because of the war in Yemen that led to the border coming under tighter control, but as a consequence smugglers have instead resorted to maritime channels to bring prohibited IED-making material into Saudi Arabia, as the Gulf coast is harder to control than the country’s land borders.

Neighbourhood police units have taken responsibility for engaging their communities in counterterrorism efforts. They encourage citizens to report suspicious packages, behaviour, or people. The government has also offered rewards for this community engagement.

Whilst Saudi Arabia is involved in multiple efforts at home and abroad to counter terrorism, it must be noted that they have also been accused of supporting terrorism. In Syria, through its opposition to Bashar al-Assad, Saudi have armed and funded terrorist-designated groups.

Sakina Campaign for Dialogue (SCD)
The SCD is part of the MoI's counter extremism efforts. This is Saudi’s de-radicalisation program. The programme encourages and assists clerics and propagators of Islam to spread moderate Islamic ideology and to explain the problems of extremist ideologies such as those encouraged by terror groups and extremists in general. The programme gives answers to those who have questions or are confused by different Islamic narratives as well as engages directly with those who have expressed understanding for extremist ideologies – some of these are found and engaged with one-on-one in al-Qaeda affiliated forums. 101

The SCD also has an online database for those who want answers through this avenue. On the database one can find research, religious texts, news and educational material. Some people may reach this site through Sakina’s social media efforts to engage young people, most vulnerable to recruitment. Staff can also be contacted through the online platform.

Sakina volunteers are also engaged in research to better understand recruitment drivers and the attraction of extremist ideologies and groups.

Other counter violent extremism efforts have seen clerics and royalty denouncing extremism and terrorist group ideologies, as well as public awareness campaigns. Public awareness campaigns seek to educate citizens on the harm of violent extremism. These messages are taught in schools, mosques and sporting events, but can also be seen in advertisements and on television.

Mohammed bin Naif Counselling and Care Center
The Mohammed bin Naif Counselling and Care Center (MNCC) is considered a rehabilitation institution for youth that have a belief in Islamic extremism. It aims to deliver through “scientific and practical correction”, a change in behaviour. It encourages moderate Islam and national loyalty. Between 2007 and 2015 the MNCC has seen 3071 beneficiaries – some from Guantanamo. The MNCC uses religion, psychology and sociology to try and rehabilitate militants and reintegrate them into society if they are deemed able to do so.

The MNCC has been referred to as the “center-piece of Saudi Arabia’s counter-terrorism strategy”. 102 Most of the militants at the MNCC were those responsible for al-Qaeda bombings between 2003 and 2006 that were
being held in Saudi prisons. Of the 3,000 treated, only 13% are said to have returned to militancy, and half of these have been arrested. 103

Despite these efforts, many say more should be done to counter extremist ideologies earlier in a citizen’s life, such as an overhaul of the education system and an end to demonising Shia Muslims, which unfortunately is encouraged in the country’s national curriculums.

Equipment

The Saudi Ministry of Defense in 2013 acquired several C-IED robots to be used by its bomb disposal units, and more than 2600 high security individuals have been trained to use these robots. The Saudi Security Forces have published online photos of the C-IED robot TEODOR (Telerob Explosive Ordnance Disposal & Observation Robot) and praised its effectiveness. 104

The remote-controlled, heavy-duty robot is designed and manufactured in Germany by Telerob, a business unit of Cobham Unmanned Systems. The robot is designed to provide enhanced bomb disposal capabilities to EOD teams. It is used to identify and disarm booby traps, fireworks, IEDs and other dangerous objects in closed areas, buildings and vehicles. It also performs reconnaissance, monitoring and investigation of objects in exceptionally dangerous conditions. On July 4 2016, Saudi officers foiled an attempted bombing of the US consulate in Jeddah using TEODOR, which dismantled 8 IEDs around the consulate during a five-hour window. An attacker had just a few minutes before detonated his suicide vest when security guards approached him near the parking lot of a neighbouring hospital.

In December 2011, the United States finalised their “largest international defence sale in history — worth approximately $29.4 billion — to Saudi Arabia. This sale included 84 advanced F-15SA fighter aircraft and updates to the Kingdom’s existing 70 F-15S aircraft. Other large programs include 36 AH-64D Block III Apache helicopters, as well as ammunition for the Royal Saudi Land Forces; 24 AH-64D Block III Apache helicopters and 72 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters for the Ministry of the National Guard; and numerous PATRIOT air defence systems and upgrades”. 105 A sale of over $11 billion was made in October 2015 for a Multi-Mission Surface Combatant ship and associated equipment, parts and logistical support.

Saudi Arabia has also bought millions of pounds’ worth of C-IED equipment from the UK — details of which can be found on Campaign Against the Arms Trade’s website. 106 This includes bomb suits and other protective equipment, detection systems, disposal and jamming equipment, equipment for initiating explosives, robots and robot accessories.

Bilateral support

Saudi security forces along with their Bahraini counterparts conduct frequent thorough searches of the cars crossing the bridge connecting Saudi Arabia with Bahrain. Saudi customs officers, helped by trained police dogs, have managed to foil numerous attempts to smuggle the highly explosive “RDX” material, according to the Ministry of Interior. The smugglers are arrested and bomb-making manuals, along with documents relating to military patrols are often found with them.

Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have been involved in information sharing to better protect their countries, mainly along their shared border.

Saudi is also considered one of the US’ best partners in the Middle East, and in recent years they have further increased their bilateral cooperation. All counterterrorism efforts have involved consultation with the US, particularly given that US personnel have been the targets of terrorism within Saudi Arabia. This cooperation ensures security for US installations and interests. The US, in their 2016 Security Cooperation Fact Sheet, expressed their intention to continue to collaborate with Saudi Arabia in counterterrorism matters. This includes continued joint training for special forces operations and counterterrorism forces and bolstering maritime security. This will see the US maintain its training and advisory services within the Kingdom.

Regional support

MENAFATF

Saudi Arabia is a member of the MENAFATF as part of its efforts to combat terrorism financing. Saudi Arabia has attempted to gain recognition as a leader in fighting terrorism financing in the region. The MoI has offered training programs to Saudi financial institutions as well as personnel from other areas concerned with countering terrorism financing, such as judges and border officials. In 2015, Saudi Arabia became an “observer” in the FATF — a step to gaining full membership.
GCC
At the US-GCC Camp David Summit in 2015 Saudi Arabia reiterated its efforts to counter terrorism and in August 2015 hosted the US-GCC Counterterrorism and Border Security Working Group. Saudi Arabia continues to encourage greater information sharing and other cooperative efforts to contribute to global counterterrorism endeavours.

International initiatives and support
King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID)
The KAICIID is an intergovernmental organisation founded by Saudi Arabia, Austria, and Spain. It has the aim of promoting dialogue to prevent and resolve conflict through understanding and cooperation. They hope to foster dialogue among people of different faiths and cultures that bridges animosities, reduces fear and instils mutual respect.

Regarding C-IED work, they are part of the international efforts to counter the root causes of violent extremism that focus on the networks that facilitate terrorism and IED use. KAICIID consistently condemns terrorist attacks of all forms. They advocate that all forms of prejudice must be rejected and that no terror or violence is acceptable – it is hoped that the dialogue will achieve reconciliation.

KAICIID has facilitated workshops alongside the OIC, with C-IED consequences, such as those targeting the roots of extremism, including online radicalisation. KAICIID has also enabled dialogues between many experts as part of the fight against violent extremism.

Islamic Counterterrorism Coalition
In December 2015, the Saudi government announced a 34-state Islamic Counterterrorism Coalition to be headquartered in Riyadh. The coalition will focus on cooperative efforts between the member states, particularly those concerning countering violent extremism. Their main terror group of concern in IS, although they remain involved in countering other terror groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as well.

Counter ISIL Coalition
Saudi Arabia is also part of the Counter ISIL Coalition. As part of its efforts, it co-leads the Counter-ISIL Finance Group, alongside Italy and the US. The Counter-ISIL Financial Group aims to destroy IS’s financial infrastructure. Saudi Arabia has been part of significant efforts to hold terrorism financiers accountable. Despite Saudi Arabia’s counter terrorism-financing, it remains the case that individuals and groups in Saudi Arabia continue to provide financial support to Sunni-based terrorist groups such as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. Although this has had to take on new forms as Saudi strengthens its counter terrorism financing. It is now the case that policing must better its efforts to stop cash being smuggled out of the country to support terrorism. Saudi Arabia is also part of the Arab League, the OIC and the GCTF. Within these, Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism efforts have been applauded and Saudi Arabia has played an important role in encouraging such efforts within these larger organisations.

NGO and private companies support and initiatives
DSA Detection
DSA Detection is a global manufacturer and distributor with offices in Saudi Arabia. They produce trace detection products for both the operation and maintenance of all explosive trace detection (ETD). Also, X-ray correct inert explosive simulants, IED training aids, and test articles used in training screeners to identify threats and to verify security checkpoint equipment are properly identifying threats. This equipment is used in training packages that DSA provides.

G4S
G4S is a global security company that delivers security and security related services across the world. They work across six continents and 100 countries and they have a $5bn annual turnover. G4S have delivered a 3-year integrated training transformation (ITT) programme for the Saudi Arabian MoI SEF to develop a team of operationally experienced instructors to train and mentor future SEF, particularly in EOD and C-IED.

The G4S personnel will be providing lessons and practical C-IED and EOD training exercises from awareness to clearance, training and tactics. G4S have also been engaged in other security projects in Saudi Arabia, such as combating terror threats during Mecca pilgrimages.

3.1.14 SYRIA (4)

Threat
Syria presents a very different C-IED approach as the country is almost wholly divided by civil war. However, IEDs have brought even more suffering to an already devastated population. Between 2011 and 2015, Syria saw 8,659 deaths and injuries from 307 IED incidents.
Of these casualties, 81% (7,027) were civilians. However, after the colossal increase from 2011 to 2012, following the escalation in fighting, the amount of IED incidents since 2012 has decreased, as have the casualties. However, the lethality per IED attack has increased.

**Capability**
Due to the escalation in fighting and the accompanying IED attacks, it has been difficult for many national entities to engage in C-IED activities. The government is focused on their own agendas and with a nation so divided, a C-IED strategy would be difficult to develop. C-IED efforts have hence mostly taken the form of airstrikes on terrorist groups, targeting IED factories and perpetrators, and as part of larger counter-terrorism initiatives, although these airstrikes also target non-terrorist rebel groups. It is also important to highlight that Syria has for a long time been considered a state sponsor of terrorism. This has allowed groups such as IS and al-Qaeda to flourish and carry out attacks both internally and externally.

**Bilateral support**
These initiatives have seen states, as part of the US-led coalition, operate airstrikes on armed group targets, such as IS. The coalition efforts that see the destruction of terrorist group members and their facilities prevent many IEDs from being made and deployed. Further military operations, such as those of Operation Inherent Resolve, have seen even greater success. Only recently, control of Manbij was retaken with OIR assistance. Syrian Democratic Forces are in the process of clearing the city to make it safe for civilians to return.

**Regional support**
Syria is a member of MENAFATF. However, as most business transactions are conducted in cash, monitoring or investigating suspicious transactions is made rather difficult. There is also concern that the government is involved in terrorist finance schemes.

**International support**

**Military**
The IED concern in Syria for most of the world is caused by IS. Hence, the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL has operated in Syria in an effort to combat the IS threat. Over 15,000 air strikes have been conducted by the coalition in Iraq and Syria. The flow of foreign terrorist fighters to Syria and Iraq has decreased, whilst many are also leaving the group. IS fighters’ salaries have seen cuts and their ability to recruit has diminished.

**Humanitarian**
Despite the challenges to operating C-IED programs in Syria there are a few that have carried out work, such as clearance, risk education, data collection, capacity building and victim assistance. UNMAS is one of the C-IED actors operating in Syria. In response to the threat posed by IEDs and other ERW, UNMAS deployed to southern Turkey in August 2015, where they could begin operations to provide assistance in Syria. UNMAS provides overall coordination for the mine action sector and partners, technical support and oversight, and has supported direct implementation of clearance and risk education activities. Their initiatives have included clearance as well as risk education which is especially important for those returning to Syria and recently liberated areas.

UNMAS has already been responsible for the 14 tonnes of ERW that have already been destroyed in the city of Kobane on the Syrian-Turkey border. This has allowed significant amounts of land and buildings to be declared safe for use again for the community. Furthermore, it has prevented the potential prospect of the explosives being utilised in the creation of more IEDs in Syria and bordering areas. UNMAS’s work has also included victim assistance. This allows survivors of IEDs and other explosives to receive the help they need.

Given the nature of the conflict in Syria and the scale of the IED threat, clearance of IEDs has not been possible in most of the worst impacted areas. Therefore, UNMAS has focused on training to improve local capabilities in responding to the threat. Ongoing conflict in many governorates prevents access by humanitarian mine action organisations. The extent and impact of contamination has resulted in Syrians with no formal training conducting ad hoc clearance without the technical ability to do so. The capacity of some local teams conducting clearance has been reduced by half as a result of casualties occurring during operations. While a comprehensive humanitarian clearance programme is not currently possible, UNMAS believes it is possible to train local capacity to survey and clear cluster munitions and other ERW. Since these areas are inaccessible to qualified international staff, capacity building adapted to the threat as well as the needs of communities will be the key to reducing the threat. To address this, UNMAS is providing a training and mentoring programme for national organisations in to deal with specific explosive hazards safely.
Training has focused on clearance, awareness raising and risk education. This will not only help local responders but also civilians looking to return home. In the latter half of 2015, UNMAS partners reached 110,000 people in Syria and provided safety briefings to 166 United Nations and non-governmental humanitarian staff.111

NGO support
Other actors have provided C-IED assistance from a far. Similar to Iraq Body Count, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) and the Center for Documentation of Violations in Syria (VDC Syria) have continued research and data collection in relation to the violence in Syria, including IEDs, often using sources on the ground.

VDC Syria
The VDC has been monitoring human rights violations in Syria since April 2011. The group documents deaths, including names where possible, detainees, those who are missing and those who are kidnapped. Statistics are published on a weekly, monthly and yearly basis, with total figures and graphs available on the website. Extensive information is recorded for each death, with information including, where possible, name, status (i.e. civilian or non-civilian), ID card number, event location, cause of death and notes. The records also include photographs where possible, and further information which generally contains notes on specific weapons.

The VDC has more than 30 activists in several Syrian cities and regions, and a team of coordinators who live both inside and outside Syria. Those activists inside Syria gather and document information on human rights violations. They also depend on “reliable sources like field hospitals, cemeteries, casualties’ families and some of the media centers”112 Initial information is collected the day of, or in the days following, an incident. In the days, weeks, and months after, lists of those who were killed are sent to the field activists to ensure that there are no errors and that as much information as possible is contained in each record.

The data is not broken down specifically enough to determine the number of deaths caused by IEDs in Syria. While such information is contained in the notes of each record, it is not easily searchable. The data can however be downloaded and used for analysis.

Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
SOHR has a similar utility. SOHR was established in May 2006, initially to raise awareness of human rights and freedom of speech violations in Syria. Rami Abdelrahman, a Syrian national who now lives in Coventry, England, runs the organisation. In March 2011, the group began counting deaths from the Syrian uprising and conflict, including those caused by IEDs. The numbers of deaths recorded by SOHR have been regularly been reported by NGOs and international newspapers in coverage of the conflict.

Abdelrahman says that he receives reports of fatalities from over 200 individual sources within Syria, who he stays in contact with via mobile phone and Skype. According to the New York Times, four men inside Syria help to report and collate the information provided by activists. Incident reports are published on the website, alongside information regarding fatalities.

The data provided by the SOHR is presented in incident reports, and a downloadable database does not exist. This makes it difficult to search for specific information. Since most international media is banned from Syria, it is extremely difficult to verify the information provided by the SOHR. Both SOHR and VDC provide C-IED in the form of data collection. This can be used to analyse the use of IEDs and exemplifies the ability to record IED incidents for intelligence purposes for attack the network C-IED efforts.

Handicap International
Handicap International has provided risk education teams to visit displaced people in camps to provide education on the dangers of ERW. This has particularly targeted children, who are considered especially vulnerable. They have also provided local demining training courses in Kobani, where Handicap International have focused their demining attentions, as the contamination there is on a level rarely seen before. The initial surveys found on average 10 pieces of munitions per square km, and booby traps placed all over Kobani, including booby-trapped corpses, that have already proved lethal.113 Handicap International's efforts in Kobani have been accompanied by further risk education and clearance.

DCA
DCA has provided EOD specialists to tackle the IED contamination in Syria’s Kobani in 2015, with the financial assistance of the Danish government.114 The
EOD specialists have taken part in an advanced refresher course on IEDs to prepare them for Kobani, as the IEDs they will see in Kobani will require highly specialised skills. The IEDs will include booby traps and other notoriously difficult and lethal IEDs. The DCA EOD specialists will have also been briefed in the terrain and the country specific knowledge they will require. The clearance operation should allow civilians to return to their homes safely and recommence their work and lives.

**Danish Demining Group (DDG)**

DDG has one office in Damascus, Syria, with one local staff and one expat staff. Since 2013, DDG has conducted an ERW Risk Education (ERWRE) project alongside the Syrian Ministry of Education (MoE). Through risk education the DDG hope to raise awareness and encourage safe behaviour, particularly for children who are made further vulnerable due to their curiosity and lack of experience. To ensure this knowledge reaches children they have begun a ‘train the trainers’ programme to train school teachers from the most affected areas of the most impacted governorates – Aleppo, Daraa, Raqqa, Hasaka, Homs, Hama, Damascus.

The training is conducted in Damascus. The training aims to provide all identified teachers with a sound basic knowledge of ERWRE techniques, but focuses upon the practical aspects of designing appropriate messages to be delivered to school children. Awareness materials such as notebooks, T-shirts, leaflets and posters are to be distributed to schools with safety messages to increase awareness further and act as training aids.

**Conflict Armament Research**

CAR has also provided significant intelligence that could be used to counter IS in Syria. The report mentioned earlier, “Tracing the Supply of Components Used in Islamic State IEDs”, also examined those used in Syria and provides extensive information on how IS’ IEDs have been made. CAR’s work in Syria has consisted of IED mapping, contamination mapping, some C-IED training, incident reporting of battlefield damage assessment, in-field recovery of IEDs and IED component parts (samples’ collecting), recovery of explosive precursors and some chemical agents, and components’ tracing, as well as technical and biometric exploitation in conjunction with the FBI. The findings can be used by forces on the ground to conduct counterterrorism and C-IED activities.
with search and destroy bomb making factory operations. The Turkish Bomb Data Center (TBDC) is a part of this Division. The TBDC archives all bomb events and has done so since 1978. The TBDC also provides information to bomb technicians about new threats.

The National Police also operate an outreach programme to affected communities, to reach those that may be vulnerable to terrorist recruitment tactics. This programme includes social projects, as well as training for local officers and teachers. The training helps those that may come into contact with vulnerable people counter extremist messages and to notice signs of terrorist interaction.

The Diyanet, Turkey’s Religious Affairs Office within government, operates a similar programme but through the religious leaders and associations, thus reaching congregations. The Diyanet also released a report explaining why IS’s ideology is un-Islamic.  

The Turkish Customs Administration (TCA) enforces border security. Part of their roles is preventing illegal substances and terrorists from passing through the border, particularly explosives and other terrorism-related materials. In the past, issues have been reported such as lack of personnel, adequate equipment, intelligence and basic supplies. However, the TCA have been engaged in many efforts to improve their capabilities. The TCA has focused on efforts to improve their effectiveness, knowing that many customs officials are already stretched and with assistance have improved the ways in which monitoring and operating is carried out.

Though the TCA has been predominantly focused on narcotics, they had trained four dogs in detecting explosives and ammunition as opposed to the complete absence of such dogs before 2000. Recent steps taken by Turkey have seen them commended for the betterment of their counter-terrorism efforts, such as increased arrest and prosecution of terrorists, increased information sharing arrangements and improved border security. However, they were also criticised for being so internally focused.

**Bilateral support**

In 1996 the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and TCA signed a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement. This has seen them regularly meet to share best practices for border security and trade facilitation. As well as collaboration and cooperation, the CBP has delivered training programs to the TCA on customs and border control.

German and UK Customs administrations have engaged in efforts to support Turkey’s improvement of its customs work, particularly in risk management. Twelve workshops and 38 seminars were organised between 2012 and 2013 for Turkish customs officials. These were attended by 727 customs officials, whilst 35 customs officers took the opportunity to participate in study visits or traineeships in Germany and the UK. 16 staff members attended train-the-trainer courses on customs techniques, so that they may pass this knowledge into further customs training in Turkey.

**Regional support**

The TCA cooperates with the administrations operating in the member countries of the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center (SELEC) and European Union. The EU’s assistance to Turkey, such as through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA-II), has seen projects which aim to improve border and customs security and surveillance through modernisation of border surveillance systems and enhanced inter-agency collaboration in line with the EU’s integrated border management policies and strategies. EU projects have allowed the TCA to purchase equipment, such as vehicles for “mobile customs enforcement units” and technical control equipment used by mobile units (drugs and explosive detectors, density measurement devices, videoscopes and laptops), as well as baggage scanning systems.

**International support and initiatives**

Turkey formally joined the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) and began operating anti-IS airstrikes in 2015. Turkey had previously followed a policy of noninterventionism towards IS, but after the IS attack on Suruç in July 2015 that killed 33 and wounded 104, their position changed. They have conducted airstrikes into both Iraq and Syria, and allowed US-led coalition forces to use Incirlik air base to conduct operations.

In response to the threat IS pose in both Turkey and Syria, Turkey has further engaged across the border in Syria since the end of August 2016. Turkey’s broadened engagement in Syria came just days after IS used a child proxy ‘suicide bomber’ to carry out an attack on a wedding in Gaziantep, south Turkey. The IED killed at
least 54 people, including 29 children, and wounded over 230. Since then, Turkey has supported attempts to push IS out of Jarabulus, one of IS’s last strongholds near the Turkish border. Turkey have indicated that their assistance in north Syria will not end until it is secured and they will continue to assist efforts to rid Syria and Iraq of IS. Many of Turkey’s efforts in Syria and Iraq have also targeted PKK and YPG forces, groups which Turkey considers terrorists.

Turkey is a founding member if the GCTF, an international forum compiled of 29 countries and the EU. Through bringing together counterterrorism experts the forum hopes to use the expertise to develop tools and strategies to combat the terrorist threat. Turkey has worked extensively on the GCTF Horn of Africa Working Group to target the specific issues within the region. As well as participating in this forum, Turkey is also a founding member of the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ), a law-based institution that provides training to law makers and enforcers on how to address terrorism and other transnational crime.

In regard to terrorism financing, Turkey is part of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body that seeks to ensure the effective combatting of money laundering and terrorism financing. At one-point Turkey’s lack of compliance with FATF recommendations risked its membership, but recently Turkey has stepped up its efforts by introducing new measures to comply with FATF standards. In regard to terrorist financing, Turkey strengthened reporting requirements for suspected terrorist financing transactions and adopted a new regime on the Prevention of the Financing of Terrorism. However, the non-profit sector is not audited regularly for counter terrorism financing purposes, nor does the sector receive adequate advice on the matter.

NGO and private actors

DDG

DDG have been providing ERW risk education to Syrian refugees in Turkey since 2013. It is hoped this will not only be useful in Turkey, where the area is unfamiliar to them, but also on their return home. Similar to DDG’s programme in Syria, children are the primary target of this education, but adults are taught as well. Humanitarian organisations operating from Turkey and providing assistance to those affected in Northern Syria are also supplied with MRE.

Conflict Armament Research

Although CAR do not operate in Turkey, their research into the IEDs used by IS has led them to some Turkish companies, whose materials have ended up in such IEDs. Turkey’s mining and agricultural sectors, which employ such chemicals and explosives, have been strongly implicated in CAR’s research. In total CAR identified 13 companies involved in IS’ IED supply chain in Turkey. The items produced in Turkey that ended up in IS IEDs include chemical precursors, containers, detonating cord, cables and wires.

3.1.16 UAE

Threat

The UAE faces little threat from IEDs. UAE borders countries that face a similar threat level. However, they remain part of a region where use of such weapons is increasing and as this has already impacted neighbouring Saudi Arabia, it poses a threat to the UAE too.

Capability

UAE’s C-IED efforts are largely preventative measures aimed to counter radicalisation and extremism. In 2015, UAE broadened their discrimination law to criminalise hate speech and acts that promote religious hatred and intolerance. It banned referring to those who are not of your own religion as infidels. However, the new laws have been criticised for their broadness, under which atheism may be criminalised for example.

Other initiatives have seen guidelines provided to mosques for Friday sermons and training to imams on messages of tolerance and peace. The UAE has also engaged in bilateral initiatives to target the promotion of violent extremism, particularly via the internet.

State security forces are responsible for investigations and responding to terrorist incidents. The weapons and explosives section of the police conduct regular specialised training for UAE police and other regional participants.

Bilateral support

The US offered UAE support for their counter terrorism efforts against IS and AQAP in the form of a case for 1,000 GBU-31B/B(V)1 and B(V)3 precision tail kits, and implemented cases for 600 GBU-12 laser-guided kits with associated containers, fuses, and repair parts.
The US and UAE cooperate to combat terrorism financing through the UAE-US Financial Counterterrorism Task Force. The Task Force is a means of enabling further coordination and information sharing between the two countries to destroy the flow of funding to terrorist groups.

**Regional initiatives**

UAE has been used by terrorist organisations to facilitate the financing of terrorism. As a member of MENAFATF, UAE has sought to prevent this through greater action to disrupt terrorism financing and have also engaged in similar efforts through the Counter ISIL Finance Group. Their financial intelligence unit is part of the Egmont Group too. In recent years, the UAE has been increasingly successful at investigating suspicious transactions and freezing assets and further training has been provided to the relevant personnel.

**INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES**

As part of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, the UAE has been most involved in the work of Communications Working Group, co-chairing the group with the US and the UK. The Sawab Center is an online counter ISIL messaging network established by the US and the UAE as part of this counter ISIL messaging effort.

The UAE have also conducted more air operations to counter ISIL than any other coalition members except the US.

The UAE has served as the Countering Violent Extremism Working Group for the GCTF and is home to Hedayah, a think-tank to provide communities and governments with the tools and expertise to counter extremism.\(^{126}\)

3.1.17 **YEMEN (6)**

**Threat**

The amount of civilians killed and injured in Yemen each year by IEDs has grown over the last five years, as has the amount of IED attacks and the lethality of each. In previous years, it appears IEDs posed more threat to armed actors, with 533 killed or injured in 2012, the worst year for armed actor casualties from IEDs in Yemen. Since 2012, armed actors impacted by IED attacks have reduced, whilst the civilian impact has risen. In 2011, there were 40 recorded civilian deaths and injuries from IED incidents, in 2015 there were 924 – an increase of 2210%.

However, this year so far has shown a return to previous years, with less civilian victims and more armed actor casualties. In the first six months of 2016, AOAV recorded 405 armed actor deaths and injuries and 110 civilian from 17 IED attacks. The main IED threat currently stems from IS in Yemen and their affiliates, though in the past IED attacks were carried out by a larger number of actors including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and their affiliates.

**Capability**

Counter-terrorism activities in Yemen are generally conducted by the Political Security Organisation (PSO) and the National Security Council (NSC). The PSO is one of Yemen’s intelligence agencies and as part of its work conducts terrorism investigations. They do however have a record of abusing their powers and infringing upon the human rights of suspects. The NSC was created to reinforce counter terrorism activities to achieve greater national security.

Anti-terrorism units within local police forces are responsible for monitoring and preventing terrorist related activities. Despite their capabilities being somewhat limited by the escalating violence, they have had some success in thwarting IED incidents. For example, Aden police anti-terrorism unit only recently prevented a bus bombing from occurring as the perpetrator was arrested before the explosives were detonated, avoiding what was likely to have been a high number of civilian casualties.\(^{127}\) The police bomb disposal experts were then able to diffuse the bomb. Similar terror arrests were also made in Aden in the preceding weeks.

In the past, Yemen had made pioneering efforts to try to reduce the impact and threat of terrorism in the country. For example, in 2002 the Yemeni government established the Committee for Religious Dialogue. It was a programme that aimed to provide rehabilitation to former terrorists whilst they were spending their sentence in prison. It attempted to encourage those who had been arrested for terrorist-related offences to confront their beliefs and re-evaluate their religious basis. The programme was said to have great potential by independent international organisations, but it was discontinued in 2005, as it lacked the necessary support from other areas of government.\(^{128}\)

In 2010, Yemen Customs ordered two Z Backscatter Vans (ZBV), a non-intrusive mobile inspection system,
with an exercisable option for two additional ZBV systems. The ZBV screens cargo and vehicles for explosive threats and materials. It was ordered to aid Yemen’s fight against terrorism at seaports and border checkpoints. Customs officials also use trained police dogs in their work.

It was reported that 80% of smuggled materials seized by Yemeni security forces between 2013 and 2014 were fertilisers and pesticides used to make explosives.

**Bilateral support**

Counterterrorism airstrikes have been conducted by the US in Yemen targeting AQAP terrorists, predominantly through the use of drones. From 2010 the UK was also involved in assisting the US to carry out the strikes as well as mentoring National Security Bureau personnel. The UK’s involvement in the drone strikes was not widely known and has received criticism. The UK would assist in identifying and locating human targets for the American drones, as the Yemeni intelligence services were not as capable of doing so.

The US offered UAE support for their counter terrorism efforts with IS and AQAP in Yemen in the form of a case for 1,000 GBU-31B/B(V)1 and B(V)3 precision tail kits, and implemented cases for 600 GBU-12 laser-guided kits with associated containers, fuses, and repair parts. The UAE also deployed mine clearance vehicles in 2015 to assist with the clearance of landmines and other UXOs as part of the operations in Aden and Marib. Saudi Arabia is also thought to have carried out demining in Marib.

Groups have called for international assistance to be provided to Yemen to assist with clearance and other demining and C-IED efforts, due to the scale of the problem faced, particularly by civilians.

The UK has provided £1.05 million through the Conflict Stability and Security Fund in 2016 to the UNDP-led efforts to re-build Yemen’s demining and IED clearance capacity. The UK hopes that these efforts will reduce the physical and socio-economic impacts of mines, IED and other ERW, as part of the work to address the urgent humanitarian needs of Yemeni civilians.

The US has taken responsibility for training counter-terrorism officers in Yemen and work closely with intelligence security services on counter-terrorism operations targeting al-Qaeda terrorists and disrupting terrorist activities. However, many of the US personnel in Yemen quickly left in 2015, due to the threat posed by the increasingly dangerous situation in Yemen. This was thought to be a considerable detriment to the Yemen and US governments counter-terrorism efforts in the country. The US approach in Yemen had once been considered by President Obama as a model for his administration’s approach to counter-terrorism.

In 2013, the US Government provided new border security equipment to the Yemen Customs Authority to enhance Yemen’s capabilities in detecting explosives and radiological materials at ports of entry and border posts. The equipment, valued at more than $175,000, was donated as part of the US Government’s Export Control and Border Security’s security assistance program. The programme has also offered training to the Government of Yemen.

**International support**

In 2013, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided support to YEMAC’s victim assistance project. The project aimed to provide specialised medical support to those who have been injured by mines and other ERW, as well as facilitate victims’ reintegration into society. The project hoped to support an estimated 200,000 survivors each year in 160 communities. In more recent years it has been necessary for the UNDP to resort to “non-traditional” approaches to the contamination in Yemen, as mine action has been dormant for some years due to the conflict. This has meant surveying had not been able to take place so the UNDP had to use open-source information to identify the most impacted areas. Currently, the UNDP has been providing clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.

Other UN agencies have also been involved in efforts in Yemen regarding landmines and IEDs. For example, the UNHCR has been working with the Mine Action Committee and has since made a request for clearance in areas where refugees may be returning to. They have also called for risk education for migrants and along key migratory routes.

**NGO support**

The National Mine Action Committee (NMAC) in Yemen aims to make Yemen free from the negative humanitarian and economic effects of landmines, and works to ensure mine accidents are eliminated through clearance of mines and other UXO. NMAC is responsible for training
de-miners, even operating its own National Demining Training Center (NDTC). The Regional Technical Executive Unit of NMAC is responsible for overseeing the Yemeni Humanitarian Demining Program. It ensures that they are performing the full range of demining and demining-related activities correctly and efficiently.

The Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC), under the NMAC was set up in 1999. YEMAC acts as the coordination and implementation body that executes a full range of mine action projects. The Government provided approximately 1,000 military personnel as deminers and other operational staff in support of mine action activities nationwide. It is said that this commitment has been, and will continue to be, a key element in establishing and fostering partnership and cooperation with UNDP and donor countries.

However, mining officials have faced key difficulties in tackling mines, IEDs and other UXO. It has been reported that YEMAC sometimes must convince armed groups and civilians to turn in landmines in their possession. Some believe they should be compensated for turning them in, even though the possession of antipersonnel mines is illegal as well as extremely dangerous. This suggests that more risk education is needed for civilian populations to understand the risk of mines, IEDs and other UXOs.

Mining officials have also reported that a lot of their demining equipment, such as vehicles and protective equipment have been looted during the conflict. Since 2014 the mine action centre has not been able to carry out much clearance or surveying work of any kind, due to the conflict as well as a lack of funding. YEMAC now carries out work in provinces not under control of Houthi’s. Work is conducted in Aden, Lahj, Abyan, Hadramout, Al-Dhale, Taiz, Mareb, and Al-Jouf.

All YEMAC’s work is conducted manually. They explained that they face equipment, funding and expertise shortages which limit the humanitarian activities they are able to carry out.

**DDG**

The DDG and DRC collaborate closely to provide support to refugees and host populations in Yemen, especially in the regions of Abyan, Saada, Harad and Aden. DDG has two offices in Yemen; Sanaa and Adan and it employs 1 local staff and 1 expat staff. It has 9,373,558 DKK (1,080,003 GBP) of contracts written in Yemen.

The DDG has provided C-IED assistance in the form of assistance with weapons and ammunition management. They have also worked in collaboration with YEMAC, and other local partners, to deliver risk education. The risk education has been delivered to both children and adults in the some of the communities most impacted by the presence of landmines and other ERW.

DDG and DRC are also currently implementing a Community Driven Recovery and Safety (CDRS) project, funded by the UK and Norway, in the southern governorates of Abyan and Lahj.

### 3.1.18 MIDDLE EAST CONCLUSION

The Middle East as a whole suffers from so much IED violence, but has also seen many C-IED initiatives, that it is difficult to summarise. Iraq alone could probably merit its own conclusion. The IED threat seen in Iraq is on a scale never previously experienced, and the civilian impact from such use is overwhelming. Greater preparation is needed to ensure that not only training but also equipment is granted to local forces. The fact that the Peshmerga forces must resort to using their bare hands, and that they lack the basic equipment that would make their already deadly job safer, is shocking.

A great deal of delay has also been reported in allowing C-IED actors, whether humanitarian or private, into liberated areas to begin surveying and clearance. This prolongs the time until civilians can return to their homes and puts them in danger, as some will try to return to their homes despite the area not being cleared. Better organisation is needed to ensure C-IED actors are deployed to carry out such tasks as quickly as possible. These efforts must also include awareness raising and victim assistance.

For less impacted states in the region, such as Israel and Oman, border security has been the main priority. However, protection against terrorists and smugglers crossing the border must also be matched to better prevent IED components and dual-use materials from entering the country. One of the key areas of C-IED that is currently inadequate in the Middle East region is the monitoring of explosives and chemical components in customs. A CAR report showed that even one of the most developed countries in region, Turkey, saw IED components and dual-use materials travelling across the border, eventually making their way into IS’ IEDs. Though many of these countries are engaged in training for customs, it is likely that many in the region could
benefit from an extension of the assistance provided by Programme Global Shield (PGS) to further assist the Middle East region. PGS have looked to extend their programmes in this region to respond to the need but require funding to assist this endeavour.

Risk education is another area in which improvement could be made in the region, particularly as the scale of the problem has escalated in recent years. In Iran, Yemen and Iraq, for example, it is clear that some civilians do not fully comprehend the danger explosives can pose.

The Middle East region has been a distinct focus of Western states as part of counterterrorism and C-IED operations. However, despite this focus, many still lack the local capacity to provide effective C-IED, particularly given the scale of the problem. Forces in both Iraq and Palestine (West Bank) have reported equipment shortages for managing explosives.

In an area so impacted by IEDs, it is understandable why many programs seek to target de-radicalisation. However, there is concern that these efforts might eclipse countering violent extremism. Although de-radicalisation is preventative, cross-cultural and inter-religious community building initiatives and efforts that provide youth empowerment could add to the initiatives already being carried out in the region. Saudi Arabia may provide some useful examples to the rest of the region.

The C-IED training and knowledge in the region is now high compared to other regions due to experience and assistance. Now efforts must focus on providing equipment and other resources to ensure the knowledge is used effectively, and implementing further preventative measures, from countering violent extremism to combating terrorism financing.

### 3.2 NORTH AFRICA REGION

#### 3.2.1 ALGERIA (25)

**Threat**

Between 2011 and 2015, Algeria saw 12 IED attacks that caused deaths and injuries. 182 deaths and injuries were recorded from English-language media in this period, though most occurred in 2011. Both civilian and armed actors have been the targets of such attacks. The majority of attacks occurred in the north of the country, in areas that line the coast, close to the capital of Algiers. The main perpetrators of such acts have been al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which aims to overthrow the Algerian government and install an Islamic state, and the group’s affiliates such as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). Both have carried out other terrorist attacks across the country as well.

**Capacity**

Algeria is still trying to free the country of mines that have littered the lands for years. The Algerian Army has destroyed hundreds of thousands of these landmines. As of February 2016, they had destroyed over 800,000.148 Landmines have also been used by terrorists in the country to protect their hideouts or to cause harm to security personnel or civilians. Algerian counterterrorism forces are involved in detecting and destroying these devices.

The Border Guard Unit is responsible for border security and preservation under the National Gendarmerie (GN). They are tasked with border surveillance, detecting border insecurity, and neutralising border insecurity. They also control the movement of persons and goods along the border. They are responsible for preventing illegal immigration, smuggling and trafficking. The Border Guard works on the frontlines of preventing terrorism. Not only are they tasked with preventing the entry of suspected terrorists but also preventing the flow of terrorist materials across the border, such as weapons, ammunition, or explosive materials.

Border security is a priority due to the high presence of terrorist groups in neighbouring countries. To increase border security, Algeria have erected more observer posts, surveillance technologies and border management facilities. They have also closed military border areas and increased troop presence, particularly along their borders with Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Over 75,000 have recently been deployed to the southern and eastern borders.149

The Special Detachment of Intervention is a unit within the GN. They are often the force tasked with tackling terrorist threats. This detachment is an elite unit whose main role is currently to neutralise terrorists and fight terrorism in Algeria, alongside keeping public order.

The People’s National Army (PNA) also plays a significant role in C-IED and counterterrorism in Algeria. They have been responsible for dismantling terrorist groups and destroying their weaponry and materials. On August 30 2016, PNA detachments found and destroyed four
homemade bombs. Only the day before, they found and destroyed nine homemade bombs, as well as ammunition and detonation tools. On the August 26 they had destroyed 2 IEDs, and on August 23, 18 were destroyed during a search operation.\textsuperscript{150}

In order to prevent importing violent Islamist extremist ideologues, the Algerian government does not allow anyone to preach in mosques other than those appointed by the government. They also monitor the mosques to avert breaches in this security and prohibit the use of mosques as public meeting places outside of regular prayer hours.\textsuperscript{151} They also are responsible for the training and salaries of all imams in the country. This is intended to help to promote a more moderate form of Islam as advocated by the Algerian government, instead of risking extremist preachers manipulating followers. Though, there is also a risk of public demand for ‘authentic’ Islam, not co-opted by the state, which could lead to radicalisation.\textsuperscript{152}

As part of these efforts to counter violent extremism, Algeria also wished to target online radicalisation. To do so, the government created the National Preventive Organ for the Fight against Infractions Linked to Information and Communication Technology. The organisation is responsible for monitoring online terrorism and efforts to radicalise and encourage violent extremism on social media. This operation has been running for little over a year, since October 2015.

Other counter-terrorism efforts have seen more internships and job opportunities offered to youth, and positions given to repentant terrorists. Media channels such as radio are also harnessed to counter extremism.

\textbf{Equipment}

In the last two years, Algeria has procured almost £8 million worth of X-ray generators for military and security use.\textsuperscript{153} These are likely to be part of Algeria’s efforts to strengthen its C-IED and counter terrorism efforts at borders and other points of entry. Since the beginning of 2015, they have also purchased £93,082 worth of IED detection equipment for civil purposes, and £446,053 of C-IED and EOD equipment for military purposes.\textsuperscript{154}

\textbf{Training}

The United States have combined training efforts in C-IED in Algeria. Algeria has also participated in the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, particularly in efforts to improve border security, such as screening measures.

Algeria is a member of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue Framework, and NATO conducted a counterinsurgency seminar in Algeria through the JFC Naples 2015 Military Partnerships activities. It was attended by more than 40 Algerian officers from the Algerian Armed Forces and the Algerian Gendarmerie. The seminar focused on intelligence lessons and C-IED. The lessons were conveyed through case studies to underline the main lessons, using experiences from Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{155}

\textbf{Bilateral support}

The United States and Algeria have conducted joint training in the area of C-IED. The US has also assisted with humanitarian mine action operations and UXO disposal in Algeria, through the 52nd Ordnance Group.\textsuperscript{156}

Canada and Algeria have cooperated in the fight against terrorism. Algeria is seen by Canada as a key partner in North Africa in the fight against terrorism. Canada has participated in conferences in Algeria to examine how cooperation in combating terrorism may be improved.

China too, has also sought to facilitate counterterrorism cooperation between themselves and Algeria. China and Algeria have engaged in discussions on increasing such bilateral cooperation. This discussion between the two states only began in July 2016, but it marks a significant step, as such as partnership would be the “first of its kind between China and Arab countries”.\textsuperscript{157}

Algeria has assisted Tunisia is its counterterrorism efforts, especially its border security, in an effort that will benefit both Tunisia and Algeria. The efforts focus on building border capacity through training on best practices. However, it is increasingly becoming clear that more of a regional effort is needed to adequately protect the borders of these neighbouring countries.

Algeria has also facilitated dialogue between groups and states in an attempt to facilitate peace in the countries through a political solution, such as in Mali and Libya.

\textbf{Regional initiatives}

Algeria is a member of MENAFATF and has made significant progress in combating terrorism financing – enough for the FATF to recognise them as a country working to improve in such areas and seeking to meet their MENAFATF commitments. Algeria has expanded their ability to seize terrorist funds and investigate suspicious transactions, as well as improved legislation on terrorism financing.
International support
Algeria was a founding member of the GCTF – a forum that brings together counterterrorism experts to develop tools and strategies to combat the terrorist threat. The GCTF also led to the development of the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ), of which Algeria is a board member. This organisation seeks specifically to train and advise law-makers how to address terrorism and other transnational crime. The IIJ focuses on countries seeking to improve their judicial response to terrorism.

Despite not wanting to join the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Algeria has provided intelligence in the counter-ISIL efforts, as well as imam training and capacity building with neighbouring states.

Algeria is also part of the OIC and the Arab League. As part of the OIC, Algeria has called for more integrated action to counterterrorism by member states. Algeria called for measures that address youth concerns and further cooperation and coordination between not only member states and regionally, but also internationally.158

NGO and private company support

Handicap International
Handicap International is deeply involved in efforts to improve the lives of those with disabilities in Algeria. As part of its multi-faceted work in the country, Handicap International’s work has included Mine Victim Assistance – improving the quality and sustainability of national landmines victim assistance services. This work had a focus on rehabilitation services and these efforts across the country will also support victims of IED violence. Their work will also have improved the lives for IED survivors in many areas, such as social inclusion, rights and reintegration.

GICHD
GICHD partnered with Algeria, as part of their Arabic-language Outreach Programme for mine action, to conduct their third annual conference on “Management of Residual Contamination” in 2014. The conference focused on developing national capacities and addressing residual contamination. At the conference the Algerian authorities on mine action provided lectures and updates on their efforts in dealing with landmines and ERW.

3.2.2 EGYPT (11)

Threat
Egypt has suffered increasingly from the threat of IEDs. There had been a consistent threat from groups such as Ajnad Misr and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM). However, when ABM pledged allegiance to IS the threat significantly increased, with ABM carrying out attacks under the name IS Sinai Province. They had received training and funds to assist with their terrorist activities. Both civilians and security forces became regular targets. So far in 2016, most attacks have targeted police and armed personnel.

Death and injuries from IED attacks have risen in the last three years, with 2015 recording 755 deaths and injuries from 79 IED incidents. In the first half of 2016 there appears to be a drop in the recorded incidents and resulting casualties from IEDs. It remains the case however, that IS Sinai Province pose the greatest IED threat, with most incidents occurring in Sinai. Most of their IED attacks are roadside bombs, likely targeting military or police convoys – 33% of their IEDs are laid on or near roads.

Capability
The Egyptian EOD/C-IED teams of the Armed Forces as well as the Security Forces face the threat of IEDs every day. Units across Egypt are thought to receive approximately 10 calls a day to which they must respond. Though it has been said that many reports turn out to be false, EOD teams successfully diffuse a great number of these IEDs. In the past the techniques of the Egyptian Armed Forces have been critiqued due to EOD personnel deaths that made headlines. The critiques centred on their training and equipment, such as the suits worn. The military found and killed 24 IS militants hiding in the Sinai and captured eight in November 2015. In September, they claimed to have killed almost 300 IS members in the Sinai.

In regard to border security, Egypt has improved security along its borders with Libya and Gaza. Specifically, in 2015 Egypt installed x-ray scanning devices at the Libyan border crossing, inspecting traffic in and out of Egypt. The amount of checkpoints in highly-impacted areas has also been increased and security vehicles have been reinforced in an attempt to implement measures to combat IED use.
Egypt also has a ministry of religious endowments, or Awqaf. The Awqaf has been involved with religious scholars and preachers in order to tackle the threat of terrorism and radicalisation. This has seen the Awqaf provide imams with topics for their sermons as part of their efforts to tackle extremism. A recent decision to make every preacher read the same sermon at Friday prayer caused some controversy, as some were critical that this would not allow those in different areas to respond to the specific needs of their community and also stifles their natural flow and expression. In 2013, the Awqaf also fired 55,000 preachers that were accused of promoting extremism.159

The Dar Al-Iftaa, which drafts religious edicts in Egypt, has also played a role in trying to counter religious extremism. This has seen them send scholars to vulnerable areas where radicalisation might spread and counter this type of extremism through a moderate reading of Islam.160 They also provide outreach services and speaking tours as well as publish religious materials to undermine religious foundations for violent extremism. Rehabilitation provided to former extremists and countering online radicalisation have also been priorities of the Dar Al-Iftaa.161

Bilateral support
Egypt has been increased its activity addressing Israel’s terrorism concerns, particularly about the smuggling tunnels between Sinai and Gaza. The tunnels allow explosives and other such materials to enter Gaza and to be used by Hamas. Egypt has in the last year initiated coordinated efforts to locate and destroy these tunnels. This is a distinct change from the pattern of behaviour seen under ex-President Morsi who was affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood.

In September 2016, Egypt agreed with India to develop their counter terrorism cooperation.162 This will see the two states engage more frequently in intelligence sharing, operational exchanges and the prevention of radicalisation of youth. The improved cooperation stems from the increased threat posed by IS. Youths in India had been motivated to join the group, whose main operations operate in states neighbouring Egypt. The Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries was signed in December 2015 and their joint working group on counter terrorism met in early 2016.

Japan too, has provided support through the provision of dual-use equipment for counter-terrorism as well as general commitment to consolidating cooperation between the two states. Through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Japan has also contributed $1,540,000 for strengthening the legal system to counter terrorism in Egypt, alongside growing the capability of criminal justice in the MENA region.

Training
Many areas of the armed and security forces have received training from the US, such as the Navy, who have been involved with EOD units using C-IED robots and diving training. Many from the Egyptian Armed Forces have received training from the British Armed Forces on C-IED measures and tactics, such a C-IED Search training package in the United Kingdom run by the UK’s EOD experts 33 Engineer Regiment. In September 2016, the UK committed troops to train the Egyptian military in counterterrorism tactics, with a focus on IEDs.163 The UK’s previous efforts had focused on train-the-trainer programs.

Regional support and initiatives
Egypt is a member of the Arab League. In response to the terrorism challenges faced by many members, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi proposed the creation of a unified Arab military force to counter regional security threats.164 Such cooperation is not unprecedented and is to some extent already occurring.

Egypt is a founding member of MENAFATF. Terrorist financing has been important to monitor, especially when it became clear that IS Sinai Province was trying a variety of ways to solicit funds, including one scheme using Twitter to solicit payments through anonymous pre-paid value cards. Egypt has recently improved its compliance to MENAFATF recommendations for terrorism financing. It has criminalised the deliberate collection and provision of funds with the unlawful intention that they be used by a terrorist group, individual or act, and has recently convicted someone of terrorist financing.165

International initiatives and support
To counter terrorism financing, Egypt is also a member of the Egmont Group - an informal international network of financial intelligence units (FIUs). Membership to the Egmont Group signifies Egypt’s ambition to improve cooperation in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

Egypt is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL and is considered a key strategic partner within the
coalition, without contributing forces as part of the response in Syria and Iraq. However, as a type of regional leader, their backing lends weight to coalition efforts with Arabic countries. Egypt have also conducted airstrikes on IS targets in Libya in 2015. The airstrikes occurred after IS released a video of the beheadings of 21 Egyptian Christians. At least 64 militants were killed in the strikes and significant damage was done to camps, training sites and weapon-storage areas.

3.2.3 LIBYA (15)

\textbf{Threat}

The impact of IEDs in Libya was felt most last year. 2015 saw almost 400 killed and injured by IEDs in 17 attacks. Of these, for the first time in five years, most were civilians – they accounted for over three quarters of all those impacted. 2016, however, has seen a return to the targeting of armed actors, such as police and security personnel.

The most impacted area of Libya has consistently been Benghazi but recently more attacks have been conducted in a wider array of areas across the country such as in Sirte, Derna, Misrata and Tripoli. Recently IS affiliated militants have been chiefly responsible for IED attacks and other terrorist acts throughout Libya, as they have expanded their influence throughout the country whilst government conflict continues to destabilise the country. In the past, other Libyan militias such as Ansar al-Sharia were the main IED attack culprits.

\textbf{Capability}

In general, Libya’s security capabilities have been somewhat lacking over the last year given the protracted internal governmental conflict. This has led to compromised border security, allowing an unregulated flow of persons, weapons and illegal materials in and out of Libya. This has been ongoing since the damage committed in 2011 and has caused a significant impact in Tunisia also in terms of militant violence, as well as to Italy who has borne a great influx of refugees, many of whom have travelled through Libya.

The Libyan National Safety Authority (NSA) is run by the Ministry of the Interior. They operate in all major cities in Libya in the field of both IEDD and CMD, under the guidance and control of the Ministry of Interior. All trainees are members of the Libyan Police force with numerous years of previous EOD skills, although not in most cases to today’s international standards.

50 NSA employees received three advanced training courses in EOD from the UNMAS/Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section of United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) at the National Safety Authority’s request in 2015, with further IED training to continue throughout 2016.

The NSA continues to carry out EOD and C-IED efforts throughout the country and aid similar actors such as demining NGOs. The conflicts in Libya have made the work particularly dangerous. There has been a lack of coordination across the country and the NSA has complained of lack of funding and correct equipment to tackle the size of the IED problem.

Other agencies combatting IEDs are the Libyan Civil Defense IED Department (LCDIEDD) and the Military Engineering Department. Both have been involved in clearing areas of Libya liberated from militant control, such as Lajit in early 2016. Much of their work has been obstructed by civilians returning to their homes when they hear that the land has been liberated, but this is despite warnings that their homes and land remain contaminated by ERW and IEDs left by the militants, rendering the land unsafe.

Both the LCDIEDD and the Military Engineering Department lack coordination with other similar agencies who can offer assistance and advice, particularly the NSA. They also rely on outdated equipment, leaving the users in greater danger. They require more advanced equipment, particularly to access IEDs buried underneath rubble.

Though some C-IED activities have continued they are very limited and deeply affected by internal conflict in the country. The operations lack coordination, strategy and support. Areas such as prevention of radicalisation, combating terrorism financing, post-blast investigations, and bringing IED attack perpetrators to justice are practically non-existent.

\textbf{Bilateral support}

Little support is currently available to Libya. It has been dangerous for countries to become entangled in the internal affairs or to have a presence on the ground in the country. Therefore, very little assistance has been offered. Anti-IS assistance has however, been provided by Egyptian warplanes, which have conducted strikes targeting the militants across Libya. Other countries also involved in providing this type of counter terrorism
support includes the US who are also using airstrikes to target IS in Libya. The sustained air campaign by the US began in August and it is hoped the involvement of the US will speed the defeat of IS in Libya. 169

Regional support and initiatives
Border security and management in Libya used to have the support of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Libya (EUBAM). However, given the security concerns many employees have relocated and the project has had to be placed on hold. The project has nevertheless been extended with the intention to operate from Tunis and move back into Libya when safe to do so. The EUBAM assists the Libyan authorities in developing their border management capacity, particularly in regard to coordination between all those involved in border security, including police, naval, and customs authorities. 170

This support is offered through advice, training and mentoring. Other areas of development include optimal use of existing equipment, risk management, and agency restructure for increased effectiveness. Since relocating, the EUBAM’s efforts have focused on workshops and seminars given outside of Libya. 171 The budget for the coming year (22 August 2016 – 21 August 2017) is €17 million. 172

Libya is a member of MENAFATF, with the aim of better combatting money laundering and terrorism financing in Libya. However, given Libya’s current circumstances, there is little data on the countries efforts in this regard, but the general lack of capacity in regard to counter terrorism would suggest that terrorism financing in Libya is increasing and any post-conflict efforts would need to immediately address this.

International support
UNMAS has been operating in Libya since 2011, although UNMAS Libyan headquarters currently operates from outside the border, in Tunisia, due to the insecurity in Libya since 2014. In July 2012, UNMAS integrated into the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) as the Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section.

Between 2012 and 2014, UNMAS helped strengthen the Libyan security structure and ensure Libya’s compliance with international standards, providing technical and operational support to Libyan national institutions, including the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Interior. In this role, UNMAS implemented catalytic projects in Tarhouna, Misrata and Zintan to construct temporary storage facilities for unsecured ammunition, working with the local Military Councils. UNMAS also developed the capacity of the Libyan Air Defence personnel, providing technical and chemical safety training on the removal of dangerous chemicals from damaged missile systems. Despite significant progress, the removal of materials was only half complete when UNMAS had to evacuate from Libya, which meant the materials still pose great risk.

Since 2014, they have maintained their presence in Libya but their work has had to be somewhat limited because of the ongoing violence and safety concerns. They have maintained their relationship with EOD, C-IED and demining actors within the country to provide advice and assistance where they can. Prior to 2014, UNMAS had generally supported demining activities in Libya alongside LibMAC, but since the escalation of violence in Libya this has been extended to C-IED.

A pile of rusting UXO lies outside an abandoned stockpile outside Misrata, Libya, in March 2012 (Simon Conway/AOAV)
UNMAS’s work has been concentrated upon three main areas: risk education, EOD, and technical advice. Although the risk education engages with IED risks, the area most related to C-IED has been the technical advice which has particularly aided Libyan actors in improving their capabilities in C-IED, including training and arms and ammunition management.

Alongside risk education and EOD training, UNMAS developed a Technical Framework Document for Arms and Ammunition Management in Libya which will assist a potential Government of National Accord to address management of arms and ammunition stockpiles. They also provided technical advice to the Libyan national mine action authority, and is assisting to draft National Mine Action Standards. This includes training to LibMAC staff and national partners in areas ranging from emergency responses (e.g. NTS), data management (e.g. IMSMA), operations, quality assurance and accreditation. Further capacity enhancement on NTS and IED training will take place in the second half of 2016, targeting the affected area of Benghazi.

The fluid political and security situation poses a major challenge to the UNMAS programmes. UNMAS is unable to engage with counterparts at a ministerial level due to the current political division, however by engaging at a local and municipality level, UNMAS, Libyan and implementing partners have been able to make progress. Despite funding shortfalls, UNMAS has continued training and projects aimed at engaging at this level of society.

NGO support

NGOs and commercial agencies have been involved with C-IED efforts across Libya, such as land clearance for mines and UXOs, as well as risk education. However, despite the limited capabilities of the state agencies, the Free Fields Foundation in Libya explained that none other than the police or army are authorised to dispose of IEDs. It was however also reported that many NGOs and private companies were trying to get the necessary authorisation to begin performing this work on the ground. It was said that the MoI and MoD usually oppose such ideas.

Some of these volunteers are said to have done more to remove mines and explosive hazards than anyone else.

LibMAC manages all other Mine Action activities in Libya, and operates a Technical Agreement with outside governments to secure Ammunition Storage Areas (ASAs) around the country. This second aspect is vital to stop militants in Libya from accessing manufactured explosives such as mines or components for IEDs.

Since its inception LibMAC has been actively supporting all Libyan mining efforts, including the significant achievements of the Libyan army. LibMAC has also been assisting with the Ammunition Storage Areas programme and helping the international Mine Action NGOs working in Libya whenever possible. Despite being organised predominantly through volunteers, these are largely made up of former soldiers and former revolutionaries, as is the LibMAC governing body.

Free Fields Foundation (3F)

Libyan Mine Action NGO, 3F, is based in Tripoli. It was founded in 2012 by a group of people who were concerned about the explosive contamination across Libya. The DDG have been partnering with 3F to implement mine action activities in Libya since 2014. With the support of the DDG, 3F employees have undergone further EOD training to help tackle the threat faced on the ground in Libya. As well as clearance operations in Libya, 3F conducts risk education to impacted communities to make them aware of the dangers posed by IEDs, mines, and UXO, and how to report explosives they come across.

However, 3F do not do any other IED work, such as search and disposal. When they encounter an IED, they report straight away to the Libyan Mine Action Centre, which in turn informs either the police or the army.

Handicap International

Handicap International have been working in Libya since March 2011, in response to the large amounts of landmines, cluster munitions, IEDs and other explosive weapons being seen in Libya at the time – of which many still pose a danger.

They have carried out MRE through a train the trainer program, which has seen 900 Libyan nationals trained to carry on educating impacted communities of the dangers posed by IEDs, landmines and other ERW.
Handicap International also runs their own awareness sessions. Clearance has taken place in Tripoli, in the districts most impacted. They destroy landmines, and other ERW. Handicap International’s work has been funded by UNMAS and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.

Dynasafe
Dynasafe have conducted operations in some of the worst impacted areas in Libya – Sirte Basin, Benghazi, and Mizda. Their work in Libya has predominantly focused on mine clearance and EOD. Most of Dynasafe’s work in Libya has been for private companies, such as Total and British Gas, rather than humanitarian organisations. They have, for example, conducted EOD, MRE and Technical Surveys.

MAG
Though MAG does not currently operate in Libya, they have been involved in previous operations there from 2011-2013. Risk education was a large part of MAG’s work in Libya. They particularly encouraged school children to be aware of the dangers and engaged them through song and drama, with the help of popular writers and musicians. Securing ammunition was vital to MAG’s impact in the country, as there was so many explosives that had been spread throughout the country after many ammunition sites were hit during the conflict. Many explosives were destroyed by MAG and others were re-secured. But it was also important to engage the communities to increase awareness and encourage them to make MAG aware of any insecure explosives.

DCA
DCA has been working in Libya since May 2011. Traditionally working on EOD, its more recent work has focused on victim assistance, particularly psychosocial support to children impacted by the violence in Libya. Despite the situation on the ground in Libya preventing DCA from operating directly in the country, DCA works with local partner organisations in Libya, such as the Libya Scout Group and the Al Nour organisation. Both are working with young people who have been suffering the psychosocial impacts from violence, such as PTSD, insomnia and depression.

Other aspects of the DCA’s work has seen them team up with local organisations to conduct risk education exercises, specifically the dangers of UXO. DCA have also supported the training of Libyan deminers in EOD. This year DCA and the authorities in Lebanon provided a specialised training course for Libyan deminers to attend. Support for the DCA’s other work includes that from actors such as the European Union, UNMAS and the Dutch Foreign Ministry.

FSD
The FSD is not currently operating any programs in Libya. However, has conducted stockpile management and destruction in Libya as part of its previous operations in the country. This will have contributed to the ability of militants in Libya to gain access to this weaponry and to use it in the creation of IEDs.

In 2012, FSD was able to dispose of 300 tonnes of ordnance and stockpiled ammunition in Libya. As part of their work they also conducted training and mentoring of security personnel on stockpile management issues. Although further operations were meant to be undertaken by FSD, these do not appear to have taken place. It is likely that this is because of the ongoing conflict and general instability in the country.

DDG
DDG has two offices in Libya, one in Tripoli and one in Sabha (the main city in southern Libya), with funding from EuropeAid and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It employs 17 local staff and 6 expatriate staff, and has so far written 20,727,116 DDK (£2,396,261) worth of contracts.

As part of an integrated Libya-Tunisia programme, DDG has worked in Libya since August 2011, in conjunction with the revolution against the 42-year regime of Col. Muammar Qaddafi, to address the widespread presence of UXO resulting from the 2011 Revolution and its aftermath.

DDG has established an institutional partnership with local demining organization, 3F, to conduct ERW Risk Education and clearance in close coordination with LibMAC, the local authorities and local community based organisations.

Mechem
Mechem, now Denel Mechem, is a private company specialising in demining and EOD that was contracted by UNMAS in Libya to undertake some of the EOD work. In 2014, it was reported that Mechem was destroying an average of a ton of explosives a day in Libya.
3.2.4 MOROCCO (39)

Threat
Morocco has managed in recent years to remain mostly immune from IED attacks. The only terrorist attack that occurred in Morocco since the Casablanca attack of 2003 was the 28 April 2011 attack in Marrakech that killed 17 people and injured 23. The blast, from an IED left in a bag, destroyed the Argana cafe in Jemaa El-Fnaa Square, a popular tourist spot. According to the Moroccan Ministry of Interior, it was packed with nails and was set off remotely, most probably by a cellphone. A Moroccan security official also added that the bomb contained ammonium nitrate and triacetone triperoxide, or TATP, an explosive easily made and popular among IED makers in the Middle East.

Although Morocco has not had many IED attacks or terrorism in general compared to its neighbouring countries, it is at risk as it is surrounded by countries experiencing such hostilities and as it is a popular destination for Western tourists.

Capability
Between 2002 and March 2015, Moroccan security services reportedly dismantled over 130 terrorist networks, leading to the arrests of almost 3,000 people.

Due to the terrorist threat faced in Morocco internally and from neighbouring states, Morocco created the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations (BCIJ) in 2015. The BCIJ’s responsibilities include investigating and countering terrorism, state security violations, smuggling of explosives and other similar areas. Their counterterrorism operations, including C-IED, are conducted in coordination with the General Direction of National Security (DGNS) alongside the DGST.

The BCIJ saw many successes in 2015, such as arrests and the destruction of terrorist networks, many of which were affiliated with IS. Some of the networks were recruiting fighters to send to Iraq and Syria. Others included explosives experts, ammunition, weapons and explosives, and plans to carry out attacks in Morocco. In July 2016, Morocco announced the arrest of 52 suspected militants said to be inspired by IS. They announced the seizure of weapons and explosive materials. As part of the same announcement, Morocco was said to have dismantled 38 suspected militant cells with IS ties since 2013.

Morocco’s Ministry of the Interior has also launched an anti-terror strategy called Operation Hadar. This counterterrorism strategy sees security forces such as Morocco’s Royal Armed Forces, the Royal Gendarmeria, police and auxiliary forces, engage in activities targeted at preventing Moroccan extremists trained abroad – numbering at least 1,500 – from re-entering the state and carrying out attacks such as those with IEDs. Hadar focuses on patrolling key sites and cities to protect civilians and foreign visitors, who it is believed would be a likely target in an attack. After Hadar saw forces deployed to the most high-risk areas, further forces were tasked with tightening controls at airports, train stations, and other transportation sites to monitor suspicious activities and persons, as well as with patrolling borders.

One key in Morocco’s counterterrorism strategies are the Muqaddamin, or municipal sheriffs. The Muqaddamin rely on a dense network of informants who provide detailed information about suspicious activities and persons. These networks are said to stretch across the entire country and reach into every neighbourhood.

The border security in Morocco has been commended for its efforts. It cooperates bilaterally with information sharing and intelligence to better monitor who is attempting to enter and exit the country. The border authorities are said to be very capable in detecting fraudulent documents, but are let down by their lack of biometric screening measures.

As part of efforts to counter violent extremism, police had been ordered by the King Mohammed VI to counter those encouraging what is known as “Tcharmil”. This practice engages young people in gang culture and behavior, prompting them to pose with weapons and carry out robberies. Teenagers would post on Facebook photos with knives, tampered scooters and jewelry or money earned in robberies. The government believed this behaviour could lead to greater extremism and violence.

Morocco’s C-IED policy is embedded in its counterterrorist strategy and consists of various preventative measures such as promoting a moderate form of Islam. For instance, the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, Morchidines, and Morchidates in Rabat, sees.
Imams and preachers from France, Morocco and across the world trained in teaching moderate Islam. Initially opened in March 2015, the centre now sees not only African national imams but is also home to a joint exertion by France and Morocco to promote religious moderation and tolerance to counter violent extremism in France too. Other countries including Mali, Guinea Conakry, Nigeria, Libya and Tunisia have received or requested instruction for their imams.

A new foundation, Mohammed VI Foundation for African Ulema, will be another key part of this continuing work and Morocco’s leadership in countering violent extremism. There are hopes that this institution will act as a place for cooperation and information sharing for Ulema.

Counter-extremism in Morocco also sees the government monitor mosques across the kingdom in a way that leaves no room for radical groups to exploit the places of worship to spread their propaganda. Every mosque falls under the control of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, which has the exclusive prerogative to appoint imams and the staff who run them.

Though Morocco is involved in many counterterrorism efforts at home and abroad, the country has also been reported to have colluded with groups carrying out terrorism, such as AQIM in Algeria. Meetings were reported to have taken place between Moroccan intelligence and AQIM leadership. It is suggested that the Moroccan intelligence services sought to revive AQIM terrorist activity on Algerian soil and would commit resources to this effort.

Bilateral support
In October 2015 bomb disposal teams from the UK were sent to Morocco due to fears that terrorists were planning to target British tourists in the country as they had recently done in Tunisia. The British troops helped train the Moroccan armed forces in bomb disposal and coping with mass casualty incidents. The soldiers were also taught to deal with any hi-tech bombs planted by militants. The British and Moroccan intelligence services had uncovered in 2015 several terror plots by members of Islamic State and al-Qaeda. Defence sources had revealed there was a “high threat” of a terrorist attack (possibly using IEDs) against holidaymakers.

Morocco works closely with the US in many aspects of counterterrorism. They share information and intelligence about border security that allows terrorists to be stopped at the borders and other entry points. Morocco participates in the US ATA programme which provides training for those investigating terrorist incidents, including post-blast investigation techniques, cyber forensics, crime scene forensics, critical incident management, and executive leadership. Government officials also participated in FBI-led courses on intelligence and management.

Algeria and Morocco’s continued disagreement over the Western Sahara has remained an impediment to both bilateral and regional counterterrorism cooperation.

Regional initiatives
Morocco is part of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), an initiative set up by the US in 2005 to build regional counterterrorism capacity and aid cooperation between regional neighbours. Some of the specific aims include strengthening borders and border cooperation, and information sharing between states. This could enable greater monitoring of materials and persons across borders and aid investigations.

Morocco is also a member of MENAFATF, a regional FATF-style body. Morocco continued to make progress in countering the financing of terrorism. In 2014, the Unité de Traitement du Renseignement Financier (UTRF) investigated four transaction reports that they suspected were linked to the financing of terrorism. The UTRF also participates in information sharing with other financial intelligence units in the region to better investigate such transactions. Such an investigation led to the arrest of two Turkish nationals and a Moroccan who were involved in an operation to raise funds for IS in 2015.

International initiatives
As a founding member of the GCTF, Morocco participated in programs to improve technical investigative training for police and prosecutors. In 2016, Morocco served as co-chair of the GCTF, continuing its leadership role within the organisation. In 2015, Morocco had co-chaired the GCTF’s Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group, and together with the US Morocco led the GCTF’s Border Security Initiative.

Morocco is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. The government’s efforts have been vigilant to countering IS propaganda and preventing recruitment of terrorists. The country has also contributed air forces to the campaign in Syria and Iraq.
NGO and Private company support

G4S

G4S signed a £10 million three-year contract in 2013 with Tangier Med Port Authority and Tangier Med Special Agency to provide specialised security services at the site in Morocco. G4S had 300 employees based in the country, responsible for security at the facility, particularly focused on operational and technical security, such as passenger and freight screening.\(^{188}\)

3.2.5 SUDAN

Threat

Similarly to South Sudan, Sudan has faced many challenges due to explosive violence but not yet from IEDs. However, there remains a threat due to violence in the region and the increasing use of IEDs in such violence. Sudan is not generally considered a high terrorist target, probably due to its status as a state-sponsor of terrorism. It continues to serve as a safe-haven for members of Hamas, although not as much as it used to, but has increasingly engaged in counterterrorism initiatives.

Capability

Though there is only a small IED threat it is worth pointing out efforts that can contribute to C-IED capacity and work to lessen the threat. For example, actors alongside the National Mine Action Centre have engaged in operations to combat mines and other ERW through clearance and MRE programs. This has seen the UN engage in efforts in Sudan, as well as private firms such as Mechem. Clearing ERW and UXO can help in the prevention of future IED incidents – which is no small thing when situated by Chad, Libya and Egypt.

Efforts by the national police in Sudan in capturing wanted terrorists and criminals show Sudan has some counterterrorism capabilities, though these remain under-developed and under-resourced. Similarly, the intelligence they provide to other government agencies in allied nations further demonstrates some ability. Sudan is said to have passed on “vital information” on IS activities in Libya, Egypt, Somalia and elsewhere in North and East Africa.\(^{189}\)

Bilateral assistance

Chad and Sudan established a Joint Border Commission in 2012 to better control the Chad-Sudan border. This sees them cooperate on issues of counter terrorism along the border and other border security issues, such as smuggling.

Sudan has engaged in counterterrorism efforts to protect US interests in the country and has cooperated with the US to counter terrorism financing. Despite cooperative efforts on terrorism financing very little action has been taken to stop the flow of assets linked to terrorist organisations. Further, Sudan has assisted the US in combating the threat posed by al-Qaeda and IS through providing intelligence.\(^{190}\)

Sudanese troops are part of the Sunni Arab coalition fighting in Yemen, as part of the attempt to restore the government of President Hadi.

Regional initiatives

Sudan is an active partner in the PREACT programme that seeks to build counterterrorism capacity. As part of MENAFATF, Sudan was removed from the FATF blacklist in October 2015, due to its “significant progress made in addressing the strategic AML/CTF deficiencies” that had previously been identified with Sudan.\(^{191}\)

International support and initiatives

Sudan has been eager to play a role in the fight against IS, and has been assisting Western forces in this effort. This is thought to be an attempt to develop closer ties to the West and see economic sanctions against Sudan eased. Sudan is said to have already passed vital intelligence to the US and other counter IS allies.\(^{192}\) Sudan also assisted INTERPOL in finding Nigerian terrorist, Aminu Sadiq Ogwuche, and found and extradited a wanted human trafficker to Italy.\(^{193}\)

UNMAS

A UNMAS Programme was established in 2002 following a tri-partite Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Government of Sudan (GoS), the SPLM (Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement) and UNMAS. The agreement provided the framework for mine action activities throughout Sudan. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 and the UN Security Council Resolution 1590 that established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) further enhanced the role of the UN in the field of mine action.

In April 2015, UNMAS became the lead mine action actor following an assessment mission in March 2015. UNMAS now supports and assists the Sudan National Mine Action Center (NMAC) in building institutional capacity, meeting obligations under Article 5 of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (“Ottawa Treaty”) and other relevant international treaties, in addition to
mobilising resources for land release, MRE and victim assistance.

Nine of 18 states of Sudan are reported to be affected by landmines and ERW, with South Kordofan, Kassala and Blue Nile States holding the highest concentration of landmines and ERW. Over the last three years, the number of mine/ERW victims has risen considerably. UNMAS’ priority is to support NMAC, to release land through surveys and/or clearance operations, return land to local communities and grant access to the wider humanitarian community that delivers humanitarian emergency aid.

Since the separation of Sudan and South Sudan in July 2011, the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states has limited mine action operations to these two most affected states. Another challenge is that access is limited as mine action activities and operations are normally impacted by the heavy rains between July and September.

In 2016, $12.4 million was required to complete release operations in the Eastern States, conduct emergency clearance in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, conduct MRE, VA and strengthen national capacity. To date, the programme has received in total $2.4 million from the Governments of Japan and Italy for land release, MRE, VA and capacity building activities. In addition, the government of Sudan is contributing $2 million to support operations on the ground.

3.2.6 TUNISIA (37)

Threat
Tunisia experienced three IED attacks between 2011 and 2015 that caused deaths and injuries. The IEDs caused 42 deaths and injuries in total, in attacks that predominantly targeted security personnel, who account for 38 of the 42 deaths and injuries from IEDs in the period.

Tunisia has faced further terrorist threats and IED attacks, some of which have been thwarted by the authorities. Tunisia’s location, with its border with Libya makes it further vulnerable to such acts.

Capability
The Army is the only body authorized to take any concrete actions related to landmines, UXO, or IEDs in Tunisia.

The presence of landmines along the Algerian borders has been reported during recent operations; in 2014 in Sakiet Sidi Youssef (governorate of Kef), several soldiers were injured by landmines in two separate incidents while military forces were conducting a combing operation to track down terrorists holed up in the region. In the first incident two servicemen were slightly wounded. In the second one, another landmine went off as a military vehicle passed by but no casualties were reported from the blast.

The Tunisian Security Forces have an EOD School, which has been transformed with the assistance of the UK into a specialist centre. It currently offers 14 different courses for EOD and C-IED.

In February 2016, Tunisia announced that it had completed the first part of its 125 mile-long barrier along its border with Libya. The barrier is part of Tunisia’s efforts to improve its border security, particularly the border with Libya, due the terrorist threat that emanates from the country. The second phase will see the installment of electronic equipment with the help of the US and Germany. It is thought that the border, in its current state, has led to a reduction in smuggling, as it makes the border impassable for vehicles.

Most C-IED activities are focused on prevention and fall under the umbrella of the Tunisian counterterrorism strategy. On July 24 2015, Tunisia introduced a new counterterrorism law. The new law seeks to make the procedures used to fight terrorism and money laundering more efficient. The Tunisian government hopes that the law’s proposed national commission to fight terrorism—a permanent joint commission uniting members of different ministries, the judiciary, and eventually members of civil society organisations—will allow for better cooperation between these different entities.

The new bill also creates a unit of judges specialized in terrorism cases (Article 38) and hands investigations to the criminal investigation department of Tunis rather than units at the governorate level (Article 36). This aims to make procedures more straightforward and avoid information being lost between different police units. The bill would also make it easier for investigators to use phone-tapping against suspects and make public expressions of support for terrorism an indictable offence.

In terms of border control, the Tunisian government has restricted travel to Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, or Libya for citizens under age 35.
Bilateral assistance
The US has provided training as requested by the Tunisian security forces, particularly Tunisia's 61st Engineer Brigade. The training includes detect, defeat and destroy techniques for IEDs. Other training has looked at post-blast investigations – carrying out safe controlled detonations, securing an uncontrolled blast scene, documenting the scene and collecting evidence. In 2016, the US agreed to fund a project to install an electronic surveillance system on Tunisia’s border with Libya, as mentioned earlier. The project is anticipated to cost $24.9 million and will be undertaken by BTP and AECOM. The project will also see Tunisian forces trained in how to use the system. Further border security funds and assistance have been provided by Germany and Italy.

The UK has a small team of C-IED and training specialists deployed in Tunisia that have been present in the country since March 2015 and will continue to be stationed there until at least June 2017. They have improved training at Tunisia’s EOD School – transforming it into a specialist centre that can offer 14 different courses. Specialist courses are being provided to targeted areas of Tunisia’s forces. It is hoped by the UK that their continued assistance in Tunisia will allow the Tunisian forces to reach international standards and achieve self-sufficiency in training by next year.

Tunisia and Algeria are seeking to enhance their cooperation to address terrorism and increase security for both countries. In particular, joint border security efforts as well as increased intelligence and information sharing seem to be advocated by both states. Algeria and Tunisia have also cooperated in counterterrorism investigations. In March 2015, Tunisia and Algeria worked together to find the perpetrators of the attack on the Bardo museum, whom they also believed were responsible for other attacks carried out in Algeria.

Regional assistance
Tunisia is a member of MENAFATF. The main threat to Tunisia through terrorism financing has been charitable associations financed abroad, according to their 2016 “Mutual Evaluation Report”. The MENAFATF recommended that Tunisia address the growth of terrorist activities within its borders, and expressed concern that despite terrorism financing taking place no one had yet been convicted. Tunisia also lacks the analysts to fully investigate suspicious transactions in a timely fashion.

International assistance
Tunisia joined the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL in September 2015. It agreed to serve as a pilot country for the International Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Capacity-Building Mechanism (ICCM). Tunisia is seen as a critical counter terrorism partner in the North Africa and its efforts have been welcomed in the Coalition.

Tunisia is a member of the Arab League and the GCTF. As part of the GCTF-inspired International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ), Tunisia participated in workshops for addressing terrorist-related crimes.

NGO assistance
DDG
The DDG has two offices in Tunisia, one in Tunis and one in Zarzis, Medenine and employs 9 local staff and one expat staff. Its activities in Tunisia include improving dialogue and cooperation between security providers, community safety, and SALW (Small Arms and Light Weapons) marking and registration. It does not perform any demining or C-IED activities in Tunisia.

DDG initially began setting up a border security and management project in July 2014 in the city of Ben Guerdane in Tunisia (located on the border with Libya), in order to focus more on border communities and to address the trans-national character of armed violence and crime in the Sahel-Sahara Region. Ben Guerdane had been put under increasing stress as a result of the large flow of people across the border in July and the threat that the conflict in Libya could spread to the communities near the Tunisian border. The organisation aimed to improve communication channels between the local community, civil society, and security providers through a participatory community-based approach involving all parties in dialogue. In the latter part of 2015, DDG continued its activities in Ben Guerdane and expanded into Dehiba in order to focus on community police dialogue, community safety and conflict management education.

Handicap International
Handicap International launched its operations in Tunisia in 1992 and currently employs 14 national staff. The organisation’s goal in Tunisia is to promote the social inclusion of the most vulnerable people and to improve their living conditions by advancing their rights and ensuring their needs are taken into account. Its activities include: Inclusive Education, Social and
economic inclusion and Disability rights. It is not involved in any mine clearance projects, education or awareness campaigns or training of personnel in any C-IED activities.

3.2.7 WESTERN SAHARA

Threat
The Western Sahara is a territory that has been ravaged by conflict and is highly contaminated by UXO. However, it has not been impacted by IEDs. The countries surrounding Western Sahara have been impacted by IEDs but only mildly compared to others in the region.

Capacity
As a territory highly contaminated by landmines (over 7 million) and other UXO, the removal of these has been a top priority for the civilians living in Western Sahara and humanitarian demining organisations. The Polisario Front, the official government of the Sahrawi people, has destroyed over 10,000 stockpiled mines, as part of its pledges under the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment. The removal of such ERW also prevents their use in IEDs.

The progress of all demining efforts can be hindered by tensions and conflicting claims over land in Western Sahara. It can prevent access and make it dangerous for NGOs and other organisations to assist in demining efforts.

International initiatives
UNMAS is engaged in the UN mission in Western Sahara – MINURSO. It has destroyed thousands of mines and ERW and released over 50 million square metres of land. They have also provided MRE to local, nomadic and refugee populations in the region to ensure their safety. This education has been provided to more than 30,000 people.

The funding for the UNMAS operations in Western Sahara primarily comes from the UN Assessed Budget, which allows surveys, clearance activities and capacity development to take place. MINURSO’s efforts were assisted by AOAV and Mechem.

NGO and private support
GICHD
The GICHD provides support to the MINURSO demining operations in Western Sahara, as well as to the Royal Moroccan Army. GICHD assist the field management of both actors. Additionally, they provide support and training to MINURSO on information system management for mine action.

NPA
NPA began assisting the Saharawi people in September 1997. Though their work has been impacted by the tension and conflict, they have made significant differences to demining and mine awareness in Western

AOAV mine clearance team, Western Sahara, September 2013 (AOAV)
Sahara. In recent years, the NPA have been conducting MRE in Western Sahara as well as landmine and UXO clearance. They have two teams working in the country. The NPA are also campaigning for international support to pressure Morocco to demilitarise its wall of occupation in Western Sahara and engage in efforts to assist with demining and EOD.

MineTech International
MineTech International was awarded a contract in 2014 to support the humanitarian demining operations in Western Sahara. They were contracted to provide landmine and ERW clearance capacity along the heavily contaminated Berm boundary.

3.2.8 NORTH AFRICA REGION CONCLUSION
Many of the initiatives in the North Africa region have focused on military efforts. This may be because in many North African countries, the military is mainly, if not wholly, responsible for IEDs. This is the case in countries such as in Libya and Tunisia. However, the region would benefit from more focus on preventative measures, such as countering violent extremism, preventing terrorism financing and conducting investigations. Many countries within the North Africa region have requested support in these areas.

Like both the Middle East and, as we shall see in the Sahel, there are two areas most highlighted as a C-IED insecurity. These are borders and resources. Many states lack the equipment to carry out C-IED work to international standards. This is quite easily remedied through international donations of the equipment needed, as has been done in many of the Middle East states.

It is worth noting the inclusion of assistance for psychological support for victims, such as that provided by the DCA in Libya. Such violence has both a physical and psychological impact which in many regions has been largely ignored.

3.3 SAHEL REGION

3.3.1 BURKINA FASO

**Threat**
Although Burkina Faso has seen increasing terrorist attacks, the country still faces very little threat from IEDs compared to other nations in the Sahel, despite a terrorist attack in November 2015 that involved IED use. However, instability in Burkina Faso’s neighbouring countries increases the risk of such devices being used in Burkina Faso, particularly as there has been a trend of groups based in the Sahara, such as AQIM, carrying out attacks in urban environments. For Burkina Faso, this became painfully evident in January 2016, when mass shootings perpetrated by AQIM killed 30 people at the Splendid Hotel and Cappuccino restaurant in the central Ouagadougou.

**Capability**
As Burkina Faso is not currently impacted by IEDs, their efforts mostly focus on counterterrorism and initiatives that would prevent IED attacks in the future, given the threat from bordering states, such as Mali and Niger.

The police and the gendarmerie hold primary responsibility for counterterrorism activities, including border security and investigations. Border security appears to have been their highest priority in recent years. The border security is conducted using the PISCES screening equipment. They have also focused on building new border stations, as the greatest security threat stems from outside their borders, particularly to the North. With additional funding, Burkina Faso aims to continue to set up security units along the border.

More efforts on countering violent extremism in the country have been recommended, though some work is reported to have been conducted by Denmark in this regard.

**Bilateral assistance**
The US has sought to support the development of Burkina Faso’s counterterrorism capabilities targeting terrorist networks. The US also funded the establishment of a 150-person company devoted to counterterrorism logistics, as they had identified a deficit in counterterrorism logistic professionals. US training, as requested by Burkina Faso, has concentrated on border security and investigations.

French forces are also stationed in Burkina Faso as part of Operation Barkhane, aimed at quelling the rise of terror groups in the Sahel. This allows the forces to respond to terrorist attacks and assist regional forces in their counterterrorism efforts. France and Canada are together also provided funding of €300,000 in 2016 to assist Burkina Faso’s counterterrorism capacity.

**Regional initiatives**
AFRICOM proposed to assist in building the capacity of

Though a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), Burkina Faso’s progress in countering terrorism financing has been slow due to political instability, a cash-based economy, and a slow investigation and prosecution process. However, over the last few years more and more training has been given to relevant personnel in the country as it seeks to progress in combating terrorism financing.

Burkina Faso is also a partner in the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which provides further counterterrorism training.

**International initiatives**

As a member of the GCTF, Burkina Faso has welcomed the training opportunities provided to their country security forces. Country representatives are also frequent participants in the GCTF Sahel Working Group.

**Threat**

The threat of IEDs in Cameroon has only emerged recently. The country experienced its first IED attack in July 2015. Throughout 2015, Cameroon saw 10 IED attacks that killed or injured, causing the deaths and injuries of at least 487 – of which 95% (464) were civilians. All attacks were suicide bombings, and were carried out by 22 suicide bombers in total. Of these, 18 were women, of which at least 11 are thought to have been under 18. All attacks occurred in the Far North region close to the border of Nigeria, Niger and Chad, around Lake Chad. This region has been plagued by the violence of Boko Haram, who is thought to be responsible for all of the bombings in Cameroon. In the first half of 2016 there had already been six IED attacks – all suicide bombings in the Far North region – causing 298 civilian deaths and injuries.

**Capability**

Much of the C-IED work conducted by the Cameroonian military involves manning checkpoints in order to prevent IEDs or IED materials crossing borders. Though this can stop IEDs from passing across the border, preventing IEDs from being detonated in densely populated areas and therefore lessening civilian harm, it also means most of Boko Haram’s IEDs are detonated at checkpoints. The Cameroonian military have recently created a Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR), who specialise in C-IED and EOD operations. The BIR typically conduct work in the Far North region to respond to the IED threat posed by Boko Haram.

Border security has been increased throughout Cameroon by using more checkpoints and patrols. Screening efforts at other points of entry have also improved, however the security continues to operate with a limited capacity, due to lack of resources. This means some borders remain insecure, though the Far North region is currently the priority. Both the police and military have made significant arrests and disrupted terrorist activities. With greater resources, more could be done.

It has been reported that Cameroon has begun using volunteer ‘vigilantes’ at checkpoints and within communities. They are known as “vigilance committees”. This has seen the use of local groups of volunteers harnessed to support C-IED efforts and it is believed that it has greatly helped. This is because most soldiers will be ignorant of the local customs and dialects given the variety of tribes located in Cameroon. A vigilante on the other hand does, and can therefore spot something out of the ordinary more easily. They also have better ties and avenues of communication in the local community, so often anything out of place will be reported to them first.209

**Equipment**

With the assistance of the US, Cameroon has increased border security through a new surveillance setup. This allows movement at border crossings and airports to be better monitored and allows officials to see scanned images from baggage and parcel screening. Identification systems are also a part of the new system – though this can pose a problem as not all Cameroonian soldiers have this kind of identification. The US provided equipment to detect explosives, something that Cameroon are very grateful for due to the growing concern.210

The military recently acquired South African-made Ratel armoured vehicles.211 Deliveries of the vehicles began in December 2015. They were bought to be used by the BIR in C-IED operations. They can be armed with guns and can be fitted with a mine-roller and detection devices. The delivery of these vehicles has also seen a new group of soldiers trained to use the new vehicles and equipment by the BIR personnel, who received training by the South African provider of the vehicles.
The BIR also uses Israeli-made GAIA Automotive Industries Thunder Mk. 1 armoured personnel carriers in their operations in the Far North.\textsuperscript{212} The announcement of the Ratel deliveries also indicated a number of other vehicles expected for delivery: around two dozen LAV-150 Commando infantry fighting vehicles, 30 AML-90s, six AMX-10RCs, a dozen Ferrets, eight M-8s and half a dozen VBLs.\textsuperscript{213}

Other vehicles acquired by Cameroon since 2011 include: five Type-07 armoured personnel carriers, six Type-07P/VN-1 infantry fighting vehicles, 12 WMA-301 Assault armoured fire support vehicles, four Z-9 helicopters and two P-108 patrol crafts from China; a second hand OPV-54 patrol boat from France, two Mi-17 helicopters from Russia; two Aresa-3200 patrol crafts and a single CN235 transport aircraft from Spain; and two Bell 412 helicopters from the United States.\textsuperscript{214}

**Bilateral support**

Nigeria has been cooperating with Cameroon on border security and together they developed the Nigeria/Cameroon Trans-border Security Committee in order to tackle the threat of Boko Haram that impacts their adjoining borders.\textsuperscript{215} In order to tackle the violence along the border together, joint military training on border security has been proposed and information and data sharing. Since this cooperation was developed, significant trade routes have been able to reopen. This is also likely due to the success of other regional efforts to tackle Boko Haram, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).\textsuperscript{216}

**Training**

As the United States were also concerned about Boko Haram they have provided training – as they have also done with Nigeria forces – to personnel from the Cameroon military, using lessons learnt from Iraq and Afghanistan. This training was given to the newly created BIR, in the summer of 2015. As the BIR mostly operate in the Far North Province where Cameroon is most susceptible to attacks, they have received training in detecting and destroying IEDs to avoid civilian casualties. The training saw assistance from over 300 US soldiers, who are assisting with intelligence as well in the fight against Boko Haram.\textsuperscript{217} The training does have its limitations, as the US forces do not go out on operations and are primarily based in schools. This means the trainers must rely on pictures and second-hand accounts to understand the IED threat they are facing and judge how best to respond. The training uses low-cost equipment but despite limitations, is thought to be having a significant impact.\textsuperscript{218}

Alongside training efforts, the US also supplied 18 Toyota pickup trucks, a front-end loader and other equipment to Cameroon's military in December 2015, and six armoured personnel carriers in October 2015.\textsuperscript{219} In September 2016 the US DoD awarded Cessna “a $24 million contract for six 208B GRAND CARAVAN EX aircrafts, plus three spare Pratt & Whitney PT-6A-140 engines and associated spares and ground handling equipment to US Africa Command and Pacific Command Areas of Responsibility, to support counterterrorism capabilities in Cameroon, Chad and the Philippines.”\textsuperscript{220}

French forces in Gabon have provided training to Cameroon forces, specifically targeting unconventional warfare tactics and how to combat them. This training was given to 32 Cameroonian troops in September 2015. The French equipped the army with 11 Peugeot P4 all-terrain vehicles, four 12.7mm heavy machine guns, nine AA52 7.62mm light machine guns, 13 ER95 VHF radios, 40 bullet-proof vests, 40 heavy helmets and 40 helmet covers.\textsuperscript{221}

Between September 19–30 2016 the French military detachment in Gabon gave mine training to Cameroonian armed forces. This training aimed to assist the soldiers in developing specialised techniques to clear mines and defuse IEDs.\textsuperscript{222} 15 policemen and 15 gendarmes who were likely to be deployed to the Far North region received a week of training on fighting terrorism as part of the training organised by the French Embassy in Cameroon.\textsuperscript{223}

France is engaged in intelligence-gathering, which has seen two military personnel detached to Maroua, as well as in C-IED training – in 2015 almost 120 deminers were trained.\textsuperscript{224}

**Regional support or initiatives**

Cameroon is a member of GABAC, a regional FATF-style body since October 2015. This engagement aims to improve Cameroon’s anti-money laundering and counter terrorism-financing measures. Suspicious transactions are monitored and investigated by the National Financial Investigation Agency. GABAC found that there were several NGOs in Cameroon being financed by fundamentalist groups. Many workers from the NGOs have now been arrested as workers were suspected of funding Boko Haram.\textsuperscript{225}
Cameroon is one of the five states that make up the regional military initiative, the MNJTF. The MNJTF has seen Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Chad and Cameroon unify their efforts, to create a 9,000 strong force, with the specific aim of bringing an end to the Boko Haram insurgency. Although the MNJTF is relatively new – only established in 2015 – they have already seen many successes, including the destruction of terrorist camps, the arrest or naturalisation of hundreds of Boko Haram terrorists, as well as the destruction of their IED making factories, IEDs, other weapons and equipment. In fact, the MNJTF is thought to have recaptured at least 80% of territory that had once been under Boko Haram’s control.

The successes of the MNJTF come despite the lack of funding these nations and the task force as a whole has received, and the comparative lack of C-IED expertise within the MNJTF. It is worth noting that MNJTF has received some training, equipment and funding from other nations and from the African Union Commission, funds amounting to $250 million as of February 2016. The US also pledged to support the MNJTF countries through the provision of $71 million worth of equipment, logistics support and training. However, the funds amounted to only a third of what was needed and dispersal has been slow. With greater international cooperation allowing the provision of more equipment, expertise and training it is easy to envision further success for the MNJTF.

NGO or civil society support and initiatives

The Council of Imams and Religious Dignitaries of Cameroon (CIDIMUC) has been involved in raising awareness on the dangers of radicalisation and have engaged in efforts to prevent extremism through promoting tolerance and peace. Materials have been distributed, and conferences and prayer sessions have focused on respect for religious freedom.

Muslim clerics, traditional rulers and dignitaries from the Far North have received training in early 2015 in communication technologies and the internet as part of information sharing between them and the military, within counter terrorism strategies. However, some of the participants were not able to read and write so it was a struggle for them to engage. They do all have access to the internet and could take the equipment back with them to use for collecting data and recording information about any suspicious activity or persons suspected to have been recruited by Boko Haram.

3.3.3 CHAD (17)

Threat

Chad experienced its first suicide bombing in June 2015. Throughout the rest of 2015, Chad faced a perpetual threat of IED attacks, carried out by Boko Haram. 488 people were killed and injured in the seven IED attacks in Chad last year. Of those killed and injured 94% (459) were civilians. The areas targeted were generally populated areas, such as villages and markets.

What is significant is that all the IED attacks were carried out by suicide bombers, and at least half of the bombers were women and children. The bombings took place in the Lac Region or N’Djamena. Where the perpetrator of the bombing has been identified, Boko Haram, an IS-affiliated group, has been responsible for all of them. Boko Haram spread across into Chad to carry out attacks from north-eastern Nigeria. Other states impacted by Boko Haram IED attacks include Niger and Cameroon.

Due to the drastic increase in violence caused by IEDs and other terrorism activities by Boko Haram, Chad declared a state of emergency in November 2015 in the Lake Chad region. Activities carried out by Chad and other impacted states have seen Boko Haram driven out of most of its previously held territory. In 2016, there has only been one attack recorded so far, when Boko Haram planted an IED which killed four soldiers and wounded dozens, in late August. The threat posed by Boko Haram is certainly less than it was this time last year in Chad, but countering Boko Haram has successfully been made a priority and increased safety has been the payoff.

Capability

The Chadian National Police perform counterterrorism functions from investigations to searches of suspicious persons. Recently, the police have made efforts to improve their counterterrorism and C-IED capabilities. This has included greater information sharing between various units across the country, and particularly the most impacted areas. They have also increased their border security capabilities. Counterterrorism and C-IED measures have included searching vehicles at the border, as well as persons. They have continued to use various screening measures to monitor borders, such as PISCES biometric screening and biographic screening. The Chadian National Police has however requested more assistance with training, particularly in the areas on investigations, crisis response and border security.
The Centre National de Déminage (CND) is responsible for the demining efforts across Chad. They coordinate all demining activities and cooperate with NGO and private companies assisting Chad in its demining efforts. At the UN Meeting of National Mine Action Directors and the United Nations Advisors (NDM-UN) in Geneva on February 16 2016, the CND reported that they have found that terrorists in the Lake Chad region are using the ERW to manufacture their IEDs which are then being used in the region and across the borders to harm civilians. As of December 30 2015, the CND reported to the UN that the situation in Chad had seen over 35,000 displaced by the violence. They have proposed further action to tackle the Lake Chad region and clear ERW. However, it is now relatively dangerous to engage in this type of work in the region. The CND has already begun work on clearing the area though in attempts to prevent further reuse of such materials.

At the meeting, Mr. Mahamat Hissein Salkato, the Deputy Coordinator of the CND, proposed that further steps were required including a technical and non-technical survey, IED management training, risk education and awareness raising, as well as victim assistance.

Bilateral support and initiatives
The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), a company owned by the German Federal Government, has operated on the behalf of the German Federal Foreign Office in Chad, providing assistance to the police, particularly in the area of border management. This training was provided between 2013 and 2015. The police were provided with training in border management, alongside other counter-terrorism measures, such as the detection of forged documents. Training was provided to mechanics and a vehicle workshop was constructed to improve the mobility of the police.

GIZ also assisted through the construction of a new border post in N’Djamena. This is hoped to further modernise border management and improve border management capacity. Forensic equipment and training has been provided by GIZ to aid criminal and terrorism investigations.

The US has partnered with Chad and other forces in the region combating Boko Haram, by providing advisors, intelligence, training, logistical support and equipment. Chad continues to be engaged in the US Antiterrorism Assistance program. The ATA manages the Special Program for Embassy, Augmentation and Response – a programme that provides the training and equipment necessary to respond to a terrorist incident against US facilities in the country.

Operation Barkhane has seen a French force of 3,000 stationed in Chad’s capital N’Djamena. The French provide support to the forces and assist in capacity building efforts to help tackle terrorism and terrorist-related activities.

Chad has been providing its own bilateral assistance to Niger to fight Boko Haram along Niger’s border with Nigeria. This assistance is provided alongside other regional efforts. Similar efforts have been provided by Chad in Nigeria as part of a bilateral arrangement. The counterterrorism engagement in Nigeria has seen Chad participate in air and ground assaults in Nigeria to tackle the insurgents there.

Regional initiatives
Chad is one of the five states that make up the regional military initiative, the MNJTF. The MNJTF has seen Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Chad and Cameroon unify their efforts, to create a 9,000 strong force, with the specific aim of bringing an end to the Boko Haram insurgency. Its headquarters are located in the Chadian capital, N’Djamena. Chad has been said to be shouldering most of the costs associated with the regional efforts of countering Boko Haram, but is growing more reluctant as the fight continues. Chad, the country in the MNJTF with the strongest and most capable military has increased its efforts when needed but due to lack of integration within the MNJTF returns to Chad when an imminent threat has been dealt with in a border country. Chad has struggled financially to provide the force asked of them by its regional partners, particularly Niger.

Chad is a member of the TSCTP, an initiative which has seen Chad concentrate on counter-radicalisation, through projects aimed at empowering youths and communities. Such efforts have involved two new community radio stations and two training centres to
help develop skills and enhance employment opportunities.\textsuperscript{240}

Other regional C-IED efforts that Chad is involved in include the GCTF’s Sahel Region Capacity Building Working Group. The effort seeks to strengthen border security and law enforcement cooperation, as well as build on community engagement projects and improve legal systems and countering terrorism financing. To improve in these areas and support regional endeavours, Chad attends the working group meetings.

In regard to the financing of terrorism, Chad is a member of GABAC. GABAC last assessed Chad in 2014, where they found a number of strategic deficiencies. In general, Chad is impacted by poverty and corruption which sees bribery occur at the border with imports and exports.

\textbf{International initiatives}

Chad is a member of the Egmont Group, an informal international network of financial intelligence units (FIUs), with the aim of providing a forum for FIUs around the world to improve cooperation in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

In December 2015, Saudi Arabia announced an Islamic military alliance to counter IS, of which Chad is one of the participating countries.\textsuperscript{241} Other international efforts related to C-IED that Chad is a part of include the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, an organisation that consistently condemns the use of suicide bombings and other forms of IED attacks and has specifically announced that it is against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The OIC encourages cooperation and dialogue between states to counter the root causes of terrorism and its related activities.

\textbf{NGO and private company support}

\textbf{MAG}

MAG has been involved in demining in Chad since 2004, and remained deeply involved last year whilst the situation in Chad worsened. This demining prevents other insurgents reusing the mines as they are or as parts of an IED. 824 anti-vehicle mines were destroyed in Chad last year alone.\textsuperscript{242} MAG has assisted Chad in improving arms and ammunition management. One of the specific aims of this work is to stop non-state actors from being able to gain possession of these materials for their own use. This work has included technical risk assessment, specialist training to the relevant personnel, as well as refurbishment of armouries and munitions depots.

The risk education MAG has given to communities vulnerable to encountering mines and other UXO has delivered life-saving education, which has been particularly focused on children and displaced people. MAG’s activities, however, are focused in the northern areas that were most impacted in previous conflict by mines and UXO, though perhaps these lessons may be easily transferred to the areas currently impacted in the west.

\textbf{Handicap International}

Handicap International has been working on land clearance operations in Chad since October 2014 and will not be leaving Chad until 2018 at the earliest. They are part of a project committed to clearing contaminated areas in Chad – work that is funded by the EU. This work has seen Handicap International train national deminers, and staff at Chad’s physical rehabilitation centres. They have provided further support to disabled people in Chad to help them integrate back into Chadian society. This has not only involved supporting the efforts of rehabilitation centres but also campaigning to secure rights in Chad for disabled people who face discrimination. The work sees them partner with both national organisations and international NGOs such as MAG.

Handicap International’s work has included technical advice and capacity building to CND. Unlike, some other organisations, Handicap International’s work now encompasses the Lake Chad region. Projects in this area include risk education and improving emergency response capabilities in the region.

\textbf{Dynasafe}

Dynasafe held a permanent presence in Chad from 2007 to 2011. In 2007, it was awarded a contract to provide international advisors to help build and then develop a local Chadian capacity to safely search for and clear UXO to international standards. From 2008 to 2011, it provided route survey, clearance and MRE in the south east of Chad. As part of this project, it also conducted BAC for the World Concern Development Organisation, clearing 497,301m\textsuperscript{2} of land.

It set up three local support offices in Abeche, Iriba and Goz Beida to support its operations. They trained hundreds of local national personnel and established a network of experienced local deminers, Team Leaders, medics and support staff, including mechanical personnel, cooks, cleaners and drivers.
3.3.4 ERITREA

**Threat**

Eritrea does not appear to face a threat from IEDs, though terror groups operate in the country, such as Eritrean Islamic Jihad.

**Capability**

Due to a lack of transparency, Eritrea's national counterterrorism efforts are difficult to determine. It is believed that the defence forces, police, intelligence and customs share responsibilities for counterterrorism initiatives. The cooperation and coordination of these units is thought to be sporadic. It is likely the personnel would benefit from further training.

**Bilateral, regional and international assistance**

Denmark aided on counterterrorism finance techniques to Eritrea. This is particularly important given Eritrea's previous support of extremist groups such as al-Shabaab and as they are not part of any financial action task force body.

Eritrea does not appear to cooperate in many regional or international counterterrorism initiatives. Though UNMAS have engaged with Eritrea to develop a mine action strategic plan and develop capacity. UNMAS have also conducted surveys of the contamination to inform their progress.

**NGO support for mine action**

**DCA**

DCA, with UN assistance, provided training to 120 Eritrean mine clearance personnel from the Eritrean Demining Agency. Due to the success of the training the Eritrean government indicated it may make more soldiers available for such training to engage in demining efforts in Eritrea.

**GICHD**

The GICHD has aided UNMAS and Eritrean demining efforts in the country through support with information management. They have provided evaluations of the efforts for UNMAS and training on the international standards for mine action. GICHD have also carried out a study on mine action and victim assistance in Eritrea.

3.3.5 ETHIOPIA (63)

**Threat**

Though Ethiopia has only experienced one IED attack in the last five years, there is still a risk due to the country's geographic location. Ethiopia borders states that are highly impacted by IEDs, including Kenya and Somalia. This means they must be vigilant in preventing the spread of such attacks and ideologies that lead to such incidents.

**Capability**

Ethiopia's counterterrorism efforts have tended to focus on the political rather than military components. Their strategy has seen them focus on liberating communities and encouraging solidarity. The military instead respond to civilian and political leadership. Communities are consulted and even given arms so they may fight too. This sees local communities connected to counterinsurgency efforts and given a voice in their area.\(^2\) This technique does however pose the risk of weapons falling into the wrong hands.

The Ethiopia National Defence Force is currently occupied in stemming the threat posed by al-Shabaab in Somalia, to prevent the spread of violence crossing into Ethiopia's own borders. They have received capacity building training from the US and cooperated in regional security efforts.

It is the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) that are primarily responsible for counterterrorism activities. They operate counterterrorism surveillance and intelligence, border security, and investigations. Though there is cross-agency cooperation, which often sees NISS having to collaborate with the military and police to prevent al-Shabaab attacks in Ethiopia. Together, the police, defence forces and intelligence services make up the Ethiopian Task Force for Counterterrorism. This encourages information sharing, coordination and collaboration between all branches of the counterterrorism efforts in Ethiopia.

NISS have worked to improve border security, particularly along Ethiopia's borders with Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, and South Sudan. They also implemented the "PISCES" border management tool to improve their watch-listing capabilities across the country and to constrain terrorist mobility.
The police respond to reported incidents, carry out investigations and bomb disposal work. However, the police have been accused of stigmatising the Muslim community in Ethiopia and having Ethiopia’s anti-terrorist laws arbitrarily used against them for actions such as peaceful protest. The police have even been accused of planting bombs and detaining local Muslims.

The Ethiopian government has also been implementing programs to counter violent extremism. This includes the Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTPII). GTPII addresses the underlying socio-economic factors that make young people vulnerable to radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. Again, this programme seeks to respond to community-based needs and give a voice to youth, and local and national concerns. The effort focused on education, health, employment, and most importantly, sustainability in these areas.

Ethiopia still faces a significant landmine and ERW problem. There are 314 areas that are suspected to be contaminated. The Ethiopian Mine Action Office is responsible for not only locating and destroying landmines and UXOs but also for developing a sustainable mine action capacity and alleviating the human suffering caused by landmines and UXOs.

**Bilateral support**

As well as supporting AMISOM’s efforts in Somalia against the threat of al-Shabaab and other counterterrorism efforts, Ethiopia has also provided direct support to the Somali National Army in similar efforts.

**Regional initiatives**

*Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre*

The Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC/FDRE-PSTC), located in Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa, was established by the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense in 2010. It aimed to help contribute to regional security and stability.

The centre runs training courses that are designed for military members, police and civilians who are potentially being deployed to UN Peacekeeping Operations and AU, EASF Peace Support Operations and other multinational efforts. The course participants enhance their knowledge, and develop practical skills in Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management, and Post-Conflict Recovery. Within this course framework, participants spend time learning how to respond to explosive threats, with a particular focus on IEDs, as well as mine action. They will receive training from those with many years’ experience such as IED specialists. The specialists will come from groups such as UNMAS who have had a lot of experience in counter-IED tactics, particularly involving the use of mines across the African continent.

FDRE-PSTC also identified challenges to C-IED in the countries they assist. These challenges included public awareness and victim assistance. Ethiopia was said to not have enough equipment for MEDVAC – medical evacuations for IED victims. Ethiopia Defense Forces are also reported to have “no specific search equipment”, whilst many of the forces trained are reported to rely on UNMAS to clear the roads used. In terms of FDRE-PSTC’s own operations, they identified a “shortage of military or civilian experts” and a shortage of budget to procure equipment and develop human resources for C-IED.

**AMISOM**

Ethiopia provided troops to AMISOM forces operating in Somalia. Cooperation between Ethiopian and Kenyan forces in AMISOM has seen al-Shabaab pushed out from some of their major strongholds in southern Somalia.

**Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT)**

Ethiopia is an active partner in PREACT. PREACT efforts to improve partner nations military capacity saw the provision of new communications equipment to the Ethiopian military, as well as training and a communications advisor in 2013. Between 2009 and 2013, PREACT saw $19.8 million funding for work in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a focus of the PREACT activities due to its border with Somalia.

**ESAAMLG**

As a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, Ethiopia has attempted to improve its poor history of monitoring terrorism financing.

**International initiatives**

As a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Ethiopia has participated in IGAD’s counterterrorism training and programs.

The efforts of the GCTF – Horn of Africa (HOA) Capacity Building Group have seen Ethiopia participate in plenary meetings and exchange views on countering terrorism and violent extremism in the region. In 2013 they hosted the meeting and have participated in the ones since.
NGO and private company support

International Committee of the Red Cross (Demining Support)\(^\text{253}\)

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have provided demining equipment to the demining squadrons in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe in April 2016 to assist their demining efforts. They have also provided advice and capacity building as part of the humanitarian assistance.

3.3.6 MALI (27)

Threat

The IED threat in Mali has been constant since around 2013, and has predominantly targeted international and state security actors. In the last five years, there were 154 deaths and injuries from 22 IED attacks. Of these deaths and injuries 5\% (8) were civilians. So far this year 14 have been killed or injured in three IED attacks. All attacks targeted security personnel.

The most impacted areas have been those such as Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. Most threats come from al-Qaeda affiliated groups such as Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), but the pro-Bamako militia known as GATIA has also been responsible for IED attacks in the country.

Capacity

Malian Armed Forces and Air Forces under the MoD are responsible for Mali’s security against terrorism. There is no specialised law enforcement for border security, with both the gendarmerie and police, who operate under different governmental bodies supporting terrorism prevention at the border. Customs officials monitor materials such as drugs and explosives moving across the border and at other points of entry. Though they have INTERPOL notices, this is often not available to the customs personnel at the points of entry.

Training

The Malian Armed Forces have received training from the European Union Training Mission in Mali. At the old Malian military academy at Koulikoro, just outside Bamako, there are now more than 400 soldiers from 22 different EU countries that are there to aid Mali and build their capabilities. The training has focused on C-IED techniques and tactics. Many of those training the Malian forces are passing on C-IED lessons learnt from Afghanistan.

Malian counterterrorism experts also received training from the Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law on areas such as building counterterrorism systems and targeting networks.

UNMAS has operated in Mali since 2013 and have worked to improve Malian Armed Forces capability to cope with explosive threats. As part of this training some have also completed courses at the Centre de Perfectionnement aux Actions Post-Conflictuelles de Déminage et Dépollution (CPADD) in Benin. Training has included EOD techniques and tactics, as well as awareness raising amongst the troops.

The US assisted with training for those engaged in counterterrorism in Mali through the US Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program and other Department of Defense training. They have both assisted with counterterrorism training related to border security, crisis management, and police reform. In February 2015, the US facilitated an IED recognition course for 100 members of the police force.

Equipment

Mali procured over £1.5 million worth of C-IED equipment from the UK between August 2013 and October 2015, including EOD equipment, equipment for initiating explosives, C-IED technology, and protection equipment such as bomb suits, alongside the IED decoy, disposal, detection and jamming equipment.\(^\text{254}\) Although it is indicated that most of this equipment is for military use, there was a procurement of C-IED equipment for an international organisation in October 2015 amounting to £883,776, and one amounting to £44,200 for civil use.\(^\text{255}\) They have also purchased bomb suits from South Africa.\(^\text{256}\)

MineWolf, as part of their contract for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), is tasked with equipping and training two MINUSMA peacekeeping mission contingent’s EOD companies in C-IED and EOD. They also provided two Mini MineWolf (MW240) systems to Mali in 2013. MineWolf also trained the relevant personnel from MINUSMA how to use the systems and its accessories.\(^\text{257}\) As MINUSMA have been targeted by IEDs and their routes are often littered with the weapons, they have, alongside their training, also acquired mine-protection vehicles. As of May 2016, there were at least five Casspir NG2000 series armoured vehicles from South Africa.
**Bilateral initiatives**

Part of the aforementioned Operation Barkhane force is based in permanent support in Gao. Operation Barkhane has been operating in Mali since 2014 and sees the G5 Sahel – Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso – work in cooperation, sharing resources as well as information. The French forces support the G5 countries against armed terrorist groups and help prevent the reconstitution of terrorist sanctuaries in the region.\(^\text{258}\)

The operations carried out under Barkhane, alongside the Malian Armed Forces or in coordination with MINUSMA, saw the neutralisation of hundreds of terrorists in Mali. It also led to the discovery of about 200 tonnes of weapons, ammunition, and explosive materials, such as ammonium nitrate.\(^\text{259}\) French aircraft dropped bombs on terrorists in the country and conducted surveillance missions. It was due to the success in Mali that France decided to expand its operations in the Sahel.

**Regional support and initiatives**

Mali is a member of the GIABA. Though GIABA was established in 1999 to fight money-laundering, its mandate was expanded in 2006 to incorporate counter-terrorist financing. However, it is difficult to control the flow of transactions in Mali as they are generally cash-based. Moreover, the personnel at Mali’s financial intelligence unit, the Cellule Nationale de Traitement des Informations Financières (CENTIF-Mali), lack training and coordination. This makes CENTIF less effective, particularly as they already lack the resources.

Mali is also part of the TSCTP. In Mali, the TSCTP saw the US military engage in building the capacity of counter-terrorism units to counter AQIM. Mali is one of the states to have received the most funding through the TSCTP to tackle terrorism in the country, particularly for support of security sector reform.

**International support and initiatives**

Mali is part of the GCTF and participates in the GCTF events. Mali became a pilot state for the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund and $15 million was committed to the projects in Mali, Bangladesh and Nigeria in 2015.\(^\text{260}\)

**MINUSMA and UNMAS**

MINUSMA, (from its French name Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali,) is the UN peacekeeping force in Mali. According to its website, MINUSMA aims to support political processes and carry out “security-related tasks” as part of the stabilisation and transition processes.

In Mali, UNMAS is also mandated by UN Security Council resolution 2295 which prioritizes the protection of civilians and stabilisation efforts, as well as the enhancement of national capacities in EOD and weapons and ammunition management (WAM). UNMAS implements, supports and coordinates humanitarian mine action activities which include surveying, marking and clearance of prioritised dangerous areas, explosive hazards risk education, and victim assistance. UNMAS has field offices in Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Tessalit.

In 2016, UNMAS directly supported the training and deployment of risk education teams which are operating in areas at risk to raise awareness among the population about the danger of mines and ERW, but also to map the extent of the contamination by conducting non-technical surveys. In Gao and Timbuktu, UNMAS promotes the empowerment of survivors of explosive incidents. At 30 June 2016, 8 survivors had been identified and trained to deliver risk education for communities, which will also enable the educators to advocate and promote the rights of persons with disabilities. In the same regions, and with UNMAS support, a project to respond to the needs of 50 additional survivors has also started through the delivery of socio-economic and physical rehabilitation support and within the broader responses to injury and disability. In parallel, humanitarian actors are trained as trainers in explosive awareness to enhance protection and humanitarian access in areas the most affected by the ongoing crisis.

UNMAS assists the national authorities in developing technical capacity to safely manage explosive threats, coordinate the explosive threat response and comply with International Mine Action Standards through the
provision of training, technical equipment and support, and the mentorship of the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF). In addition, UNMAS provides advice and training in weapons and ammunition storage and management to help the Malian authorities minimise the risk of accidental explosions or looting.

Furthermore, UNMAS provides explosive threat mitigation support to MINUSMA through technical advice and delivery of training, facilitating freedom of movement for peacekeeping and civilian personnel and improving safety for the delivery of the mission mandate. Specialised training, technical assistance and equipment have also been provided to the MINUSMA EOD companies.

UNMAS Mali is primarily funded through the MINUSMA Assessed Budget and through the following donors: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the UK, as well as donors contributing to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in Mali, and Benin, Switzerland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for in-kind support.

UNMAS activities in Mali are implemented with participation of the MAG, Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP) and Handicap International, as well as TDI, Dynasafe, MineTech International and G4S.

**NGO and private company support**

**DCA**

DCA has been present in Mali since February 2013. Recent and on-going armed conflict has resulted in contamination of weapons and ERW. In addition to ERW, IEDs and landmines also adversely affect livelihoods, freedom of movement as well as the safe return of Internally Displaced People, and economic recovery.

DCA conducts two main operations in Mali. The first is conducting emergency Risk Education to prevent accidents and deaths among conflict affected populations in Timbuktu. The second is conducting surveys in Gao to map the location of ERW and mark dangerous areas both to protect civilians but also to speed up future clearance operations.

DCA is currently working in Mopti region where a multi-task team is providing risk education to at-risk groups such as children, young adults and in general the civil population, conducting surveys to mark dangerous areas and clearing UXO. DCA is also training national ACT Alliance partners in the basics of conducting surveys and providing Risk Education to remote communities.

Alongside their other work, the DCA established an Armed Violence Reduction project that began in the beginning of 2014. The overall aim of this project is to promote safe behavior in relation to guns and ammunition. Medical training has also been provided by DCA to United Nations staff posted to Mali.

**DDG**

The DDG have established a Border Security and Management programme (BSM) in the Sahel region, covering Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The BSM aims to reduce armed violence through increased border security and management capacity. The operation is conducted with support from Denmark, the UK, and the US. They have three offices in Mali: in Gao, Koro and Mondoro. It is hoped that the programme will result in better cross-border communication and cooperation and improved security presence and responsiveness.

The DDG has also been involved in sensitising communities to the risks associated with ERW, particularly in Douentza, Menaka, and Gao-Labezzanga axis. Within Northern Mali, the DDG are working to promote better trust between communities and security providers to promote cooperation, such as information sharing, and to enhance security.

**MAG**

The MAG has been involved in a variety of C-IED operations though they predominantly focus on mines. In Mali, MAG has surveyed the areas to better understand the contamination to carry out clearance work effectively. MAG has provided risk education to local communities and displaced people in Mali on the danger of landmines and UXO and what to do if they encounter such danger. They are training teachers and leaders to share this information, as well as to collect data about the contamination and any accidents that do arise.

MAG also conducts non-technical surveys, collecting information about the presence, type, distribution and surrounding environment of mines and UXO, to better define where the contamination is. This allows better prioritisation of clearance. MAG is working with local communities to develop a network of Community Focal Points. This involves training men, women, young
people, teachers and traditional leaders to share safety messages and collect data relating to accident victims and levels of contamination within communities.

They are also involved in arms management and destruction in Mali. This is to protect against their use elsewhere and to avoid accidental explosions. Their activities have included: technical risk assessments, training, refurbishing armouries to improve security, destruction of unserviceable arms and ammunition.

TDI
TDI has been providing EOD and IEDD training in Mali in support of UNMAS’s operations in the country. The work was part of a contract they were awarded by UNOPS in 2013 to respond to the ERW, IEDs and landmines that were affecting not only UN agencies but also civilians and their livelihoods.

TDI has supplied training conducted by three experts, as well as international Mine Protected Vehicle Driver/Mechanic instructors to train Nepalese and Cambodian MPV drivers. Both from Troop Contributing Countries, the peacekeepers were trained in Gao and Kidal from March 2015 for three months.

They have also facilitated UNMAS’s work through a contract to provide fleet maintenance for vehicles in northern Mali. TDI were asked to provide repairs and maintenance in four key locations in Mali to ensure MINUSMA and UNMAS can continue to deliver their humanitarian support mission in Mali.

Furthermore, TDI has been contracted to deliver a C-IED and IED awareness programme to the MINUSMA forces. For this purpose, TDI have sub-contracted Optima Group to provide the highly specialist C-IED and IED skill set. The three-year contract started in September 2014 and to date 3,467 peacekeeping troops have been trained.

They have also been engaged in assessing the explosive threat more generally across Mali, conducting survey as well as the EOD operations.

Handicap International
Handicap International has been providing risk education to civilians since 2012, alongside some demining efforts. These sessions teach civilians to identify and avoid contact with dangerous weapons and explosive devices. Handicap International’s demining experts were also active in the region in the immediate wake of the conflict, working to clear ERW, which posed a threat to the general population and especially to children.

The staff in Mali also provides equipment and training to two regional orthopaedic-fitting and rehabilitation centres to aid victims of explosives, such as IEDs or mines, that have been left with physical disabilities. The psychological impacts of ERW are not forgotten, as Handicap provides a variety of support to the most vulnerable, such as group sessions for victims to discuss their experiences.

G4S
G4S won a contract for the provision of C-IED and EOD training and mentoring to UN troops in Mali, and this training began in April 2016. The MINUSMA personnel will be delivered C-IED theory as well as practical training. The course will also cover components, threat mitigation, search operations, route search, specialised equipment, detection training with various detectors including minilab and VMR 3 GPR, and tactical training.

Teams had previously been deployed in Timbukto, Gao (3 teams), Kidal (2 teams), Tessalit, Aguelok, and Menaka, in 2014. They were engaged in capacity building and development of the MINUSMA EOD teams.

G4S have also provided C-IED training to the staff of commercial companies, such as the private company CrossBoundary Energy, which offers solar installations to African enterprises. G4S does not perform any clearance or research activities, mainly the training of personnel on the ground to mitigate the threat of IEDs, and only upon the client’s request. It does not have any formal C-IED training institution and does not provide any victim assistance of any sort. It does not face any shortage in equipment or personnel as it is a commercial company that can hire the rightly qualified ex-military personnel upon the demand of its clients.

Dynasafe
Dynasafe was awarded a contract to provide Explosive and Narcotics Detection Dog Teams in Mali. Dynasafe dog teams provide critical protection against IEDs to the UNMAS teams in Mali. The dogs are trained at a dedicated training facility, Dynasafe Canine Services, located in Pretoria, South Africa. The security canines provided can be used as patrol dogs and are capable of detecting explosives, narcotics, landmines and human remains.
**Optima Group**

TDI were contracted to deliver C-IED and IED awareness programmes to the MINUSMA forces. For this purpose, TDI sub-contracted Optima Group to provide the highly specialist C-IED and IED skill set. The three-year contract started in September 2014. Optima Group mobilised a team of 12 C-IED and Search experts, deployed them to Mali, prepared the course content and commenced the delivery of training. To date 3,467 peacekeeping troops have been trained.

Rich Williams, Optima Group's Director International explains: “The work that Optima Group and TDI have been conducting in support of UNMAS in Mali is essential for improving collective understanding and mitigating the threat from IEDs.”

3.3.7 MAURITANIA (47)

**Threat**

Although IEDs have been used in Mauritania, those experienced in the last five years did very little damage. The threat has however been present and due to the scares in February 2011, Mauritania has sought to improve its C-IED capabilities and remove the terrorist threat nationally and through regional assistance.

**Capacity**

Mauritania has proved itself in the counterterrorism arena through its handling of the al-Qaeda presence in the country, as the country directed most its resources towards security – to the detriment of health and education. The US also provided support to Mauritania. Their efforts have reformed the army, increased surveillance, intelligence and training.

 Providing better border security has been a key priority of Mauritania. Screening at border checkpoints is sporadic, and some lack equipment and personnel to carry out such tests. There is also a lack of coordination between border police and those of neighbouring countries, as well as other Mauritanian agencies.

The National Gendarmerie and Security Directorate are the main law enforcement units for conducting counterterrorism efforts. Though, it has been said that information sharing could be improved between the two agencies to better facilitate coordination and cooperation in their actions.

Mauritania’s efforts to counterterrorism in the country have led to the arrests of IS members and supporters. This contributes to disrupting the terrorist network. Mauritania’s counterterrorism efforts have also seen members of the judiciary placed in training to better allow them to prosecute terrorist related offences.

Counter-extremism efforts in Mauritania have focused on Muslim youth, through a programme run by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Traditional Education to empower youths. Other initiatives turn to media to encourage moderate Islam, tolerance and acceptance. Secret police are also employed to ensure imams stick to the regulations to ensure the teaching of moderate Islam.

The National Mine Action Authority (PNDHD) in Mauritania was created in 2007 to move demining from under military control to civilian. The PNDHD is responsible for conducting demining across the country. Most demining has now been completed across the contaminated areas, with international and NGO assistance with training and equipment.

**Bilateral assistance**

Mauritania is part of the Sahel G5. French forces, through Operation Barkhane, support the G5 countries against armed terrorist groups and help prevent the reconstitution of terrorist sanctuaries in the region.

**Training**

Mauritania has engaged in US-sponsored training, focusing on counterterrorism tactics and techniques. The US has also provided training to members of Mauritania’s judiciary, so they may handle cases of suspected terrorism or terrorism-related offences. Security personnel also participate in the US ATA programs. In 2016, Mauritania participated in the annual “Flintlock” exercise, which saw more than 1,700 military personnel take part across Senegal and Mauritania. The exercises focus on counterterrorism and involved anti-IED training.

A Spanish contingent of EOD specialists provided de-activation training to Mauritanian forces in May 2016. The subjects included: detection devices, protection, attack, ammunition, removal, exploitation, and doctrine. The instructors were impressed with the forces knowledge from their experience in demining and using metal detectors. Of particular use to Mauritania were the courses in exploiting the scene and collecting evidence. Some of the personnel from Mauritania had also spent
two months training in Madrid’s International Demining Center.\textsuperscript{268}

\textit{Equipment}
In 2014, the US gave Mauritania two military aircrafts equipped with surveillance systems worth a combined $21 million.\textsuperscript{269}

\textbf{Regional initiatives}
As part of their obligations as a member of MENAFATF, Mauritania is working to bring their legislation in-line with international standards. However, as with many other areas of Mauritania’s counterterrorism functions, they lack the ideal resources to implement their efforts as they and their allies would like.

Mauritania is also a member of the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.

\textbf{International initiatives}
Mauritania hosted a regional countering violent extremism summit in 2015. This conference focused on countering violent extremism, such as identifying what factors allow radicalisation to flourish and promoting community and youth empowerment as a solution.

The UNDP assisted Mauritania’s demining efforts through the provision of equipment, equipment maintenance and demining assistance.

\textbf{NGO and private company support}
\textit{NPA}
NPA provided training to personnel from the PNDHD and from the Mauritanian Corps of Engineers in 2013. They then assisted in their work to clear Nouadibou province. The Japanese Government provided funding for the equipment needed for the project – other costs were covered by the governments of Norway and Germany.

\textit{GICHD}
The GICHD has assisted the demining programs in Mauritania, particularly in the areas of information management and standards. They provided training to the demining personnel in capacity building through information management. GICHD also evaluated the UNDP and NPA projects in Mauritania.

\textit{Institute for Security Studies}
Mauritania requested the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) to provide technical assistance to augment its counterterrorism capacity. The ISS and the Directorate of National Security of the Mauritanian Police Training Force organised a two-week counterterrorism course in 2013. The course focused on border controls, cooperation, information sharing, and dealing with IEDs and situations of terrorism.\textsuperscript{270}

\textbf{3.3.8 NIGER (35)}
\textbf{Threat}
Niger has faced three IED attacks between 2011 and 2015. These killed and injured 75 people, of which 34 were civilians. Two attacks occurred in 2013, both perpetrated by MUJAO. In 2015 the only IED attack was committed by Boko Haram. Currently, the main threat of IEDs in Niger stems from Boko Haram who has increasingly mounted terrorist attacks in the country, crossing the border from Nigeria. Niger also faces the threat from attacks by militant groups from Libya and Mali.

\textbf{Capability}
Niger has been working to increase their C-IED and counterterrorism capacity, particularly in the areas of border security and intelligence. However, a lack of resources and basic utensils such as electricity, communications equipment, vehicles and personnel, constrain Niger’s development in this and other areas. It produces a lack of resources, coordination and overall effectiveness.

The Central Service for the Fight Against Terrorism (known by its French acronym SCLCT) is made up of law enforcement personnel from Niger’s main policing entities: the National Police, the National Guard, and the Gendarmerie. The SCLCT is the main actor in Niger responsible for counterterrorism investigations. The SCLCT facilitates greater information sharing between the three branches of law enforcement in Niger on counterterrorism issues.

Improving border security has been a priority for Niger. Particularly along its northern borders with Algeria, Libya, and Mali, which are often utilised for smuggling arms, explosives and drugs. This has seen an increase in Niger’s border control facilities and cooperation with bordering nations. At border checkpoints, terrorist watch-lists are used, and these are also circulated with other security services to improve coordination across all Niger’s state security actors. However, the lack of funding has seen these border facilities ill-equipped to carry out the ideal level of checks, such as biometric and biographic screening.
Efforts to counter violent extremism saw the Nigerien government proliferate messages of tolerance and peace through social media, education, and religious leaders, as well as the rehabilitation and reintegration of prisoners incarcerating for violent extremism.271

**Bilateral assistance**

Niger has engaged in an initiative with Chad and Libya in order to form a tripartite border commission as part of their counterterrorism efforts and to increase to cooperation to provide effective national security for each state.

The US has also provided assistance to Niger, who has cooperatively worked to improve national security through the US' Security Governance Initiative. Niger has also been engaged in the US ATA programme to help improve their counterterrorism ability. US troops have been involving with the training of Niger's local forces to better prepare them for fighting Islamist militants.272 The US has also donated two US military aircrafts to Niger.273

Canada has played a significant role in assisting Niger in developing their border security management and building the capacity of the armed forces to manage terrorist threats. These initiatives have included the provision of training to improve counter terrorism abilities.

French forces are based in Niamey to assist counterterrorism efforts, including through ground operations, as well as air surveillance.

**Regional initiatives**

Niger has provided assistance to combat AQIM in Mali, alongside other regional forces.

Niger is a member of GIABA, which was established in 1999 to fight money laundering. At the beginning of 2006, GIABA's mandate was expanded to cover counterterrorism financing. Countering terrorism financing is particularly significant in Niger, whose borders are known to facilitate the smuggling of large sums of money. However, Niger has charged many with terrorism financing and made efforts to combat its continuation. Improved border security has contributed to this. As part of the Sahel-Sahara Development and Security Strategy (SDSS), a regional initiative supported by USAID's Peace through Development II program, Niger strengthened moderate voices and helped counter violent extremism. The programme encouraged the use of radio, social media, education and religion to promote tolerance and dialogue as part of the attempts to counteract the dissemination of extremist voices.274

As part of Niger's commitment to combat Boko Haram, Niger cooperates with the Lake Chad Basin Commission and hosted many meetings on the subject. Niger is also part of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to tackle Boko Haram, to whom it cooperates with in operations and provides troops to.

The GCTF Sahel Capacity-Building Working Group has seen increased attention to border security, as requested by Niger and other Sahel states. Discussions have focused on the challenges and good practice of border security and customs.

Niger is also part of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.

**NGO and private company support**

**Spirit of America**

Spirit of America is a relatively small American NGO that has operated in Niger since 2015. They have provided many items of non-lethal equipment to Niger in their fight against Boko Haram, including metal detectors.275 Additionally, they funded a community-level counter Boko Haram summit in Diffa, southern Niger. The summit was conducted in cooperation with the US unit and the Nigerien military and focused on stopping the flow of recruits to help the militant group to counter radicalisation and recruitment. They also looked at how to better police village borders.

Currently, they are looking to fund equipment purchases for the *Action Civil-Militaire* (ACM) unit that empowers local leaders and has developed early warning systems, but are under-resourced.276

### 3.3.9 NIGERIA (5)

**Threat**

Between 2011 and 2015 Nigeria saw 7,439 deaths and injuries from 236 IED incidents. Of these casualties, 94% (7,010) were civilians. The largest number IED-caused deaths and injuries occurred in 2015, when 2,923 deaths and injuries were recorded from 82 IED incidents. Of these, 2,739 (94%) of the deaths and injuries occurred in populated areas. Where a perpetrator could be confirmed, 100% of the incidents were perpetrated by Boko Haram. However, they rarely claim
their attacks. Boko Haram has also caused a string of IED attacks in neighboring countries, such as Chad and Cameroon.

**Capability**

The Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF) is the combined military forces of Nigeria. The largest portion of the NAF is the Nigerian Army. According to Global Fire Power, the NAF has approximately 130,000 active front-line personnel.\(^{277}\) The NAF are currently engaged in ongoing counter-insurgency efforts against Boko Haram, an Islamist group known for grisly tactics targeting civilians. As previously noted by AOAV, Boko Haram’s suicide bombings and IEDs are the most lethal in the world in terms of deaths and injuries per attack.\(^{278}\) This puts the NAF on the front line of a serious IED conflict, a challenge it previously faced during the secessionist Biafra Conflict in the 1980s.

The NAF have an experienced bomb disposal unit which deals with C-IED operations in a military context. However, in general, the campaign against Boko Haram has been dogged by corruption and mismanagement. The most high-profile corruption case saw former National Security Advisor Sambo Dusuki accused of awarding up to $2 million in false contracts, leaving Nigerian troops lacking the correct equipment to engage Boko Haram.\(^{279}\)

Though the NAF play an important role in responding to IED threats in Nigeria, due to the threat the police also have designated EOD teams which respond to local threats. The Nigerian Police Force have received C-IED training from abroad in order to increase police capabilities at tackling the high IED threat that persists in Nigeria. The training was part of a wider counter-terrorism initiative to combat Boko Haram. Most of the training they have received on C-IED has been provided by the United States or by US-funded bodies.

**Bilateral assistance**

As well as those briefly mentioned above, the Nigerian government has received considerable assistance from international bodies, including from the US Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) programme. Most of the US-backed efforts to counter the IED threat are inseparable from a broader counter-terrorism campaign, including CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) programmes and attempts to deal with the underlying problems motivating the rise of insurgent groups, such as corruption and the weakness of civil society.

However, the NAF itself has not received enormous amounts of foreign training or assistance, perhaps because the NAF have been accused of various human rights abuses during the conflict, deterring those who might otherwise provide military aid. In 2014, however, a Congressional Research Service Report asserted that $5 million in aid was being directed by the US to the NAF in the form of military-civilian relations and C-IED training, an increase from the previous year. In one publicised incident, a US bomb squad supervisor volunteered to provide C-IED training to Nigerian police during a visit on an unrelated mission. Other countries, including the UK, are also providing C-IED training to the NAF.

Attempts to improve the NAF’s counterterrorism abilities have included the establishment of the Nigerian Army Information Processing Center, an open-source database institution that encourages the rapid reporting and analysis of terrorist activity as well as the anonymous reporting of NAF abuses. According to the same source, they have also begun to equip themselves with balloon-based reconnaissance platforms and electronic sensors termed TM-1s which supposedly have the ability to detect human-borne IEDs from a distance of 500 metres.

**Regional initiatives**

Nigeria is also part of TSCTP, which provides C-IED training to civil law enforcement as well as military personnel alongside other partner nations, such as Chad and Cameroon, who are also involved in the fight against Boko Haram. The training police have received has also targeted counter-terrorism financing, with the aim of better restricting Boko Haram’s ability to raise and store money.

Nigeria also participates as a member of GIABA to assist their impact in tackling money-laundering and terrorism financing. This is particularly important in Nigeria, as the country faces a high risk from these crimes. It is likely that Boko Haram had been easily able to abuse Nigeria’s unexceptional monitoring system of terrorism financing, but Nigeria have been commended by GIABA for the significant steps they have taken already. One of these steps was the Anti-Terrorism Act; the implementation of which was seen to signify a turning point with the enactment of strong counterterrorism measures, which is required for effective counterterrorism financing.\(^{280}\)

In recognition of the significant efforts Nigeria has made, GIABA recommended Nigeria for membership of the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – the only other African state to gain membership is South Africa which makes Nigeria the second African state to register for FATF membership. GIABA has been providing technical and other support to Nigeria and is ready to sustain and create further training programmes in areas such as asset recovery, asset forfeiture, the tracking and monitoring of stolen funds, money laundering and terrorists financing activities in Nigeria.

Nigeria is also engaged in a regional military initiative to combat Boko Haram. The MNJTF has seen Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Chad and Cameroon unify their efforts, to create a 9,000 strong force, with the specific aim of bringing an end to the Boko Haram insurgency. This has significantly aided Nigeria’s efforts to combat the Boko Haram group, who have caused the most devastation in Nigeria. Assistance from Nigeria’s neighbours has enabled the group to be tackled in a way that was not done before MNJTF’s creation, as Boko Haram moved across borders to regroup, recruit, fund, prepare and carry out attacks.

NGO, civil society and private company assistance

DDG
The DDG have delivered emergency mine/ERW risk education, particularly targeting IDPs in highly affected areas. This work began in October 2015 and now covers high-risk areas in Adamawa state and Borno state; the DDG were hoping to expand their operations into Yobe state in late 2016. Other aims that DDG hope to achieve in Nigeria include carrying out IED risk assessments as well as developing risk education materials and strategies aimed at IDPs and humanitarian workers.

MKDS Training
Nigeria participated in the training provided by MKDS, who specialise in delivering counterterrorism solutions, consultancy, operational support and training to the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC). The training was comprised of seminars, an exhibition, demonstrations, and importantly an IEDD / Render Safe exercise, and a one-day Security and Counter-Terrorism in Africa Conference on December 12, featuring high level speakers.

Vox Peccavi
Vox Peccavi is a consultancy that appears to post updates on IED attacks throughout Nigeria. It also offers advice on IEDs that appears to be aimed at local communities, as it details ways to try and ensure individual safety in an area that is at high risk of an IED attack. The high-threat level of the area target may be due to the region in general or due to a particular event that increases IED risk. This advice too remains aimed at those living in Nigeria or other areas of West Africa.
Vox Peccavi also explores the tactics behind the use of the IEDs by groups that operate in West Africa, such as Boko Haram. Vox Paccavi’s reports have examined where the groups might get their resources to build IEDs and find safe/hospitable places to build them.

Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)
The CJTF are a paramilitary vigilante group in northeast Nigeria that was formed in 2013. They currently boast 26,000 members, of which most are volunteers.284 The CJTF have the express aim of defeating Boko Haram.

The vigilante group gained attention for their quick response to IED threats that Boko Haram presents. Members of the CJTF have been known to intercept suicide bombers, killing them before they detonate their explosives or ensuring that the only people they kill are themselves. This work has meant suicide bombers are being stopped before civilians are harmed.

The CJTF are working in cooperation with the Nigerian Army. They have taken responsibility for manning check-points, such as at camp entrances. Many of the members have been victims or witnesses to Boko Haram’s crime and the residents of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, are said to be grateful for the protection the CJTF offer. Some of the CJTF have now been trained by the military and receive some wages for their work but hold the same positions as other members. Like the NAF there have also been allegations of human rights abuses levelled at the CJTF.

Though the CJTF represent a very differently type of C-IED civil society organisation, they are said to have been instrumental in stopping the threat of bombs in Borno State. They represent the increasing need in areas where the threat of IED attacks is so high, for action and cooperation to decrease the threat they pose to civilians.

### Capability
Senegal is fortunate not to suffer from high-levels of extremist violence in general. Religious followers and preachers are moderate in their belief and encourage tolerance. Religious entities are supported by the government if they require assistance in preventing extremism.

The National Police are the main counterterrorism enforcers in Senegal, with the assistance of the gendarmerie. The police carry out investigations for terrorism related crimes, as well as everyday counterterrorism activities such as stop and searches, and surveillance. The counterterrorism unit of the national intelligence services assists with surveillance and investigations. The police have an anti-terrorist unit, designed to respond to terrorism incidents and capture terrorists. Police presence in public areas has also been increased to provide greater security in these areas.

Customs and border security, for which the police are responsible, lack the resources and cooperation with neighbours and partners needed to fulfil terrorism prevention tasks to the required standard. This is especially a problem at the borders to the south and east. Border security has been a focus of training efforts.

All the law enforcement organisations are said to lack the capacity needed to adequately carry out C-IED initiatives. Coordination between the various enforcers of counterterrorism in the country is also absent. The issue stems from the poverty prevalent throughout Senegal.285

Another significant problem that might effect IED use in Senegal is the high contamination of landmines that the government in recent years avoided doing anything about. Many NGOs and international organisations withdrew their support for humanitarian demining in Senegal in December 2015 due to the lack of government cooperation. Mechem deminers have also been kidnapped by a faction of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance, one of the rebel factions in Senegal, in 2013. However, in 2016 demining activities resumed with the particular assistance of Handicap International.

### Bilateral assistance
In 2016 Senegal participated in the annual “Flintlock” exercise, which saw more than 1,700 military personnel take part across Senegal and Mauritania. The exercises focus on counterterrorism and involved C-IED training.286
Senegal police, gendarmes, lawyers and judges have been trained in post-blast procedure and investigations. In July of this year, the Senegalese Armed Forces and the US Army Africa took part in a two-week joint training in Theis, Senegal, as part of the Africa Readiness Training program. The training included IED detection alongside a variety of other realistic training. This exercise not only increases the capacity of the Senegalese Forces but also those of the US who must adapt to Africa’s environment and tactics.

The US has also enhanced Senegal’s demining capability though a train-the-trainer program, which began in 2014. This saw engineers within the army taught how to safely detect and move explosive ordnance. The veterans taught have begun teaching further students from the lessons learnt.

As well as cooperation with the US, Senegal has also received assistance in the form of training and funding from French forces, particularly for police response. France has planned to invest a further $47 million to African Sahel countries for counterterrorism training and equipment. Though Senegal is unlikely to be considered a priority in the region, they will see efforts there too.

Regional initiatives
Senegal is part of the TSCTP and GIABA, a FATF style organisation that combats money laundering and terrorism financing. Senegal has seen many individuals suspected of supporting terrorism through financing, and has begun to make a name for itself as a terrorist financing base. Senegal has endeavoured to counter this image though counter terrorism financing investigations and arrests.

International initiatives
In 2015, Senegal hosted the GCTF’s Sahel Regional Capacity Building Working Group meeting. Senegal are looking to increase their border capabilities through cooperation with the GCTF’s Border Security Initiative, as well as similar programmes run by other organisations such as the AU.

Senegal provides troops and assistance to the MINUSMA operation in Mali. MISUSMA forces face a significant threat from IEDs in Mali. Many of the states supporting the MINUSMA operation lacked C-IED training. Training has been provided by NATO agencies, and UNMAS has provided threat mitigation services to MINUSMA which also helps to reduce the civilian harm from IEDs. Senegalese forces are also assisting in peacekeeping forces in MINUSC, MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNMISS, and UNOCI.

Senegal has engaged in INTERPOL training provided to states in West Africa to improve border management. The exercise in 2016, focused on enhancing interagency collaboration. To encourage greater cooperation, other agencies such as GIABA, immigration services, trafficking units and other law enforcement agencies also provided training, to improve awareness and foster good relations between the agencies within the states participating.

NGO AND PRIVATE ACTOR SUPPORT
GICHD
The GICHD has assisted Senegal’s demining centre, focusing on programme and information management. They have supported demining personnel in Senegal through the provision of training and provided workshops on how to conduct MRE programmes. Furthermore, they have supported Senegal to develop National Mine Action Standards.

Handicap International
Handicap International has been clearing mines and UXOs from Casamance throughout 2016. They had previously carried out land clearance three years ago. In 2016, they planned to clear 55,000m². They are also assisting the Senegalese Association of Mine Victims in providing MRE in the same area. 60 schools and 65 villages will be the target of the education as they hope to reach children most importantly due their curiosity and inexperience that makes them more vulnerable. Pax Mondial provided several mine detection dogs to Handicap International to aid their efforts.

3.3.11 SOUTH SUDAN
Threat
South Sudan does not suffer from IEDs. However, due to the conflict that has been dominant throughout Sudan and South Sudan, South Sudan has been highly impacted by other weaponry, such as a proliferation of small arms as well as land contaminated by mines and other UXOs. Though South Sudan does not currently have a problem with IEDs, they do share a border with states that do, particularly Kenya.
**Capability**

Though South Sudan does not suffer from the threat of IEDs, the country holds actors who are experienced in clearance and decontamination of UXOs and mines. South Sudan has seen many demining actors engaged in land clearance, awareness raising and disposal of UXO/ERW to protect the civilian population.

South Sudan has its own National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), formerly known as the South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA). The NMAA is responsible for overseeing all mining activity in the country. The NMAA works in cooperation with other demining actors to conduct surveys and clearance work, as well as providing education to impacted communities. The clearance of such items would not only be preparatory if South Sudan did encounter IEDs within their own borders but also acts as preventative – the clearance of such materials means they cannot be re-fashioned into IEDs.

**Bilateral support**

Much of South Sudan’s bilateral support has come from Japan. In 2015, Japan contributed $2.5 million to mine efforts and $2.3 million in 2016.293 Over the past four years, Japan has donated over $12.5 million to assist with demining and other clearance work throughout the country. Their support has allowed the clearance of 3,972,675 square metres of land, and for the delivery of risk education to 54,358 civilians, most of them children.294

**International support**

The United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre in South Sudan (UNMACC) was created under Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1996 which established the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). On 1 July 2012, UNMACC changed its name to UNMAS South Sudan – though it is referred to as simply UNMAS. In accordance with the original UNMISS mandate (SCR 1996), UNMAS provided support to the Government in conducting demining activities and worked to strengthen its capacity to conduct mine action in accordance with International Mine Action Standards.

UNMAS and its partners run operations throughout South Sudan, focusing on states most affected by the current crisis, as well as on the states affected by the legacy of ERW from the former Sudan civil war. UNMAS works with a broad spectrum of partners, including commercial contractors and national and international NGOs.

During the July 2015 - June 2016 demining season, UNMAS had contracts with five demining companies: Denel Land Systems Incorporating MECHEM, TDI, Dynasafe Minetech International, G4S and MAG. UNMAS also works in close collaboration with UNICEF and international NGOs such as DCA and the DDG, as well as national mine action NGOs such as the Christian Missionary Initiative.

UNMAS has cleared ERW from all UNMISS Protection of Civilians (PoC) areas and responded to every incident of explosive weapons strikes in and around UN bases. UNMAS has also performed clearance operations in areas critical for the safe return of civilians to their homes and is assessing major roads to ensure safe access for civilians, peacekeepers and humanitarian aid actors.

Through route assessment and verification, UNMAS opened a total of 4,030 kilometres of roads, which now allows the free and safe movement of humanitarian actors, peacekeeping personnel, and development actors. UNMAS has coordinated and supported implementation of MRE activities for 784,867 women, men, boys and girls; especially targeting vulnerable groups. Apart from the clearance operations UNMAS has conducted in South Sudan, they have also been responsible for searching vehicles, bags, people, and buildings with Explosive Detection Dogs (EDD). EDD teams are predominantly used at entry points and to check cargo in Juba. In May 2016, UNMAS in South Sudan received a further 37 EDDs.295

**NGO and private support**

Actors that have been or are engaged in demining and other such efforts in South Sudan include TDI, MAG, DDG, DCA, G4S Ordnance Management (G4S), Mechem, MineTech International (MTI), and GICHD.

**NPA**

NPA Humanitarian Disarmament has been based out of Central Equatoria since 2004. The programme boasts some 200 staff, as well as mechanical and mine detection dogs (MDD) assets. NPA conducts survey, clearance, BAC and EOD activities. NPA is closely supporting national authorities with the destruction of unstable stockpiles of weapons and ammunition.

**DCA**

To address the threat of ERW in South Sudan, DCA is deploying two EOD teams and a Risk Education (RE) team to remove deadly ERW and to deliver key
messages about mines, ERW and safe behaviour. The teams are made up of South Sudanese nationals, who work alongside DCA’s international technical staff to remove and destroy the ERW.

The Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) programme in South Sudan has joined the DCA regional office based in Juba in 2012 to contribute to providing a holistic approach to the humanitarian issues facing the country. Through this partnership, HMA will integrate its activities with those of the DCA regional office, and more broadly with our ACT Alliance partners in country.

Dynasafe
Since 2007, Dynasafe has supported humanitarian operations by providing integrated clearance capacities, comprising mechanical, manual and MDD assets, as well as, canine capacities including Explosive Detection Dog (EDD) teams. They have an established management office in Juba which assists with a range of tasks, such as sourcing local personnel, sourcing local supplies, obtaining visas, evacuation plans, security planning and the collection of transported and imported equipment.

3.3.12 SAHEL REGION CONCLUSION
The countries within the Sahel region, more than others, rely heavily on international and humanitarian assistance and support, in almost all areas of C-IED and other counterterrorism efforts. Many of the countries lack the resources to adequately launch attack the network operations and dismantle IEDs.

However, the lack of resources appears to have encouraged Sahel nations to seek better community cohesion. This has not only seen Sahel states utilise civilian volunteers in their military and law enforcement efforts, including intelligence and border security, but has also provided further empowerment to communities that can combat violent extremism and act as a preventative measure against recruitment for example. Such civilian efforts in the Sahel include the CJTF in Nigeria, vigilance committees in Cameroon, and ACM in Niger.

The involvement of civilians in C-IED of this scale is not seen in any of the other regions or globally. That civilians are willing and needed shows the scale of the problem faced, but may also facilitate better chances of combating such violence. However, the fact that civilians must be relied upon clearly places them in danger, and arming them also runs the risk of weapons falling into the wrong hands and accidents being caused by those who are untrained.

Greater international assistance to Sahel nations through funds, training, and equipment for C-IED capacity building is required. Further regional support to assist the cooperation of neighbouring states is also recommended.

3.4 OTHER HIGHLY AFFECTED IED COUNTRIES

3.4.1 AFGHANISTAN (3)
Threat
Between 2011 and 2015 the country suffered 11,838 deaths and injuries from 1,157 IED incidents. Of these casualties, 73% (8,608) were civilians. However, there has been a significant decrease in IED incidents in this period and over the last five years, and Afghanistan has seen the deaths and injuries from IEDs per year drop by 41%. Though, similarly to Iraq, Afghanistan has also witnessed the lethality per IED incident increase by 175% from 8 per incident in 2011, to 22 in 2015.

Capability
Afghanistan has taken important steps to combat the use of IEDs within policy and diplomacy, such as Presidential Decree no. 28, which was issued in 2010. The decree bans the import, use, storage and trade of ammonium nitrate fertiliser, which had been a key component of IEDs used in the country. Afghanistan has also engaged in efforts to improve border security, awareness raising and information sharing. Other border security efforts in Afghanistan have been tackled by the World Customs Organisation’s Programme Global Shield (PGS), which will be looked at in more detail later. The Afghan National Police have developed explosive hazard reduction teams. The police within this field receive training to be used in the fight against the IED problem in Afghanistan. The first of these teams was introduced into Helmand province where they put their C-IED skills to use in the protection of Afghan civilians.

C-IED assistance to Afghanistan has come from diverse sources and in a variety of forms. Not only have armed forces and law enforcement received training from countries such as the UK and US, but from NATO as well. NATO has also provided monetary assistance to Afghanistan through the ANA Trust Fund.
This assistance has greatly improved Afghanistan’s C-IED capabilities and appears to have informed the state on what C-IED progress must look like, not just nationally but globally.

**Training**

The Afghani National Police use the Central Training Center in Kabul to learn and train in C-IED. Many of the trainers are experts from abroad. For example, the C-IED Chief Advisor at the Central Training Center is an EOD Technician from the Royal Australian Navy. Some of the Afghan police have received training from foreign bomb disposal operators such as those from the UK and the US, who have contributed experienced force members to aid in C-IED training efforts. They have been given training particularly in destroying roadside bombs, and have also received training in robot maintenance and repair.

The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are the national armed forces of Afghanistan. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) is responsible for the ANDSF’s institutional training, education and professional development activities, as set out by the Afghan Ministries of Defence and Interior.

The Resolute Support Mission, which will be detailed momentarily, mission engages in C-IED training and activity through the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Counter-IED Directorate (CSTC-A C-IED Directorate). The C-IED Directorate trains, advises and assists the ANDSF on how to identify and disarm IEDs and UXOs and collect evidence following detonation.

In April 2014, the C-IED Directorate launched the Improvised Explosive Device Analysis Course. This course trains ANA Soldiers on how to collect and analyse information from IEDs. The course lasts ten days, and aims to see the trainees return to their home forces and in turn train them. The instructors use practical exercises throughout the course to increase the retention of lessons by the students. After graduating, the students should be able to:

- Identify the characteristics of an IED
- Know the local tactics for employing, transporting, storing, and making IEDs
- Understand the reporting process
- Understand how the intelligence cycle supports analysis of IED threat data
- Be able to produce an IED threat product briefing slide

The CSTC-A also provide awareness raising in coordination with the Afghan Ministry of Education teachers. This sees training given, alongside the use of adverts on billboards and entertainment to reach provide such awareness on IEDs.
Equipment
Both the police and army have received equipment such as metal detectors, suits and robots. Now the amount of bomb disposal specialists is in the hundreds but they hope to train more given the scale of the threat in Afghanistan.

Through the ANA trust fund the ANA has received equipment, such as 450 personnel devices from Afghanistan in January 2015. Equipment received through the C-IED Directorate efforts from international forces has seen the ANDSF accumulate more than 455 mine rollers in support of route clearance operations since 2011, along with 90,000 mounted and dismounted C-IED radio controlled electronic warfare devices. He said there were 64 EOD items delivered to the ANDSF, including critical equipment such as medium tactical vehicles, IED jammers, bomb suits, hand-held detectors and robots.

Funding
The development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) is supported by the ANA Trust Fund, which is a NATO project. The ANA Trust Fund was created in 2007 to provide a mechanism for International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to support the transportation and installation of equipment donated by ISAF nations, and to purchase equipment and services for ANA engineering projects, and to support in- and out-of-country training. It also supports the long-term sustaining of the ANA and literacy and professional military education which includes C-IED efforts. Through this programme the ANA has received contributions from the international community in excess of $1 billion.

Bilateral assistance
The US has assisted in training efforts as well as in airstrikes. Both NATO Resolute Support, and the US, have targeted armed groups such as the Taliban, al-Qaeda and IS affiliates across Afghanistan and have been responsible for the death and injury of hundreds of militants, as well as the destruction of their assets, such as vehicles, hideouts, and buildings.

State assistance has also seen the US engage with both Afghanistan and Pakistan within what is known as the Tripartite Counter-IED Working Group. The group is composed of senior military and diplomatic representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The Tripartite C-IED Working Group is one arm of the Tripartite Commission.

The group engages frequently in C-IED information exchange between US, Afghan and Pakistani military representatives. The information exchange has already resulted in substantial improvements in cooperation and has seen greater operational successes and the saving of numerous Afghan civilian lives. Recently, the working group also proposed that a common database be developed to aid in the fight against IEDs.

The group has also begun efforts in civilian awareness raising, as well as attempting to improve border security between Afghanistan and Pakistan to target terrorists and IED materials moving between the two countries. Afghanistan has increasingly sought to improve border security to assist enforcement, as they believe 80% of the IEDs in Afghanistan are made with commercial explosives that come from companies in Pakistan.

Afghan National Army search for IEDs (Sgt. Rupert Freer RLC/MOD)

REGIONAL INITIATIVES
Afghanistan has been a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) since 2006. It received a warning from the FATF to comply with its commitments to implement its action plan to address deficiencies by October 2014 or it risked being placed on the FATF’s list of high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions. In March 2015, Afghanistan amended its anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing laws to increase the countries compliance with FATF standards. However, significant deficiencies remain in Afghanistan’s compliance and ability to combat terrorism financing.

Between August and September 2015, Afghanistan Border Police also participated in a regional workshop in Tajikistan on “Border Security and Management for
Countering Terrorism”. Similar courses have been provided in Tajikistan by the OSCE Border Management College, such as the Train the Trainers Course for the Afghan Border Police in April 2016.

INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

Customs
Afghanistan’s involvement in PGS has seen customs officers participate in PGS training where they learn how to identify IEDs, detonators and dual-use precursor chemicals used in manufacturing IEDs. Additionally, training has provided Afghanistan Customs the knowledge necessary to carry out risk assessments, and knowledge of international and national measures to reduce risks associated with such chemicals. At training they also have gained experience using presumptive chemical test kits and devices.

Military
The main NATO effort in Afghanistan is the NATO Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. Resolute Support is an international task force whose mission is to provide further training, advice and assistance for Afghan institutions and security forces. It is intended to promote the ‘Afghanisation’ of military and security work in the country, replacing NATO’s direct military role. As of June 2015 it consisted of 41 nations that are participating in the RS mission, including 26 NATO allies and 15 other partner countries, for a complement of 13,223 military personnel, including 6,834 U.S. forces.

Resolute Support was launched in early January 2015 after the completion of the mission of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Much of the ISAF infrastructure was folded into Resolute Support, including the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), now re-designated CJ7. Resolute Support is based in Kabul and Bagram Airfield, with four local ‘spokes’: Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Laghman.

Resolute Support’s key functions include:
- Supporting planning, programming and budgeting
- Assuring transparency, accountability and oversight
- Supporting the adherence to the principles of rule of law and good governance
- Supporting the establishment and sustainment of such processes as force generation, recruiting,
- training, managing and development of personnel
- They have also reportedly established two state of the art Ministry of the Interior exploitation labs in both Kabul and Herat. These are designed to provide extra intelligence about the devices that are being used and allow post-blast investigations to be carried out. This can considerably aid in the defeat the network aspect of C-IED. They can establish the explosives used and potentially where they have come from, as well as the mechanisms used.

Humanitarian
Mining agencies have also played a notable role in C-IED, as their efforts have gradually expanded to see them clear IEDs alongside mines and other ERW. These organisations include MACCA and the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA). It is hoped that their role in C-IED will continue to grow, given their experience with explosives and clearance tactics. UNMAS’s role in Afghanistan has also included IED clearance, though this is not part of their mandate. In 2012 UNMAS partners cleared most parts of Nawzad district of Helmand province and, in doing so, destroyed 579 PPIED and 2300 different types of ERW.

UNMAS in Afghanistan have also provided victim assistance – an aspect of C-IED that is all too often overlooked. They provide this through their ACAPIII project, which includes the provision of immediate assistance packages, physical rehabilitation referrals, psycho social referrals and economic reintegration referrals to war affected civilians based on certain eligibility criteria, where IED attacks civilian victims fall in.

The largest United Nations agency role in Afghanistan has been played by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). Though UNAMA was established in 2002, it has been essential within Afghanistan over the last few years. As of August 2014, it consisted of 1559 civilian staff (predominantly Afghan citizens), 14 military advisors and two police advisors, and has a permanent field presence in 13 Afghan provinces as well as liaison offices in Pakistan and Iran. Its mandate was renewed in 2015 by the Security Council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution 2210, which made explicit the need for UNAMA to support the Afghan government’s ban on ammonium nitrate fertiliser and to help regulate explosive materials and precursor chemicals.

UNAMA produces regular reports. The 2015 mid-year report recorded a drop in the number of IED casualties,
but a 78% increase in civilian casualties of suicide attacks from the same period in 2014.\textsuperscript{307}

UNAMA undertakes a range of activities aimed at minimising the impact of the armed conflict on civilians including:

- Independent and impartial monitoring of incidents involving loss of life or injury to civilians
- Advocacy to strengthen protection of civilians affected by the armed conflict
- Initiatives to promote compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law, and the Constitution and laws of Afghanistan among all parties to the conflict

UNAMA's engagement in Afghanistan through its data collection has also provided information to other actors involved with Afghanistan and is a data model upon which similar IED monitoring elsewhere can be built.\textsuperscript{308}

Other efforts in Afghanistan have focused on some of the root-causes of IED use. The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) was proposed in 2010 and since December 2015 worked with the aim of reinvigorating the Afghan-led peace and reintegration efforts. They hoped to help provide political solutions to conflict, as well as promoting dialogue and measures to reintegrate armed opposition groups back into society – targeting one of the root causes of IED use.

The achievements of the programme included the reintegration of 10,404 former combatants after renouncing violence. Of these, 10,286 received financial assistance to reintegrate into their communities. Further, 146 small grant projects have been implemented (consisting mostly of small community infrastructure projects) to help reintegration as well as benefit local people. Vocational training was also provided, such as farming and road maintenance, which gave employment as well as local economic growth.\textsuperscript{310}

**Afghanistan influence on C-IED at the UN**

Afghanistan led the way in the international arena, proposing a resolution to the United Nations General Assembly titled “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices”, a resolution that will be explained in more detail further on. It is important to note however, that the resolution was based on Afghanistan’s call for international engagement in C-IED that goes beyond states and seeks to involve civil society and businesses too.\textsuperscript{311}

The CSTC-A C-IED Directorate is a Kabul-based team of coalition service members, Department of Defense civilians and contractors at Resolute Support Headquarters. The C-IED Directorate trains, advises and assists the ANDSF and also brings awareness directly to civilians. The CSTC-A C-IED Directorate has teamed up with the UN Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA), Afghan Security Institutions’ C-IED officers and the Ministry of Education to spread IED awareness techniques to as many Afghan children as possible. The C-IED Directorate also produces hand-outs, radio and television PSAs and billboards in Dari, Pashto and English to reach civilians and educate them on IED awareness.

Over the summer of 2015, 123 child protection officers and teachers from all 34 provinces converged in Kabul for a four-day seminar.\textsuperscript{312} They learned about the newest IED technology, what to look for and how to use the 119 Emergency Services Call Center for reporting. Each graduate received hand-outs, posters and discs that will help them train 5,074 teachers throughout Afghanistan, who will in turn teach their students IED and UXO safety.

**NGO, civil society and private company support**

**Ulema Council of Afghanistan**

As it is vital to acknowledge what led to individuals perpetrating explosive violence, Afghanistan has also engaged religious authorities in their C-IED work. In this regard the Ulema Council of Afghanistan can have a major influence and Afghanistan have tried to utilise this. The Ulema Council is made up of religious leaders. Their C-IED influence has seen them encourage peace and denounced IED attacks. They have often used their position to call out the use of terrorism and explain that these attacks are against the teachings of Islam.

Over recent years the Ulema Council has condemned many IED attacks across Afghanistan, especially those
that target civilians. They have also urged citizens to rally behind the Afghan National Security Forces. It should be remembered though, that other Ulema councils, such as in Pakistan have been supportive of some IED attacks by terrorist groups. Many countries have asked the Ulema Council and other religious leaders within their respective borders to denounce IED attacks, principally suicide attacks, as they understand the influence the clerics have within Islam.

Dynasafe
Since 2004, Dynasafe has worked on many projects for a diverse selection of clients from international construction and security companies to NGOs. Projects completed include a large and complex mine clearance operation in Herat Province, the provision of MDDs to a company operating in Kandahar and a variety of demining and UXO clearance operations on infrastructure and humanitarian projects.

Dynasafe has also been awarded a major contract to provide Explosive and Narcotics Detection Dog Teams, as part of the general security package across all Afghan airports. It currently provides in total 9 canine teams in support of security contracts in Afghanistan. Its main office is located in Kabul.

Handicap International
Handicap International has managed the only rehabilitation centre in Kandahar since 1996. The centre is increasingly seeing new patients. In 2015 they saw over 7,000 new patients. Approximately 20% of new patients have a lower limb amputated due to harm from landmines, IEDs or other explosives.

The centre has 33 beds and treats people from across Afghanistan and even Pakistan. They provide physical therapy and group sessions to help victims adjust to their disability.

DDG
The DDG have been operating in Afghanistan since 1999. DDG has delivered a full package of mine action services, including non-technical and technical survey, mine and ERW risk education, mine clearance, BAC, and EOD.

They have provided MRE programs in the most affected areas, such as, Kunduz, Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul. These are particularly focused along axes of displacement and returnee areas.

This has also been the case with the EOD and area clearance DDG have carried out too. This work has often been conducted in cooperation with other agencies within the country, such as MACCA, whom the DDG have been working with since 2014.

3.4.2 KENYA (20)

Threat
The IED threat in Kenya predominantly stems from al-Shabaab militants. Hence, most IED attacks occur in the east of the country, near Kenya’s border with Somalia, although attacks have also been seen in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital and largest city. IED attacks that caused death or injury were recorded between 2011 and 2015 in English-language media reports. These attacks left 425 dead and injured, of which 79% (336) were civilians. The attacks seen in 2013 and 2014 were particularly lethal, where there were fewer but larger-scale attacks. Between January and September 2016, there have been five attacks recorded so far, causing 20 deaths and injuries, though only 6 of these are civilians, as 2016’s attacks appear to be predominantly targeting security forces in Kenya.

Capacity
The Kenyan Police have taken significant steps in countering IEDs and combating terrorism. The police have a specific Bomb Disposal Unit (BDU) that was established in 2002 and which works in coordination with the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU). The BDU shares responsibility for handling, detonating and defusing bombs, grenades and IEDs. They are also in charge of conducting post-blast investigations in order to track the materials to the sources and makers. This then aids the ATPU in finding the suspects.

As of April this year 2016 they had 28 officers, including commanders, though more detectives were being dispatched to Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret and areas in North Kenya. Other officers are also expected to join the unit soon after they had completed their specialised training, necessary to be part of the BDU and undertake the hazardous work involved.

The BDU does however, face severe shortages such as: protective gear, equipment, funds, (particularly salaries to encourage more officers to join,) staffing, and vehicles – they have to rely on the ATPU’s vehicles. In the past they have been provided with bomb disposal equipment and training from the United States.
The Police have also carried out investigations into the financing of terrorism. In 2015, police investigations led to the freezing of the funds of many organisations for their suspected links, and the licenses of three NGOs were cancelled by the NGO Coordination Board. Though with further investigations, many of these actions were reversed.

The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) also play a vital C-IED role. Much of the KDF’s expertise of clearing operations comes from participating in demining efforts across the region. They have received training in C-IED through from a variety of sources, such as the British Peace Support Team, the US, and from Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance.

Three key areas of weakness are said to exist within the KDF’s capabilities. These include the material resources they have available to them, a lack of pre-deployment training for soldiers outside the EOD community, and a lack of validated KDF C-IED instructors. The training given by other states has targeted these issues.

In terms of border security, the Kenyan border goes highly unregulated. The US has engaged in efforts to improve Kenyan border security but the lack of border security capacity as well as a shortage of equipment and funding to improve such security has left the border open to terrorists crossing. Some ports of entry into Kenya use terrorist screening watch-list and screening processes. However, it would still be very easy for terrorists to enter and exit Kenya.

**National Counterterrorism Center**
The Kenya National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is a policy institution created to serve primarily as the coordinating agency for all counter terrorism efforts for the government of Kenya. NCTC efforts have involved training law enforcement, border control personnel, and those in the prison services.

In response to al-Shabaab’s increasing efforts to recruit members from the local communities, the government has introduced a programme to build capacity for youth and women’s groups to counter the rise of extremist violence in their communities. It is believed this will help strengthen community resilience among the groups susceptible to recruitment.

These initiatives have seen the NCTC partner with Kenya Muslim Women Alliance, Kenya Community Centre and Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance to engage them in their efforts to counter extremist violence. This is particularly important as most the IED attacks in Kenya have been carried out by Kenyan youths.

**Equipment**
The US has provided equipment to the BDU, including a digital x-ray scanner, mobile bomb detecting robots, bomb disposal suits, as well as other specialised detection and disposal tools.

In July 2016, new equipment was introduced, including detonation units and robots. A new forensic lab is also in the process of being built.

**Training**
The US has also provided training to the BDU for many years as part of the Anti-Terror Assistance Program. The BDU was trained on how to use the new equipment for detecting car bombs, explosive packages, and suicide vests. They also received training on the methods used by terrorists, such as al-Shabaab, to package, conceal, transplant and plant bombs.

Furthermore, the KDF has received training from the United States, including in bomb detection and disposal. The training was given by trainers from the US Army’s Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) as part of their Train the Trainer programme. Topics covered included operational risk management, first aid, EOD safety precautions and fuse functions.

Expanded courses covered the identification of ordnance such as bombs, bomb fuses, missiles, sub-munitions and dispensers. The KDF units were also trained in protective works, demolition firing systems and demolition materials. The training responded to identified weaknesses in Kenya’s C-IED capabilities. Train the Trainer efforts allowed the C-IED knowledge that had already been accumulated within the KDF to be distributed through a KDF operated training programme.

Kenya also hosted the US’s East Africa Joint Operations Capstone exercise for Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian law enforcement. This saw training given in crisis response, particularly terrorist-related crises, and saw a large-scale simulation of a response to a terrorist incident.
Bilateral assistance
The US has engaged in training efforts to the BDU through their Anti-Terror Assistance Programme, and have supplied C-IED equipment to the BDU. They have also provided training to the KDF as part of the CJTF-HOA.

US bilateral assistance has particularly focused on border security at the request of Kenyan forces, as their borders receive very little regulation. This assistance has provided exchange visits for border security officials and assistance with the development of Kenyan border-control strategy.

Regional initiatives
AMISOM
Kenya continues to provide troops to the AMISOM mission despite Kenya’s own difficulties and the dangers posed in Somalia to Kenyan troops. In 2015, Kenyan and Ethiopian forces played a significant role as part of AMISOM in forcing al-Shabaab to retreat from some of their main Somali strongholds.

PREACT
Kenya is an active partner in PREACT, a programme established in 2009 and funded and implemented by the US. PREACT seeks to establish cooperation between the states law enforcement, military and civilian actors in the partner nations and through this improve their counterterrorism capacity.

The tactics predominantly focus on the networks that employ IEDs, including terrorism financing, border controls and their community influence. Joint training has been provided to Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan forces for first responders and law enforcement as part of the PREACT efforts.

Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa
The Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is a US-headed international task force which operates primarily in Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Seychelles and Kenya. It also has operations in Mauritius, Comoros, Liberia, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania. The CJTF-HOA falls under AFRICOM, the USA’s Africa regional command. Its role is to counteract extremist organisations in East Africa, to “dissuade conflict” and to “protect US and coalition interests”.

CJTF-HOA currently consists of about 2,000 service-men and women from the US military and allied countries. As well as military operations, crisis response and personnel recovery, the CJTF-HOA provides training of various kinds to partner countries. This includes C-IED
training as these weapons have been a remarkable threat to Somalia and Kenya in recent years. These efforts have focused on detecting and detonating explosives, as well as intelligence exercises.

As part of a training programme in Kenya in 2011, a team of US Army soldiers from CJTF-HOA spent a month teaming up with the Kenyan Army to develop a C-IED training programme from militaries in East Africa. This involved sharing information with classes of service members from countries including Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan and Uganda. Initially, the class was comprised of 20 Kenyan soldiers, with eight remaining at the facility to teach the curriculum to new students, in a ‘train the trainer’ type of programme. US Army Staff Sergeant Joshua Moore said of the training: “when we first started, [the student instructors] didn’t know what IED stood for, but by the time we were finished, they were teaching the class pretty much entirely on their own”.\(^{314}\)

The lessons, which involved both classroom and practical exercises, could potentially save hundreds or thousands of lives.

**Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group**

Kenya is also a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), under which Kenyan authorities further seek to tackle terrorism financing in Kenya, but a lack of financial reporting in the NGO sector hinders some of Kenya’s efforts.

**International initiatives**

Despite not being a member of the GCTF, Kenya is increasingly participating in the GCTF’s counter-extremism efforts. They have hosted regional events in Kenya and agreed to serve as a pilot-country for the GCTF-endorsed International CT/CVE Clearing House Mechanism, that aims to identify gaps and overlaps in such programmes to better coordinate efforts and respond to needs.

**NGO and private company support**

**DDG and the DRC**

The DDG and DRC both operate in Kenya. The DRC introduced a new programme called Young, Empowered and Safe (YESI) in Kakuma Refugee Camp, between September 2014-2015. The programme is part of a new joint regional approach to addressing youth at risk of marginalisation, criminalisation and radicalisation that is being piloted with activities to promote youth dialogue and engagement.

DDG has been engaged in research and mitigating efforts on cross border conflict, particularly in the regions bordering Somalia and Uganda. These efforts have included Conflict Risk Mapping, Conflict Assessment reports, Community Safety projects, and conflict prevention and management. These projects have seen increased capacity of local stakeholders, multi-level dialogue meetings, and increased awareness.

DDG has 19 local staff and one expatriate staff operating from five offices across the country – in Nairobi, Lamu, Mandera, West Pokot, and Ludwar (Turkana).

**3.4.3 PAKISTAN (2)**

**Threat**

Over the last five years, Pakistan has seen 13,475 deaths and injuries from 831 IED incidents. Of these casualties, 81% (10,868) were civilians. Like Afghanistan and Iraq, IED incidents in Pakistan have decreased. The most commonly used IED in this period – where reported – was that of remotely detonated IEDs – this accounted for 57% of incidents where the type was known. However, whilst suicide attacks accounted for 29% of attacks, they caused the most harm; totalling 53% of all casualties. Remotely detonated IEDs caused 35% of all casualties.

Pakistan has seen many perpetrators of IED attacks. These include the al-Mukhtar Army, the Baloch Liberation Army, Lashkar-e-Islam, Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e-Baluchistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Momin Afridi group, Ansarul Islam Mujahideen, United Baloch Liberation Army, Ahraji Hind, Mast Gul militant group, IS, Jamaatul Ahrar and Jundullah. This list of known perpetrators shows at least 14 different groups involved in the use of IEDs in Pakistan over the last five years.

However, Pakistan has also seen the number of deaths and injuries per IED incident decrease, albeit somewhat erratically, over this period. This is likely due to the C-IED measures being put in place in the last few years, alongside further counter-terrorism efforts.

**Capability**

The Pakistan Army has introduced some restrictions for the availability of calcium ammonium nitrate-based fertilisers, particularly in the most volatile regions, such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These restrictions though have also had an impact on local farming and have led to calls for improved regulation rather than restrictions.\(^{315}\)
Due to the high threat of IEDs across the country from insurgency groups, developing C-IED capabilities has been a high priority for the Pakistan Security Forces over the last few years, and the Security Forces have requested and accepted training from foreign forces.

The Pakistan Army has its own C-IED school. Though the school has mainly been used by the military it is also used by the police and other security actors who are likely to be first on the scene in response to local events and threats. The school mimics many of the urban environments in which the army and police are likely to encounter an IED. The school bases its training on the scenarios that the militants planting the IEDs have used and are likely to use again.316

Pakistan's Police Bomb Disposal Unit responds to IED incidents or suspicious objects being reported, and the unit has seen many successes in defeating IEDs. Between 2009 and 2013 alone, Pakistan's Police Bomb Disposal Unit was able to destroy over 5,000 explosive devices. These have included IEDs from truck bombs to child suicide bombers, as well as the more prevalent roadside bombs.

The BDU also has its own Police School of Explosive Handling (PSEH) in Nowshera, which began operating in February last year and has seen hundreds of police officers from BDUs receive additional training.317 The PSEH provides training to those at all levels of experience. Courses can cover basic IEDD, awareness, as well as refresher courses, and others focus on post-blast investigations.

Both the PSEH and the BDU suffer from considerable funding issues which affect equipment as well as salaries and personnel.318 This means the job becomes more dangerous and there are less people willing to do it given that there is little monetary incentive. The lack of funding has had a serious impact on their work and bomb disposal operations across the country. Both continue when possible to respond to IED threats despite their limited capacity.

Pakistan's border security has continued to improve. Biometric screening takes place at the borders and information is maintained on a national database. Improvements looked to address Pakistan's smuggling prevention capabilities through training efforts. Pakistan's border security could further be addressed through the procurement of equipment, such as scanners, and funding for staff. In particular regard to C-IED efforts at the border, Pakistan's End Use Verification by Customs personnel saw investigations into dual-use chemicals that could be destined for use in IEDs.

Pakistan also hosts six de-radicalisation centres that aim to de-radicalise extremists. All are run by the government, except for the Sabaoon Centre for Rehabilitation. The Sabaoon Rehabilitation Center was founded in partnership with the Pakistani military, but is now administered by a Pakistani NGO. The work of the Rehabilitation Center focuses on de-radicalisation efforts targeting juvenile violent extremists.

However, it should be noted that there has been resistance from Pakistan in conducting and implementing C-IED efforts. Pakistani intelligence has also been found to assist and fund several terrorist groups over the years, primarily the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the components of many IEDs in Afghanistan can still be traced back to Pakistan.319

**Training**

Over 5000 members of Pakistan’s security forces are trained in C-IED.320 They have been supported by foreign forces to develop their C-IED capabilities.

The UK assisted in training the security forces in C-IED techniques such as: finding and defusing IEDs, and gathering and analysing forensic evidence from bomb scenes. This is to not only assist in defeating the device but also aids in preventative action through attacking the network C-IED. The US has also provided its expertise through training efforts with the assistance of the US’ Joint IED Defeat Organisation (JIEDDO). Most of these have taken place at the Pakistan Army’s C-IED school, which was designed to help develop the soldiers’ capabilities.

However, C-IED efforts have been reported often to be hampered by bureaucracy. This has seen foreign trainers forced to leave the country and cancel training courses while their visa is being renewed, or their equipment is held for months in customs. This has proved a significant hindrance to C-IED efforts and assistance.321

**Equipment**

Pakistan received £12,915 million worth of equipment and spare parts from the UK government at Pakistan’s request.322 Equipment supplied by the US to aid
Pakistan’s C-IED efforts has included detection kits, jammers, and mine resistant vehicles. Both Britain and the US have aided in the form of equipment to aid the Police Bomb Disposal Unit’s C-IED efforts. Britain has supplied the unit with sniffer dogs, bomb disposal suits and at least four remote-controlled bomb disposal robots. Other equipment at their disposal includes investigative kits and vehicles which were provided by the United States.

**Bilateral assistance**

The US and Pakistan have been engaged in diplomatic efforts to encourage stricter regulation of trade in explosive precursor materials as well as information-sharing. Though the restrictions are not as strong or wide as the US and Pakistan’s neighbours may like, the Pakistan Army have introduced some restrictions for the availability of calcium ammonium nitrate-based fertilisers. The US continues to urge Pakistan to stop producing the CAN-based fertilisers completely – they even tried to make it a condition of the US Aid Bill.

The US requested Pakistan put in place a C-IED strategy in Pakistan that will not only counter the IED impact in Pakistan but also in Afghanistan. Part of that strategy was supposed to be the Counter-IED Act 2012 (C-IED 2012). Draft legislation for the National Strategy to Counter-IEDs was to be tabled in Parliament in 2012. However, there is no record of the C-IED Act 2012 having been drafted or approved and it appears little has been done to put any such action into effect.

The United States and Pakistan’s cooperation has extended beyond training and policy, and has seen both sides participate in information sharing efforts. The Pakistan Security Forces often share information on roadside bombs, whilst the US assists in sharing expertise on militant tactics and C-IED techniques. The US has also provided public awareness campaigns to the people of Pakistan. This aimed to increase the public’s knowledge of the IED threat as well as of the terrorist networks that employ them.

**Regional initiatives**

Pakistan is a member of the APG. Pakistan’s progress in addressing terrorism financing and money laundering to comply with international standards, saw it removed from the FATF’s review process in February 2015. However, there are still many organisations that fundraise and finance terrorism within Pakistan, which suggest greater work needs to be done to investigate and, most importantly, prosecute those financing terrorism within the country, particularly in border areas.

**International initiatives**

Pakistan’s involvement in PGS has seen customs officers participate in PGS training where they learn how to identify IEDs, detonators and dual-use precursor chemicals used in manufacturing IEDs. Additionally, training has provided Pakistan Customs the knowledge necessary to carry out risk assessments, and knowledge of international and national measures to reduce risks associated with such chemicals. At training, they have also gained experience using presumptive chemical test kits and devices.

As a member, Pakistan has expressed support for the efforts of the GCTF to combat violent extremism and justice, and the need for international cooperation to tackle these issues.

To combat violent extremism, Pakistan organised a Needs Assessment Conference on Youth Engagement Skills Development, and Employment Facilitation in May 2015. The conference focused on education and drew upon Pakistan’s own experience in countering extremism in youth. The conference sought to identify ways in which educational institutions could provide more appropriate training that will better facilitate youth entering the workforce.

**Civil society, NGO and private actor support**

**Pakistan Ulema Council**

The Pakistan Ulema Council has been criticised in the past for its support of some IED attacks. However, in recent years the Ulema have become more critical of the attacks and raised their voice to condemn IED attacks, more and more often.

In 2015, 200 scholars issued a decree against suicide attacks. The attacks were decreed unlawful under Islamic law. The scholars also warned that the teachings and actions of groups such as the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP), al-Qaeda, and other jihadi groups were ignorant and un-Islamic. Sermons against unlawful killings were also delivered in about 400,000 mosques. This action recognises the C-IED and counter-terrorism role religious leaders can take in wider efforts.
Moreover, in an interview with the Chairman of the Pakistan Ulema Council, Hafiz Muhammad Tahir Ashrafi in 2014, AOAV were told:

“I want to say that in my opinion it is illegal to carry out suicide attacks or other types of attacks on innocent people, destroy their properties or inflict any other form of devastation. Whenever innocent people are killed—be it in from strikes, suicide attacks or bomb blasts- this should be called terrorism. I do not care if some people do not agree with my viewpoint, but my religion does not allow killing of any innocent person.”

The engagement of religious leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan reflects the holistic approach needed to truly combat terrorist networks and stop IED harm.

Sabaoon Rehabilitation Center
The Sabaoon Rehabilitation Center was founded in partnership with the Pakistani military, but is now administered by a Pakistani NGO. Sabaaon’s work focuses on de-radicalisation efforts targeting juvenile violent extremists.

The efforts are carried out in a heavily guarded facility where the employees conduct a multidisciplinary programme tailored to the needs of each person. The efforts are likely to include a mix of psychological treatment, education and vocational training for the young people there who have been picked up, sent in or voluntarily joined to change their prospects.

The centre seeks to not only de-radicalise but also provide an opportunity to learn skills that may help them reintegrate back into society. Many of the youth at the centre also suffer from PTSD, anger issues, low confidence and other psychological and behavioural issues.

3.4.4 SOMALIA (8)

Threat
The IED threat in Somalia is caused primarily by al-Shabaab. Between 2011 and 2015, at least 138 IED attacks that caused deaths and injuries were recorded from English-language news sources. These caused over 2,000 deaths and injuries, of which 78% were civilians. Between January and September 2016, there were already 29 attacks recorded, causing 665 deaths and injuries – the most ever recorded in a single year in Somalia despite only counting the nine first months of this year. Of the casualties, 74% (489) were civilians, and security forces are increasingly becoming targets of attacks. Most still occurred in Mogadishu, which has remained the prime target for IEDs throughout the last five years.

Capability
The Somali security forces and law enforcement have been a significant part of the efforts to counter IEDs and to combat terrorism. Security operations have managed to expose weapons caches and terrorist activities, but do however lack the means to prosecute them effectively, due to outdated laws. They also lack the capacity to conduct thorough investigations into suspicious persons and activity. However, the Somali Police Force (SPF) Joint Investigative Team (JIT) – funded and trained by the US – has made significant headway in improving this. They could respond to terrorist incidents and carry out post-incident investigations; allowing the investigations division of the police to carry out further investigation.

The National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) is responsible for national security in Somalia, and is such as highly involved in counterterrorism. NISA is comprised of intelligence officers from Somalia’s armed forces. Most of their counterterrorism efforts involve collecting intelligence, identifying threats and launching covert counterterrorism operations. They also have a rapid response team to respond to IED or other terrorist attacks. NISA has increased its cooperation with the police investigations department regarding counterterrorism issues.

The Ministry of Internal Security in Somalia has been cooperating with international partners, Somali clan elders, and the media to raise awareness on al-Shabaab radicalisation and extremism in general. They drew awareness to its negative community impacts and the
destruction it can cause. The Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs implemented a programme to improve stabilisation of recovered areas through the empowerment of local communities by providing them with control in the regeneration processes. TV and radio stations have also broadcast counter violent extremism messages to impacted areas.

However, despite improvements in other areas, Somalia’s border security is very weak. Not only are most borders insecure, but where there are border security personnel they have very little chance of preventing terrorist entry due to Somalia’s lack of coordinated terrorist screening across the country. They are without any biometric or biographic screening capabilities at ports of entry. Cooperation and coordination between security forces and border security is also relatively absent.

**Somali Explosive Management Authority**

Although SEMA was created in 2013 to replace the Somalia National Mine Action Authority in south-central Somalia, it has still not assumed all responsibilities under its mandate. Soon after its creation, there were hopes that SEMA would coordinate the work of international and local actors within the region. SEMA has received support, such as funding and training, from other nations, and UNMAS has also assisted SEMA. To strengthen SEMA capacity, the NPA and the GICHD has also tried to step in.

In 2014, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) deployed 12 EOD teams to each sector and 30 explosive dog detection (EDD) teams. Nine government police EOD teams were deployed in south-central Somalia.

2015 saw the creation of the “Badbaado Plan”. This outlined the government’s approach to explosive hazard management, highlighting the financial support required. SEMA will be implementing this plan throughout 2016. Explosive management focuses predominantly on EOD, clearance and survey, as well as IED defeat and risk education.

**Puntland Mine Action Centre**

Established in 1999, the Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) has collaborated with both national and international partners to combat mines, such as HALO, DDG and MAG. Due to the increasing threat of IEDs in Somalia due to al-Shabaab prolific use of the devices, combatting IED has become a significant part of PMAC’s work.

PMAC runs the only police EOD team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance. In June 2015, Puntland requested assistance to increase its capacity and deploy three EOD teams in Bosaso, Galkayo, and Garowe. In 2016, the “Badbaado Plan” will be implemented in Puntland. PMAC will work with SEMA and other partners within the region to work of the long-term capacities of the region to manage explosive hazards.

**Somaliland Mine Action Centre**

The Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC) was established in 1997 with the assistance of the UNDP. SMAC is responsible for all demining activities in Somaliland. Action on demining has seen SMAC collaborate with HALO, police EOD teams, and DDG. They participate in raising awareness as well as clearance alongside the above organisations.

In 2014, five police EOD teams were operational in Somaliland. UNMAS continued to support the teams with funding, equipment, and training, which was scheduled to continue through to October 2015. Much of the activities in regard to mine action now focus on IEDs as they have become far greater risks to police and security in Somalia, as well as civilians who are also significantly impacted by al-Shabaab IED use.

**Bilateral initiatives**

The US assisted in counterterrorism investigations and provided training to the relevant personnel, allowing the number of prosecutors to be increased. They also trained and funded the Somali Police Force Joint Investigative Team.

**Regional initiatives**

**African Union Mission in Somalia**

AMISOM is an active regional peace support mission set up by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union with the full support of the United Nations.

Alongside other training and missions, much of AMISOM’s work deals with the threat of IED and hence C-IED responses. For example, AMISOM trains Somali Army Officers in C-IED awareness. They often take part in joint operations with the Somali army and police forces to find and recover materials used in the making of an IED and recovering IEDs themselves.
Alongside their work with the national army, AMISOM helps training local forces to protect communities from IED threats. This may be needed particularly at events and gatherings, such as at Ramadan, when the IED threat is thought to be heightened. Not only will AMISOM train police for such events but they will work in collaboration at the gatherings with them.

AMISOM also helps setting up local community initiatives to respond to the threat that the IED poses to civilians. This work is specifically carried out in areas that experience a high-level of IED violence. As part of this work they provide advice and an emergency number so they may respond to threats quickly and give further assistance.

**MENAFATF**

Somalia has observer status within MENAFATF; but until 2016 the country had no laws criminalising money-laundering or terrorism financing. The Central Bank of Somalia, with the assistance of the World Bank and the UNODC, drafted a bill on money laundering and terrorism financing that was signed into law in February 2016. The law complies with requirements and recommendations from the FATF, and would enable Somalia to better investigate and monitor suspicious transactions if those responsible for such investigations saw increased funding, staffing and technical expertise.

**INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES AND SUPPORT**

**UNMAS**

UNMAS aids national and local governments as well as other actors in Somalia, such as NGOs, to conduct strategic policies and coordination to better explosive hazard management and weapons and ammunition management. Given the high threat of IEDs in Somalia due to their use by groups such as al-Shabaab, UNMAS has a high degree of experience in tackling IEDs. Although UNMAS Somalia claims that they cannot end the threat of IEDs, it appears they have definitely succeeded in some efforts to lessen the threat they pose.

UNMAS achieves this through a variety of strategies, including IED information capture, providing technical IED training and assistance to the state and AMISOM so they may detect and dispose of them, and clearance of UXO and unused ammunition that could be made to manufacture IEDs. The remainder of their work focuses on providing policy advice and coordination to the FGS on explosive hazards, and supporting the FGS to develop a national police plan, the “Heegan Plan”, as well as to develop EOD and IED defeat capabilities as part of a growing force.

UNMAS has worked in cooperation with other states and NGOs. Funding from countries such as Canada, Italy, Japan and the UK allowed UNMAS to provide police with IEDD training and equipment. UNMAS partnered with HALO to survey contaminated areas and have also helped SEMA develop a way to monitor and manage weapons in Somalia.

**Global Coalition to Counter ISIL**

Somalia participates in the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Working Group and the Stabilization Support Working Group, as part of its participation in the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.

Somalia is also a partner in PREACT and a member of the OIC and Arab League. As part of the GCTF, Somalia is part of the Horn of Africa Capability Building Initiative.

**NGO and private company support**

**TDI**

TDI conducted a 16-month demining and MRE project in Somalia between 2013 and 2014 as part of the efforts by the UN Mission in Somalia. They assisted in the stabilisation of recovered areas through EOD and mine clearance, and through capacity building with the local mine action authorities. MRE was delivered to more than 170,000 people.

Furthermore, TDI trained and employed local people to support their work and women comprise about 25% of the local staff. The relationships developed with the local populations also made their work more fruitful by directing TDI’s work to the most impacted areas. Information sharing between other international organisations assisted these efforts, as their dialogue with local populations aided their work.

**HALO Trust**

HALO has operated in Somaliland since 1999, conducting MRE, land clearance, focusing on demining and EOD, and increasing stockpile management and physical security. By 2016 they had cleared almost 20 square kilometres of hazardous area, disposed of over 4,500 landmines, over 33,000 items of UXO, and 215,000 of small arms ammunition. By 2018, HALO hopes to have cleared all known hazardous areas.
HALO began work in other regions of Somalia in 2015, and is conducting non-technical survey operations in south-central Somalia, particularly near the Somali-Ethiopian border where a significant amount of mines are present. Clearance operations started in 2016.

HALO was contracted by UNMAS to survey contaminated areas.

**DDG**

The DDG has been operating in Somalia on mine clearance and MRE since 1999, when it began work in Somaliland. Mine clearance in Somaliland continued until 2006. After this, work focused on clearing UXOs village-by-village and successfully encouraged locals to hand over UXOs through education and advocacy initiatives. DDG’s work is focused around Mogadishu and Galkayo. They have worked on setting up a humanitarian mine action programme in Mogadishu since October 2007, with MRE provided to locals and IDPs. Their work in Galkayo began in 2010, but their mine action in the Galkayo did not begin until September 2011.

Demining projects run by the DDG have also operated in rural Puntland districts, including demining Galgodob, and MRE and community safety elsewhere. The clearance of ERW from areas across Somalia has the express aim of not only preventing civilian accidents but also preventing “the use of these items as tools of violence”.

DDG also provides training and support to AMISOM and the UN on IED and UXO, as well as IED and UXO awareness training to Somali actors. They have 266 local staff and 12 expatriate staff operating from 14 offices throughout the country.

**MAG**

MAG began work in Somalia in 2001. In 2008, MAG set a consistent effort to assist Puntland Police EOD teams. This saw MAG help with safely removing and destroying UXO in the area. In 2010, Community Liaison teams provided MRE in South Central Somalia to increase awareness. Their more recent work has focused on SALW, such as providing low-cost security for armouries and arms management.

MAG’s work in Somalia is funded by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the German Federal Foreign Office, the UK Government, and the US State Department Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement.

**GICHD**

GICHD has been involved in a variety of projects in Somalia. They were responsible for the evaluation of DDG’s work, as well as providing MRE on behalf of UNICEF, UNDP and Puntland and Somaliland Mine Action Centers. This work has also seen GICHD provide technical assistance on land rights to mine action organisations and assist all mine actors in the region with the transition in IMSMA.

** Mecham**

Mecham has provided modified versions of the CASSPIR, a four-wheel drive mine-resistant ambush protected vehicle, and other demining equipment to AMISOM and the UN as part of the support services they offer to both actors in the country. However, it should be noted that despite Mecham’s experience in bomb-disposal and demining, these are not the type of services they operate in Somalia.

**Bancroft Global in Somalia**

Bancroft has picked up contracts with AMISOM and the US to provide field training and IED and UXO expertise to AMISOM and the Somali government. This training has focused on detection and defusing IEDs as well as intelligence gathering. Their efforts have focused on building partner capacity in the regards C-IED and EOD. Bancroft is said to have significantly improved the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency skills of the Somali Army.

Bancroft has also engaged in health and veterinarian services, as well as investments in real estate. There has been some criticism that the Bancroft ‘mentors’ in fact act as mercenaries, though this allegation is denied by the employees and Bancroft’s president.

### 3.4.5 UKRAINE Threat

Explosive violence in Ukraine increased significantly in 2014. This violence stemmed from the revolution that began in February 2014 and from Russia’s occupation of Crimea shortly after. This escalation in violence predominantly took place in the two provinces bordering Russia: Luhansk and Donetsk.

Whilst the levels of violence, since the height in 2014, appears to have decreased (as of early 2017), this decrease in recorded levels of violence also reflects both the dangers of reporting in the impacted areas and
a reporting fatigue on the violence. There are still significant levels of violence present at the time of writing.

The number of IED incidents to have gained attention in English-language media is significantly lower than the reality recorded on the ground. This is predominantly due the impact IEDs have in Ukraine, as IEDs there have not killed or injured as many people as they do in other impacted areas, such as Afghanistan, for example. So whilst AOAV recorded 8 incidents recorded in English language media between 2014 and 2015, which in total caused 25 civilian deaths and injuries, and 44 armed actor deaths or injuries, NATO recorded more: 650 incidents, killing 65 and wounding 152.

The areas most impacted by IEDs are Kiev, Kharkiv and Odessa. However, whilst many IED incidents have occurred there, very few have led to any death or injury. The areas that have seen the most casualties from IEDs are Luhansk and Donetsk.

**Capability**

Though the Ukrainian police have some C-IED capacity for criminal and terrorist incidents, C-IED work lies primarily as the responsibility of the army. Over the last few years the Pakistani Armed Forces (PAF) have developed significant experience in C-IED. The PAF were deployed in Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). Whilst deployed in Afghanistan they were responsible for the destruction of over 10,000 explosive devices. Furthermore, in Ukraine during the recent conflict with separatists, C-IED operations have been essential.

Greater focus has been applied on improving C-IED skills among the Armed Forces since the beginning of the recent conflict in Ukraine.

It is also worth noting the impact on operations from the threat of other weaponry whilst carrying out bomb disposal or other C-IED work, with the counter-terrorism unit facing the threat of shelling whilst conducting clearance.

The Demining Center in Western Ukraine is used for CIED training. It houses animals such as dogs, sheep and rabbits that are used in detecting IEDs in the current conflict.

Over 49,000 mines and IEDs have been neutralised since the beginning of operations in April 2014.

**Training**

The International Peacekeeping and Security Centre (IPSC) was formed in 2007, in order to aid in the training of personnel from the Pakistani Armed Forces, particularly for peacekeeping missions. It also provides training to foreign state military units which provide forces to peace keeping missions and in the fight against terrorism.

There are three main courses taught at the IPSC: one for headquarters officers, one for peacekeeping units, and another, dedicated to C-IED instruction.

The latter course, for C-IED instructors has been conducted yearly since 2007. The course is held in partnership with NATO. Those that receive this training range from sergeants to lieutenant colonels. They are also trained to take part in multinational peacekeeping operations.

**Equipment**

In 2015, Canada provided the Ministry of Defence with Foster-Miller Talon bomb disposal robots and 15 EOD-9 suits for bomb disposal experts, for use in the Ukraine Army’s counter-terrorism operations.

As of August 2016, NATO had provided EUR 1 million-worth of equipment to Ukraine. This equipment includes mine clearance equipment for units operating in Donetsk and Luhansk.

In April 2016, it was announced that the Kremenchug Automobile Plant had built a vehicle tailored for use in mine clearing operations in Luhansk. It is fitted with C-IED equipment and a crane designed to handle IEDs.

**Bilateral assistance**

Not only have Canada provide essential equipment to allow the Pakistani Armed Forces to conduct C-IED, but Canada have also provided training. Operation Unifier is a bilateral training program run by Canadians to promote security in the region, through military capacity building. Training is given on basic C-IED principles, post-blast investigations, and neutralising IEDs.

The US has also been providing training to Pakistani troops. In April 2015, US troops began a six-month training course for the Ukrainian National Guard in Vicenza, Italy. The course included, amongst other skills training, lessons in countering IEDs based on US forces’ experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is said that there are many similarities between some of the IEDs seen in Iraq and those seen in Ukraine.
In 2016 it was reported that Britain was extending its training programme for Ukrainian government troops in the face of a “more belligerent Russia”. It was reported that thousands of service personnel would be trained by British troops, who have been spread across around 14 sites across Ukraine since 2015. Around 100 training team members are active in the country at any one time, running 30 courses for infantry, medical and logistics corps, as well as on IED clearance. British forces have already trained more than 5,000 Ukrainian troops, the Ministry of Defence said, saying they would remain until early 2018 at least.

The UK coordinates with four other nations in the “Quint” group, including the US, Canada, Lithuania and Poland.

**International initiatives**

**NATO C-IED COE**

NATO have provided C-IED training in Ukraine. The NATO-led C-IED awareness courses, with experts from across the NATO nations, aid the Ukrainian forces, including military, law enforcement and security organisations, in dealing with the increase in IEDs witnessed. In January 2016, a Mobile Training Team from the C-IED COE ran a C-IED Awareness Course for 26 students. The course responded to Ukraine’s formal request for training on C-IED and demining, sent to NATO in 2014.

The course focused on the specific situation that Ukrainian soldiers were facing, after identifying the areas of Ukrainian’s C-IED capability and capacity that needed most improvement. The course was a ‘train the trainer’ type of program, ensuring that the knowledge given is passed through the remainder of the Ukrainian forces. The course aimed to develop an inter-agency approach and encouraged greater evidence collection and investigation from exploited IEDs.

The courses by both Canada and NATO appear to be helping Ukraine to develop a national C-IED strategy to protect civilians as well as the ground forces.

There is increasing partnership between the Ukrainian ISPC C-IED programs and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Joint Counter Explosive Threat Task Force (JCET TF) training in Ukraine. The hope is that this will better the Ukrainian Armed Forces ability to conduct C-IED operations as part of their anti-terror operations.

NATO have also been monitoring the use if IEDs in Ukraine, including: civilian and combatant casualty figures, where the IED incidents have taken place, and how they have been used.

**Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe**

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also conducts a Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. It has been deployed since March 2014, as requested by the government in Ukraine. It predominantly observes and records the situation in Ukraine, including the use of IEDs.

The OSCE has also developed MRE clips, shown on TV and online, to disseminate MRE messages. Other groups involved in demining are involved in similar efforts.

**Civil society, NGO and private actor support**

**Danish Demining Group**

When the DRC reopened its offices in Kiev in 2014, the DDG joined them. The DDG presence in Ukraine was in order to address the significant risk of mine and ERW.

The work of the DDG in Ukraine involves:
- mine risk education (MRE)
- “training of trainers" project, training school teachers in the delivery of MRE
- Non-Technical Survey operations in six regions
- capacity building the State Emergency Service (SES) – the state demining group

The DDG have also begun developing a two-way communication web and text service to improve service provision and information exchange between affected communities in Ukraine and the mine action teams. This will provide safety alerts to mine and ERW affected communities, and allow affected communities to report any suspect items.

**HALO Trust**

HALO began manual mine clearance in March 2016 in Eastern Ukraine. Most their work takes place around the contact line and buffer zone. Alongside the survey and clearance work, HALO has also trained local deminers. All items discovered by HALO are destroyed by the Ministry of Defence, as only the armed forces may use explosives in the conflict areas.

Whilst there are a range of UXO and manufactured antivehicle and antipersonnel mines, cleared by both DDG and HALO, IEDs and booby-trapped ERW (trip-wires connected to conventional munitions) are also commonplace amongst the clearance work.
4. REGIONAL C-IED INITIATIVES

Many terrorist groups, and particularly those who regularly use IEDs, are not confined to one country and spread across borders, like those already discussed, such as Boko Haram and IS. Hence, national C-IED efforts can be limited if there is not cooperation between states, especially those impacted by the same group. Like any C-IED initiatives, most regional efforts have a main focus, whether that is border security, intelligence or military operations. Other regional initiatives have stemmed from international approaches. These will be covered under the next section of the report.

4.1 MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE

An example of the benefits facilitated by regional cooperation is seen in the military and law enforcement C-IED cooperation to combat Boko Haram. Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Chad and Cameroon have engaged in what is known as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF has seen these five states unify their efforts, to create a 9,000 strong force, with the specific aim of bringing an end to the Boko Haram insurgency.341

Although relatively new (it was established in 2015) the MNJTF has had many successes, including the destruction of terrorist camps, the arrest or neutralisation of hundreds of terrorists, and the destruction of IED making factories and equipment. The MNJTF has in fact recaptured 80% of territory that had once been under Boko Haram's control.342

These successes come despite the lack of funding these nations receive and the comparative lack of C-IED expertise within the task force as a whole. It is worth noting that MNJTF, though, have received some training, equipment and funding from other nations and from the African Union Commission. However, the funds amounted to only a third of what was needed and dispersal has been slow.343 With greater international cooperation allowing the provision of more equipment, expertise or training it is easy to envision further success for the MNJTF.

4.2 AFRICOM

Other regional military efforts include several projects initiated by the US, including such as United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). These programmes have greatly aided partner nations’ C-IED capabilities, particularly through ‘train the trainer’ programs.

AFRICOM is one of six of the US Department of Defense’s geographical combatant commands, and is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for military relations with African nations, the African Union, and African regional security organisations. The Command is responsible for all Department of Defense operations, exercises, and security cooperation on the African continent, and amongst many other things, is involved in providing C-IED training for some African militaries.

The Command, which began initial operations on October 1, 2007 and became an independent command on October 1, 2008, has a broad mission. It is headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, with others assigned to AFRICOM units at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, and RAF Molesworth, UK. The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is a good example of measures taken under AFRICOM to try to counter IEDs. CJTF-HOA originated under Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa as part of the US response to the September 11 attacks, and has its headquarters in the Republic of Djibouti. The Task Force works with countries, coalition forces, and international organisations to support partner nation military operations in East Africa to fight violent extremism, including by providing C-IED training.344

AFRICOM has been involved in providing C-IED training in a number of African countries. Examples of such involvement includes a training programme in Kenya in 2011, where a team of US Army soldiers from CJTF-HOA spent a month teaming up with the Kenyan Army to develop a C-IED training programme from militaries in East Africa. This involved sharing information with classes of service members from countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan and Uganda. Initially, the class was comprised of 20 Kenyan soldiers, with eight remaining at the facility to teach the curriculum to new students, in a Train the Trainer type of programme. US Army Staff Sergeant Joshua Moore considered the training thoroughly successful.345

A more recent example, involved the training of the Burundi National Defense Force in best practice for
C-IED detection. The US Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force Africa (S PMAGTF), which is specifically trained to support US and partner interests throughout the US Africa Command area of responsibility, trained the National Defense Force for 10 weeks, ending in November 2014. The same group (S PMAGTF) worked with the Uganda People’s Defense Force, focusing solely on detection techniques and safety precautions when dealing with IEDs. This training began in October 2014 and ended in December the same year, and “covered the basics for what steps each UPDF soldier can take to keep themselves and their fellow soldiers safe if they encounter an IED”.346

Such training is increasingly important in a region which is seeing more and more IED attacks. It is crucial that those likely to encounter IEDs, including police and military personnel, know how to safely clear an area and then defuse an IED. The practice of training a smaller number of personnel who can then use these skills to train others in their national armies or police forces is extremely important, and is an efficient means through which information can be quickly and accurately shared.

4.3 ACLED

Other regional initiatives have also set in place a path for progress with regard to data collection and information sharing on IEDs. Organisations such as the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP),347 and the European Bomb Data System (EBDS)348 all are leading data groups involved – at least in part – in cataloguing the harm wrought by IEDs. However, many of these efforts to record and share data are often limited in use as they are only available to the members of the organisation, or are not easily searchable.349

Take for example the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). ACLED covers all African countries from 1997 to the present, and South and South-East Asia in real-time. It claims to be the “most comprehensive public collection of political violence and protest data for developing states”.350 It contains information on the specific dates and locations of political violence, the type of event, the groups involved, fatalities and changes in territorial control.

The database contains historic data from 1997, and is updated on a real-time basis. Over 100,000 incidents had been recorded as of early 2016.351 The aim of the project is for data to be able to be used for analysis and mapping of political violence across developing countries, as well as informing humanitarian and development work in crisis and conflict-affected areas through their real-time data updates and reports. The database can be downloaded for free by the public.

Although not aimed as a C-IED effort, IED incidents are captured by the database, but the type of weapon used in an incident is not specifically noted. Every ACLED incident requires at least one source, and the source is contained in the database. While the link to the source is not included, the publication details are, thus enabling the user to find the original source. Caithriona Dowd, Senior Researcher at ACLED, told AOAV that “for many events, a combination of sources is reviewed for information on a single event, with the intention of triangulating data from a variety of sources”. The data is collected by individual researchers, and inputted into the database manually.

The ACLED data is not coded by weapon type. The database is extremely comprehensive, but it is difficult to search it by incident caused by IEDs. The only way to do this is to manually search through the “notes” field, and identify individual incidents which have been caused by IEDs. With a database containing over 100,000 incidents, this is time-consuming and inefficient. However, it serves to show the possibility of C-IED data collection of this type and the potential impact of this type of record and intelligence.

4.4 TSCTP AND PREACT

Both the TSCTP and PREACT were established by the US. The TSCTP was established in 2005, in order to build regional counterterrorism capacity and aid in the cooperation between the member states. The activities engaged in have seen border movements strengthened and the improved monitoring of the financing of terrorism. TSCTP members include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. Many of these states have been significantly impacted by the IEDs used by extremist groups.

TSCTP has witnessed successes despite the unstable political climate. For example, cooperation between partners Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, has seen them form a Multinational Joint Task Force to counter Boko Haram alongside Benin. This has allowed significant progress to be made, and though tensions remain, a cooperative effort like the MNJTF would have been
less likely without the TSCTP. Responsibility for the programme was transferred from EUCOM and CENTCOM to AFRICOM in 2008. However, between 2009 and 2013, U.S. agencies allocated $288 million in funding and disbursed about half that amount. 352

PREACT was established four years later than the TSCTP, in 2009. Active PREACT partners include Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda. Burundi, Comoros, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan, and Sudan are also members of PREACT. PREACT sought to establish greater capacity of the East African nations in their response to counterterrorism. In order to achieve this the main focus was primarily on improving the cooperation between states main counterterrorism agencies, such as law enforcement, including police, border security, customs, military, and civilian actors. PREACT targeted the main networks that IEDs rely, including financing, border controls and community influence.

The initiative hopes to build the inter-agency cooperation between states through facilitating joint training exercises and seminars. PREACT has also seen the provision of communication equipment to aid state implementation. 353

Both PREACT and TSCTP have integrated countering violent extremism strategies into partner states. Such initiatives are aimed at challenging the root causes of radicalisation, such as unemployment and disenfranchisement. This has seen initiatives targeted at youth that seek to build skills and empower. At a community level outreach services may be provided as part of further community development. 354

TSCTP has been operating for over a decade and the situation in some of these regional countries, specifically Mali, has deteriorated. However, whilst the terrorist impacts in Mali increased during this time, what is also noticeable is the regional response and support as well as that from the international community. Whilst the initiatives have improved capacity of the nation states, more focus could be placed upon the cooperative efforts of the regional nations, particularly in the area of intelligence sharing.
5. INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

“Ultimately, the impact of any approaches to counter the IED threat will be of limited effect without a comprehensive international approach to disrupt the networks and enablers.”

There has been increasing demand for action within the international community concerning the growing IED threat and the terrorist network that enables it. In recognition of this, the Government of Afghanistan proposed a resolution to the United Nations General Assembly and in December 2015, resolution 70/46 titled “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices” was adopted. The resolution encouraged states to not only adopt their own national policy to C-IED but also urged state “measures to support international and regional efforts”, as well as enhance their “international and regional cooperation, including the sharing of information on good practices”.

The reason Afghanistan put forward the resolution to the UN was to foster an international holistic effort to confront the root causes of IED harm. The Afghanistan Ambassador to the United Nations, in an interview highlighted later in this report, emphasised the importance of not just international cooperation, but also of multilateral collaboration where non-state actors, such as civil society and private industry have a C-IED role to play.

It is a nuanced critique that may be levelled at a number of international C-IED initiatives. Until we see a unified global C-IED effort with a focus on information sharing, like that encouraged by Afghanistan, the networks using IEDs will remain difficult to defeat.

5.1 INTERNATIONAL BOMB DATA CENTER WORKING GROUP

Many efforts remain limited because states put too much focus on particular C-IED actors and approaches, such as military or police. For example, the International Bomb Data Center Working Group (IBDCWG), formed in 2005, engages over 40 member nations from across the globe, 12 nations who participate with observer status, and four observing organisations. They partake in information sharing at conferences and through an online portal that also facilitates encrypted chat between the members. However, members of the IBDCWG must be government agencies responsible for the management of technical intelligence and information related to the unlawful use of explosives – except for the four exceptions – this means a great deal of valuable knowledge from non-state C-IED actors is not shared in this forum. Furthermore, many of the most impacted nations from IEDs and top explosive importers and exporters are not involved in this project.

Throughout the international C-IED community it is steadily being recognised that a variety of groups need to engage and slowly C-IED efforts are seeing diverse actors cooperating internationally.

5.2 AXON GLOBAL IED PARTNERSHIP

The AXON Global IED Partnership started as a trial in 2014 on the initiative of the Australian Defence Force. It sought to “share unclassified raw IED event data and collaborate on common issues globally across jurisdictions employing a common language”. Principally, it engaged some of the most important state and international C-IED actors, allowing them equal access to shared information over a secure web portal and an avenue for greater cooperation. AXON demonstrated that states and international actors can strike a balance in sharing information on such sensitive areas. Despite this success, the Project Manager, Major Simon Patching, indicated to AOAV how much work still needs to be done to see information sharing of this type flourish, as the default position too often sees all IED event data protected.

AXON’s engagement of both state and international actors was commendable, but involvement of an even greater range of actors is still necessary. Engaging state officials and international institutions alone leaves crucial avenues of information untapped, mostly those within civil society and businesses.

5.3 PROGRAMME GLOBAL SHIELD

A programme that seeks to encompass some of these overlooked areas is PGS. PGS was developed in 2010 by the World Customs Organisation (WCO) in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL). It aims to “counter the illicit diversion and trafficking of explosive precursor chemicals that might be used to manufacture IEDs”.

5. IN TERNAT IONAL INITIATIVES
The programme’s four avenues of action are training, practical support, intelligence sharing and industry outreach.

PGS have had to overcome challenges to information sharing such as the lack of political will and engaging with those who do not have the legal authority to share identifying data. Mr Leigh Winchell, the Deputy Director of Compliance and Enforcement at the WCO, also identified cooperation as a challenge but also as the key to progress. In response to this challenge, they have specifically tried to overcome distrust between partners through operational coordination meetings focused on building trust and fostering greater cooperation between all actors in the region. Their specific focus is on building trust between customs and law enforcement. It is hoped this will encourage further investigations into seizures, which means that those supplying and buying the chemicals can be held accountable.

Despite the challenges, the scale of the information sharing and those involved with PGS was unprecedented, and has seen growing partnership between industry and customs. In particular, the engagement with industry has had a large impact and seen the chemical suppliers develop mechanisms to validate customers, report suspicious activity and report lost or stolen goods. Industry cooperation with customs and law enforcement has led to greater success with seizures of chemical IED materials, as well as complete IEDs and other IED materials such as detonators, alongside the legal trade in the chemicals.

Within this spirit of cooperation, the WCO have fostered important relationships with other C-IED actors to strengthen the impact of their work. These actors include other law enforcement orientated actors such as INTERPOL, as well as NGOs who assist with providing data and awareness raising.

Although PGS has a global reach with the involvement of over 90 countries, they are currently focused on the Central Asian region. This means their awareness raising seminars and training are limited to these countries. They are seeking to expand to the North Africa region as well, a region that would highly benefit from such efforts, but this is reliant on donor funding. The WCO also operate other C-IED programs based on similar cooperative initiatives, such as the Container Control Programme and Strategic Trade Control Enforcement Project.

5.4 INTERPOL

In a similar respect much progress has been made through the development of these older organisations. An actor that has been leading the way in C-IED is INTERPOL, an intergovernmental organisation, established in 1923, which facilitates international police cooperation. With 190 member countries, it is the world’s largest international police organisation, with the role of enabling “police around the world to work together to make the world a safer place”. CBRNE terrorism prevention has been a top priority in INTERPOL and a vital aspect of this is collecting and sharing information.

The Chase Programme focuses on precursor materials used to make IEDs and engages not just police but also border forces, customs, immigration and security agencies in a collaborative effort, whilst also providing training to increase C-IED capabilities and expanding their information exchange network.

INTERPOL’s Chemical and Explosive Countermeasures Programme, aimed at law enforcement, government bodies and chemical industry partners, also seeks to facilitate cooperation with all sections of the chemical industry. This enables the early detection of those seeking to acquire chemicals for IED prior to attacks. What makes INTERPOL successful is its highly collaborative nature and its recognition of the key role of private industry in C-IED.

As well as encouraging member states to share information, Interpol itself cooperates with a number of international organisations. Such organisations include Europol, the World Customs Organisation, EU CBRN Centres of Excellence, and UN agencies including the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute.

INTERPOL has previously demonstrated impressive leadership in bringing together parties to combat IED networks. However, there has been some uncertainty regarding the extent of the organisation’s ongoing engagement. It is hoped that INTERPOL’s expertise in addressing the criminal spread of IED usage continues to build on its past strengths. INTERPOL demonstrates the ability and the necessity to cooperate with all C-IED actors to address the threat effectively.
5.5 GLOBAL COALITION TO COUNTER ISIL

The Global Coalition to Counter ISIL is made up of over 60 state members all with the express task of defeating IS. Each state contributes military forces or resources, or both, as part of the initiative.

Some countries, particularly those in the West, such as the US, UK and France, carry out military efforts such as airstrikes to combat IS in Iraq and Syria or training. These states also include strong military powers in the Middle East like Jordan. Operation Inherent Resolve makes up the military component of the coalition. Some states chose to only operate in either Iraq or Syria, due to a number of varying reasons, such as capacity, location, or affiliations. The Building Partner Capacity (BPC) training in Iraq was designed to train Iraqi Army and Peshmerga units in various tactical subjects to include C-IED, an area both requested training in. Many of the BPC initiatives have focused on training, but have also seen provision of C-IED equipment for Iraqi forces. This engagement has seen a considerable improvement in military and police C-IED capabilities across Iraq.

Others states, such as Cyprus and Jordan, allow Western and other more remote allies to use their bases to conduct training or air strikes, as well as aid drops. Israel, though not a part of the Coalition, provides intelligence to assist in the counter ISIL operations. Some Middle East states focus on their own borders whilst remaining a part of the coalition. Other states are engaged through the provision of aid. For example, Japan granted $6 million in emergency aid for displaced people in Northern Iraq.

The Coalition’s Strategic Communications Working Group seeks to counteract the threat of IS’s recruitment and other propaganda efforts. The Stabilisation Working Group addresses the humanitarian crisis left in the wake of IS. The Counter-ISIL Finance Group aims to stop the flow of funding to IS through assisting state efforts to monitor and investigate terrorism financing, alongside other preventative efforts. Lastly, the coalition’s working group on Foreign Terrorist Fighters seeks to stop the flow of terrorist fighters into Iraq and Syria.

INTERPOL has joined the coalition in supporting these efforts – stemming the flow of foreign fighters and finance. It is hoped that INTERPOL’s engagement will encourage greater law enforcement involvement in the Coalition efforts. As it is the civilian and law enforcement efforts that would stem resurgence of IS once military efforts have conducted their tasks.

Over 15,000 air strikes have been conducted by the coalition in Iraq and Syria, and over 30,000 personnel have been provided with training. The flow of foreign terrorist fighters to Syria and Iraq has decreased, whilst many are also leaving the group. IS fighters salaries have seen cuts and their efforts to recruit have diminished. With coalition support, local forces have captured almost 10,000 square kilometres in northeastern Syria and retaken nearly 30,000 square kilometres in Iraq, including key supply routes and other strategic areas. However, it remains difficult to gauge the effectiveness of many of the coalition’s approaches, such as the impact on IS’ finances and messaging. The US’ average daily spend on counter-IS military efforts is thought to be approximately $12.3 million.

5.6 GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM

The GCTF is an international forum established in September 2011 and compiled of 29 countries and the EU, though many more countries are involved in the GCTF’s work and engage in GCTF efforts. The GCTF also works closely with the UN and other international agencies, with whom members hold many meetings and sessions to further their counterterrorism aims. The GCTF brings together counterterrorism experts from a variety of fields, such as police, judges and border control. Through bringing together counterterrorism experts the forum hopes to use the expertise to develop tools, knowledge and strategies to combat the terrorist threat faced today.

These efforts are largely considered counterterrorism but if they work they will significantly reduce the threat of IEDs. Much of this work is preventative, targeting the aspects of society and behaviour that leads to an IED attack or other terrorist event.

The areas that the GCTF has a particular focus on include:

- Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law
- Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
- Detention and Reintegration
- Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF)
- Sahel Region Capacity-Building
- Horn of Africa Capacity-Building
Each of these areas has its own working group and events to target the particular issue or location.

The Africa-focused working groups focus on these highly impacted locations to address the specific terrorist threats in these locations. This sees the impacted states and other regional bodies engaged in the efforts of the GCTF. The working groups build on the initiatives already operating in the region, such as TSCTP and PREACT, and utilising the shared knowledge and resources to enhance regional effectiveness and reinforce collaboration.

5.7 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM (ICT)

The ICT was founded in 1996, and records global terrorist attacks, terrorist organisations and activists in addition to statistical reports. Its “Incidents and Activists Database” is a comprehensive survey of open sources of intelligence, and is “one of the most all-encompassing non-governmental resources on terrorist incidents in the world.” The database has recorded over 33,000 terrorist incidents since 1975, including information on successful terrorist attacks, foiled attacks, and counter-terrorism operations. It also includes background and follow-up information.

A monthly report is published by the ICT, providing a summary and analysis of terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism operations, and an annual report is released.

The ICT database includes information on suicide attacks and bombings, including IED attacks. The aim of the report, as stated by the ICT, is to identify patterns and trends of world-wide terrorist activity, which includes the scale and impact of IEDs. The report includes details of casualty figures, perpetrators, targets, organisations associated with each attack, sources of funding, and weapons used.

ICT’s global framing is broken down into regions and countries, and focuses on the most significant incidents. The ICT is an academic institute and relies solely on private donations and revenue from events, projects and programs. The ICT reports do not mention a particular methodology, except for stating that they use open sources. In the reports themselves, incidents are referenced to news reports, but without hyperlinks. For example, an incident may be coded as: “BBC, “British pair who travelled to Syria admit terror charges”, July 8, 2014”.

The data is reported in annual and monthly PDF reports, and no public database is available. This means that the data is not particularly searchable. While the reports include information regarding weapon types used in each attack, there is no way to search for results involving IEDs. Manually reviewing each incident would be required. The reports only record those incidents defined as “terrorist”. This excludes those attacks deemed not to fall under the definition of terrorism. The ICT itself acknowledges that it is an incomplete database, stating in its 2013 report that: “it should be noted that…the ICT database team tends to cover only significant attacks in “hotspot areas”, such as Iraq and Syria, and major incidents with high casualty figures.”

In addition to data collection, ICT is an academic institute and think tank providing expertise in issues such as terrorism and counter-terrorism. It facilitates information sharing by policymakers and academics, and allows the sharing of research papers, situation reports, and academic publications.

ICT highlights the need for a global IED database to ensure IED incidents are monitored effectively, so that trends and patterns may be identified. Currently there is no database monitoring global IED use specifically.

5.8 INTERNATIONAL C-IED LEADERS’ FORUM

The inaugural International C-IED Leaders’ Forum took place just last year, between 2 and 4 September 2015, in Canberra, Australia, and was hosted by INTERPOL, the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Department of Defence. It sought to gather key representatives from various C-IED areas, such as government, law enforcement and military services.

The aim of the Forum was to improve the cooperation between states and the range of C-IED actors. It is hoped that the Forum will provide a platform through which C-IED leaders will engage and partake in information sharing to better target the networks that facilitate IED use. The Forum managed to engage some of the most senior C-IED leaders from states as well as organisations such as the UN and NATO.

The forum’s main focuses are: component controls, capacity building, public awareness and information sharing. It appeared to build on the efforts and lessons of AXON and sought to establish a “whole of government” approach within partner states and work with the
information sharing oriented towards the “need to share” principle.  

A key outcome of the inaugural Forum, at a multilateral level, was the development and launch of the C-IED Global Alliance Strategy, to combat the global IED threat. The International C-IED Leaders’ Forum recognised the holistic approach needed to confront IEDs through cooperation not just between all C-IED arms within a state but also across states. The Forum promoted both these types of cooperation and emphasised the importance of both aspects for a comprehensive global C-IED approach. It is hoped that the lessons continue to be implemented and a successful holistic approach is adopted which engages all types of C-IED actors.
6. CONCLUSION

Significant developments have been made with national, bilateral, regional and international C-IED initiatives, particularly in regard to military efforts and the progress in information sharing. However, there are still considerable shortcomings in C-IED. Evidently, the networks creating IEDs still demonstrate better information sharing than those trying to stop them do. The increased lethality of IEDs is becoming a global problem. 2015 saw more countries impacted by suicide bombings than ever before. It is clear that there is still much more to be done to effectively combat IED harm, and it becomes ever more apparent that a more collaborative holistic approach is required.

Whilst bilateral, regional and international efforts have engaged national forces that have requested such assistance in C-IED training, many of these highly impacted nations have still been left without the adequate resources to carry out C-IED effectively. Many are without basic C-IED equipment, funds for personnel, or even basic resources such as electricity. Those engaged in training and assisting impacted nations should ensure that the training they are given is compatible with the resources available or that actions are taken to ensure they receive the resources required to carry out C-IED effectively. The lack of resources has meant that in some cases, despite training, the task of search and clearance has often been left to international actors or private companies. Occasionally, it has even been ignored, leaving contaminated areas – homes, roads and other land – untouchable; leaving a devastating impact on lives and economies.

Victim assistance, especially for those psychologically impacted, remains largely ignored. Some small-scale studies have been conducted and some assistance has been provided to military personnel, but when civilians are increasingly becoming the target, far more needs to be done in this area for all those impacted. Psychological impacts may be less visible but are important to address, especially when a conflict-inflicted area is looking to develop stability and peace. This support may help combat the culture of fear caused by the use of IEDs – a fear that terrorist groups can manipulate.

Many national efforts have been taken to counter violent extremism, focusing on religious, community and educational institutions. These are often targeted at the youth, and increasingly those that have already carried out extremist acts. More recent initiatives in the international realm have also sought to facilitate counter-extremism efforts. Such efforts include the King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID), an initiative that seeks to cross faith boundaries and encourage understanding and tolerance.

When it comes to regional and international efforts, what is clear is that many of the utensils available to the international community are being left unharnessed or unimplemented. Within civil society and private businesses, there are information databases that could aid substantially with C-IED work. However, such information often remains disaggregated or overlooked. The most successful C-IED initiatives are those that are working collaboratively, such as the MNJTF or PGS, though many of those are struggling due to funding.

Despite a wide acceptance that some information on an IED event may have to remain classified for security reasons, there is also a growing sense of frustration that this principle is too deeply rooted in the psyche of many nations and C-IED actors, and that this unnecessarily prevents C-IED progress. Even whilst conducting the research for this report, much resistance was encountered to sharing information, even upon seemingly unsensitive information. Vice Chief of the Australian Defence Force, VADM Ray Griggs, gave a speech to the International Counter-Improvised Explosives Device Leaders’ Forum, in which he called for a re-balancing of these principles, with more weight being given to the information sharing based on greater understanding of the actors involved and the threat being faced. C-IED actors must imaginatively reassess what they do and do not share, and be better prepared to engage in information sharing.

A priority for information sharing must be the communication of data such as the sale or purchase of large and
suspicious transactions of things like dual-use precursor materials between countries. Such sharing should involve both law enforcement and those industries involved in such trade. As efforts to secure stockpiles and ERW/UXO have greatly improved, terrorists are increasingly using commercially manufactured materials that allow them to build more sophisticated IEDs on a larger scale.

The C-IED efforts of the international community are progressing, and new initiatives do seek to build on previously learnt lessons. The initiative of the International C-IED Leaders’ Forum is an example of this, where new efforts seek to provide a holistic approach to C-IED with the involvement of a range of actors involved in all strands of C-IED. It is hoped that all C-IED initiatives recognise their interconnectedness with other areas of C-IED and seek to build cooperative and coordinated efforts to tackle the IED scourge.
The profiles of the over 200 C-IED mentioned in the report can be seen on AOAV. Below you can find the groups/organisations working on C-IED projects.374

Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF)
Afghanistan National Police C-IED
Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP)
Airbus Defence and Space – Qatar
Al Wefaq
Algerian Gendarmerie
AMISOM
Arab League
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)
Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG)
Australian Defence Force (ADF)
AXON The Global IED Partnership
BACTEC - Lebanon
Baghdad Operations Command
Bahrain Coast Guard
Bahrain Public Security Forces
Bancroft Global Development - Somalia
Bomb Disposal Squad – Pakistani Police
British Army Counter-IED/EOD units
Cameroon military EOD/C-IED
Center for Documentation of Violations in Syria
Central Service for the Fight Against Terrorism
Centre de Perfectionnement aux Actions post conflictuelles de Démage et Dépollution, Center for Humanitarian Demining (CPADD)
Centre National de Déminage (CND)
Chadian National Police
Civilian Joint Task Force
Combat Engineering Corps (Israel)
Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR)
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
Counter-IED Directorate (CSTC-A C-IED Directorate)
Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (MONEYVAL)
Conflict Armament Research - Iraq
Conflict Armament Research - Lebanon
Conflict Armament Research - Syria
Council of Imams and Religious Dignitaries of Cameroon (CIDIMUC)
Cyprus Police
DanChurchAid - Eritrea
DanChurchAid – Lebanon
DanChurchAid – Libya
DanChurchAid – Mali
DanChurchAid – South Sudan
DanChurchAid – Syria
Danish Demining Group (DDG) – Afghanistan
Danish Demining Group (DDG) – Iraq
Danish Demining Group (DDG) - Kenya
Danish Demining Group (DDG) – Libya
Danish Demining Group (DDG) – Mali
Danish Demining Group (DDG) – Nigeria
Danish Demining Group (DDG) – Sahel: Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso
Danish Demining Group (DDG) – Somalia
Danish Demining Group (DDG) – Syria
Danish Demining Group (DDG) – Tunisia
Danish Demining Group (DDG) – Turkey
Danish Demining Group (DDG) – Yemen
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) - Chad
DSA Detection
Dynasafe – Afghanistan
Dynasafe – Chad
Dynasafe – Iraq
Dynasafe – Kuwait
Dynasafe – Libya
Dynasafe – Mali
Dynasafe – South Sudan
Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group
Egmont Group
Egyptian Armed Forces (C-IED/EOD teams)
Eitan Lidor
Ethiopia National Defense Force
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Peace Support Training Centre (FDREPSTC)
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
Free Fields Foundation
G4S - Mali
G4S – Morocco
G4S - Saudi Arabia
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining – Algeria
Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)
Muqaddamin
National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (Jordan)
National Counterterrorism Center
National Intelligence and Security Services
National Mine Action Authority (PNDHD) in Mauritania
National Mine Action Authority (NMMA) – South Sudan
National Mine Action Committee (NMAC) (Yemen)
National Police – Senegal
NATO C-IED COE
NATO Resolute Support Mission (Afghanistan)
New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)
Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF)
Nigeria police EOD/C-IED
Norwegian People’s Aid – Iraq
Norwegian People’s Aid – Lebanon
Norwegian People’s Aid - Mauritania
Norwegian People’s Aid - South Sudan
Norwegian People’s Aid – Western Sahara
Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA)
Operation Barkhane
Optima Group - Mali
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
PAE in Kuwait
Pakistan Security Forces C-IED units
Pakistan Air Forces EOD School
Pakistan Ulema Council
Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF)
Palestinian Mine Action Center
Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT)
Police and Gendarmerie – Burkina Faso
Polisario Front – SPLA
Programme Global Shield
Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC)
Quadro Projects and Technologies
Royal Oman Police
Sahel-Sahara Development and Security Strategy (SDSS)
Sabaoon Rehabilitation Center
Sakina Campaign for Dialogue
SITA – Oman
Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC)
Spanish Army Demining and EOD personnel
Spirit of America in Niger
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action – Iraq
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action – Libya
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action - Mali
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
Task Force Al Asad (TFAA)
Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa
(Groupe d’Action contre le blanchiment d’Argent en Afrique Centrale (GABAC))
Task Group Taji (TG Taji)
The Development Initiative – Kuwait
The Development Initiative – Mali
The Development Initiative – Somalia
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
Tripartite (United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan)
Counter-IED Working Group
Tunisian Security Forces C-IED/EOD
Turkish Customs Administration
Turkish National Police – Bomb Disposal and Investigations Division
Ulema Council of Afghanistan
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – Yemen
United Nations Mine Action Service – Eritrea
United Nations Mine Action Service – Iraq
United Nations Mine Action Service – Lebanon
United Nations Mine Action Service - Libya
United Nations Mine Action Service – Gaza
United Nations Mine Action Service – South Sudan
United Nations Mine Action Service – Sudan
United Nations Mine Action Service – Syria
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
US Department of State Office of Antiterrorism (ATA)
US Marine Corps C-IED units
Vigilance Committees
Vox Peccavi
Yemen Coast Guard
Yemen intelligence services
Yemen Anti-terrorism units
198 AFP, ‘US to fund multi-million-dollar Tunisia border surveillance’, March 26 2016,
See http://www.acleddata.com/
See http://www.acleddata.com/
General Assembly resolution 70/46, Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, A/RES/70/46 (11 December 2015), available from undocs.org/A/RES/70/46
Interview transcript.
The 30 founding members are: Algeria, Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, EU, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, UAE, UK, US.
Improvised Threat Management, private C-IED focused company, expressed in a questionnaire response that they conduct research in the psychological impact of IEDs. The findings of which, though difficult to find, have been disseminated through articles on social media.